










Behavioural Economic Applications to Climate Change 
Mitigation and Adaptation  






Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
School of Economics 















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 

























This thesis contributes to the economics of climate change by incorporating insights from 
behavioural economics. As both mitigation and adaptation are components of any climate 
change strategy, the four papers presented here use laboratory and field experiments to examine 
different dimensions of individuals’ mitigation and adaptive behaviour.  
 
The papers in Section 1 utilise framed public good games to focus on two different aspects of 
the public goods dilemma synonymous with climate change mitigation. In this context, the first 
paper ‘What is fair? An experimental guide to climate negotiations’ examines the degree 
to which the use of particular burden-sharing principles in multilateral climate change 
negotiations reflects self-interest. The multi-country public good game is conducted with a 
sample of individuals from the United States, European Union, China, India and South Africa. 
The results signal the use of the historical and future polluter-pays rules by American and 
Chinese participants to reflect self-interest. 
 
The potential for groups of heterogeneous individuals to meet a collective emission-reduction 
target through individual contributions is examined in the second paper: ‘Cooperation and 
Climate Change: Can Communication Facilitate the Provision of Public Goods in 
Heterogeneous Agents?” Heterogeneity is framed as differences in participants’ marginal 
abatement costs. While communication promotes cooperation, even when heterogeneity is 
present, the non-binding nature of communication results in the two dominant contribution 
strategies of free-riding and perfect-cooperation.  
 
The papers in Section 2 examine the role of risk and uncertainty in individuals’ adaptive 
strategies. The correlation between risk attitudes and individuals’ flood adaptation strategies is 
examined in the third paper: ‘Risk Attitudes and Adaptation: Experimental Evidence from 
a Flood Prone Urban Informal Settlement in South Africa.’ Risk attitudes are elicited from 
a series of lottery tasks conducted across a sample of individuals living in a flood-prone urban 
informal settlement. The results indicate that individuals adopting more effective (and costly) 
adaptation strategies are more risk averse.  
 
The fourth paper ‘Risk Preferences, Technology Adoption and Insurance Uptake’ uses 
lottery tasks and a framed insurance game to examine whether the provision of a framed index 
insurance product induces individuals to opt into riskier but potentially more profitable 
activities. Experiment participants are small-scale and subsistence urban food growers. The 
results indicate that risk-averse individuals are more likely to opt into traditional agriculture 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has described climate change as 
unequivocal: surface temperatures are rising as concentrations of greenhouse gases increase 
(IPCC 2013).1  Likely current-century consequences of climate change include increased 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (heat waves, storms and hurricanes), sea-
level rise and altered precipitation patterns (Goulder and Pizer 2006). These changes can, in 
turn, impact significantly on the well-being of ecosystems, wildlife and humans, through 
more frequent flooding and droughts and an increase in heat-related illnesses (Stern Review 
2006, IPCC 2007). The livelihoods of the poor are likely to be most adversely affected as 
climate-change-related hazards manifest through a reduction in crop yields, increased food 
prices and food insecurity, damage to home and property and even displacement (IPCC 
2013).   
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis examines the implications of certain insights from 
behavioural economics for climate change policy. More specifically, any public policy 
response must address both mitigation and adaption (to be discussed in the proceeding 
subsections). In this context, the papers in this thesis consider: (i) self-interested use of 
equity preferences and, more so, the impact of material self-interest on cooperation in the 
negotiating process; (ii) the effect of heterogeneous mitigation costs on cooperation in 
meeting a domestic emission-reduction target; (iii) the relationship between risk attitudes 
and choice of adaptation strategy in the context of uncertainty around the timing and severity 
of climate variability; and (iv), the relationship between risk attitudes and adaptation when 




Mitigation, in which the sources of greenhouse gas emissions are reduced (IPCC 2014), is a 
vital component of any strategy addressing climate change.  
                                                          
1 Where climate change relates to changes in the mean and/or variability of the climate (for example 
temperature, extreme weather events, precipitation) that persist for an extended duration (typically decades or 
longer), due in part to anthropogenic activities (IPCC 2013). Note that the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Article 1) attributes climate change directly to human activity – 














Within this context of mitigation, climate change typifies a global collective action problem in 
as much as the emissions of any agent (an individual, company or country, for example) affect 
other agents and accumulate in the atmosphere over time, mixing globally (IPCC 2013, Brekke 
and Johansson-Stenman 2008). More specifically, climate change mitigation exemplifies the 
collective action problem known as a public good dilemma; specifically, while there is broad 
consensus that a significant reduction of greenhouse gases is needed to reduce the risk of 
dangerous climate change, as the benefits of (costly) mitigation are shared equally by all 
irrespective of individual contribution, there is considerable incentive to free ride (Hasson et 
al. 2010, Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008). 
 
The current model for tackling climate change is a top-down approach in terms of which 
emission reduction targets are first negotiated at multilateral climate talks and then 
implemented at a domestic level by national governments, through the formulation of climate 
policy. In both these international and domestic settings, since no single country or individual 
can adequately provide the public good of mitigation and significant incentives for free-riding 
tend to prevail, widespread participation is needed for climate policy to be effective (Ringius 
et al. 2002). With respect to the implementation of international environmental agreements, no 
single supranational authority can enforce cooperation and, in a domestic setting, in instances 
where cooperation can be enforced through penalties for non-compliance, monitoring, 
verification and enforcement is costly. 
 
On a global scale, international environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol require 
countries with divergent levels of income and historical responsibility for emissions to agree 
on how best to distribute an abatement burden and apportion future entitlements to emissions. 
On a country level, reducing a national greenhouse gas inventory requires a change in 
behaviour from both industry sectors and individuals, both of which categories are asymmetric 
as regards income, energy consumption, abatement costs and historical emissions. As such, 
climate change mitigation is a prime example of a public good dilemma in which stakeholders 
are heterogeneous.  
 
Furthermore, given the historical responsibility of developed nations for the existing stock of 
greenhouse gases, combined with both the greater vulnerability of developing economies to 













has become a cornerstone of the global climate change debate. Specifically, the 1998 Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC in Article 10 exemplifies this sentiment by stating the need for 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” according to specific “national and regional 
development priorities” (UNFCCC, 1992).  
 
There is a large behavioural economic literature offering insights into the conditions under 
which people cooperate, even when it is not in their own self-interest to do so (Brekke and 
Johansson-Stenman 2008). The experimental evidence indicates that people are, to some 
extent, concerned with achieving outcomes that they perceive to be fair.2 However, several 
studies also provide evidence of a self-serving bias, under which individuals’ judgement of 
what is fair is often aligned with their own self-interest (Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein 
1996, Babcock and Loewenstein 1997 and Babcock et al. 1997). In relation to climate 
negotiations, since different equity principles have different cost implications for different 
countries, the use of a particular equity principle may be based on fairness considerations or, 
alternatively, may reflect self-interest (for example to soften the emission-reduction target 
allocated to your particular country (Lange et al. 2007, Lange et al. 2010, Ringius et al. 2002, 
Carlsson et al. 2013).  
 
Furthermore, and again implying a preference for fairness, the experimental evidence from 
public good games with symmetric players and sanctioning reflects the contribution norm of 
equal contributions (Reuben and Riedl 2013).3 However, in a climate change setting 
characterised by heterogeneity, it is not immediately clear whether individuals will be able to 
reach consensus on a contribution norm. While communication has been found to be effective 
in facilitating cooperation in public good games in a homogeneous setting (Gächter and 
Herrmann 2009), when players are heterogeneous, communication might prove to be 
counterproductive, emphasising dissimilarities between players and amplifying disagreement, 
rather than fostering cooperation.  
  
                                                          
2 For example, contrary to theory, people make positive (although often suboptimal) contributions in public good 
games (Ledyard 1995). Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) find that cooperation reflects 
the norm of conditional cooperation which prescribes cooperation if group members cooperate and defection if 
group members defect. Laboratory experiments also provide evidence consistent with reciprocity, in which 
subjects reward kind actions toward them and punish unkind actions (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008, 
Gachter and Hermann 2009).  
3 In games with punishment opportunities, a number of authors have found that punishment increases as the 
differential between individual contributions and average group contributions widens (Fehr and Gächter 2000, 













To examine outcomes within this context, the first paper of this thesis “What is fair? An 
experimental guide to climate negotiations” considers the role of equity in multilateral 
climate change negotiations and, more specifically, the self-interested use of burden-sharing 
principles. The second paper “Cooperation and Climate Change: Can Communication 
Facilitate the Provision of Public Goods in Heterogeneous Settings?” explores the potential 
for cooperation in meeting a national emission-reduction target when individuals are 
heterogeneous. These papers are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.  
 
1.1 What is fair? An experimental guide to climate negotiations 
 
Multilateral climate change negotiations and international environmental agreements are 
mechanisms through which to coordinate a global response to climate change. In this collective 
action problem, no single country can unilaterally provide the public good of mitigation, no 
supranational authority exists to enforce cooperation, and countries are incentivised to free-
ride given the public good characteristics of climate change mitigation (Brekke and Johansson-
Stenman 2008, Lange et al. 2010). As such, where voluntary cooperation across countries is 
needed to reduce emissions, equity principles are commonly used in multilateral climate 
negotiations to guide the discourse (Lange et al. 2007). While choice of burden-sharing 
principle purportedly reflects negotiators’ fairness ideals, because the application of different 
equity principles translates into different financial costs and reduction obligations, the use of 
equity principles likely also reflects economic self-interest (Ringius et al. 2002).  
 
Under these assumptions, employing a threshold public good game with a climate change 
framing, real monetary incentives, and drawing on a cross-section of individuals from the 
United States, the European Union, China, India and South Africa, this multi-country study 
examines the degree to which the use of burden-sharing principles reflects self-interest. In an 
initial treatment, participants, who represent the country of which they are a national, choose 
between various burden-sharing principles. In a subsequent treatment, drawing inspiration 
from Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”, participants are unaware of which country they represent, 
and are randomly allocated to a country after making their decision. The burden-sharing 
principles incorporated into the experiment include the egalitarian rule (equal per capita 













current emissions) (Lange et al. 2007, Lange et al. 2010, Cazorla and Toman 2000, Winkler et 
al. 2001, Ringius et al. 2002).  
 
The results reveal the use of the historical and future polluter-pays rule by American and 
Chinese participants to be consistent with self-interest. Conversely, there is no evidence of self-
interested use of burden-sharing principles among European participants. In both treatments 
(own and random nationality), European participants select the burden-sharing principles that 
are most costly for the European Union and that are often advocated by negotiators from 
developing countries.  
 
1.2 Cooperation and Climate Change: Can Communication Facilitate the 
Provision of Public Goods in Heterogeneous Agents? 
 
Stakeholder participation in domestic policy processes occurs in extremely complex 
environments amid large divergences in historical energy usage among different sectors of 
society, party-politics, special-interest lobbying, alternative developmental priorities and 
environmental objectives and concerns relating to social and distributive justice.  
 
Despite this complexity, the need for public good provision (meeting an emission-reduction 
target) in this domestic setting is extremely important given that while the current multilateral, 
top-down, rules-based approach of the Kyoto Protocol assigns each country a quantifiable and 
binding emission-reduction target, each country formulates and implements its own domestic 
climate policy agenda. In this context, this article considers the role of communication (and by 
extension, stakeholder participation) in facilitating success in meeting a national mitigation 
obligation when a large degree of heterogeneity exists amongst those engaging in the policy 
process.   
 
To do so, using a linear public good game with a climate change framing, the experiment 
reported here examines whether groups of heterogeneous individuals can meet a collective 
emission-reduction target through individual contributions. Heterogeneity is introduced into 
the experiment by varying players’ marginal productivity to the public good. In terms of the 
experiment framing, this means that players have different marginal costs of abatement, 













relative to another player type. The experiment consists of two treatments: a standard public 
good game and a communication treatment where participants are able to communicate with 
their group members in order to discuss how best to meet the target.  
 
While communication is found to improve public good provision, even when heterogeneity is 
present, the non-binding nature of communication results in significant levels of free-riding. In 
particular, with the introduction of communication, two dominant contribution norms of free-
riding and perfect-cooperation emerge. This outcome emphasises the importance of 




Adaptation, which refers to action taken to prevent or minimise the expected adverse effects 
associated with climate change, is the sole response to the climactic impacts that will register 
over the next several decades before mitigation measures have an effect (Stern Review 2006). 
As such, the unavoidable impacts of climate change must also be addressed though adaptation 
policy (EU 2009).  
 
While there is now broad consensus regarding the consequences of climate change, there is 
continued uncertainty around the timing and severity of climate change impacts (IPCC 2013). 
Accordingly, responding to the risks inherent in climate change (through adaptation) involves 
decision-making under uncertainty.  
 
In addition to the uncertainty characterising the adverse impacts of climate change, proposed 
adaptation strategies may also have uncertain outcomes. For example, within a developing 
country context, while the adoption of new farming practices to reduce vulnerability to climate 
change has the potential to engender significant yield improvements, these practices are also 
potentially more risky relative to traditional agriculture. Mosley and Verschoor (2005) discuss 
the risk-induced poverty trap: poor individuals who are risk averse – and thus unwilling to 
invest in riskier modern inputs – will remain poor, while wealthier individuals who are in a 
position to better insulate themselves from risk will benefit from technological innovations. 













account individuals’ aversion to risk and the manner in which they make choices under 
conditions of uncertainty (Harrison et al. 2010).  
 
In this connection, the final two papers of this thesis focus on risk aversion and uncertainty in 
the context of adaptation. The third paper, “Risk Attitudes and Adaptation: Experimental 
Evidence from a Flood Prone Urban Informal Settlement in South Africa” categorises risk 
attitudes in terms of two popular theories of decision-making under uncertainty (namely: 
Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory), and examines the correlation between risk 
attitudes and choice of flood adaptation strategy. The fourth and final paper, “Risk Preferences, 
Technology Adoption and Insurance Uptake” explores the potential for index-insurance to 
induce risk-averse individuals to opt into riskier and potentially more profitable farming 
practices.  
 
2.1 Risk Attitudes and Adaptation: Experimental Evidence from a Flood-
Prone Urban Informal Settlement in South Africa 
 
This study characterises the risk attitudes and, more specifically the relationship between risk 
attitudes and flood adaptation, of a sample of individuals living in a flood-prone urban informal 
settlement. Decisions around flood adaptation involve significant stakes. In particular, 
vulnerability to flood risk – and the associated damage to property and possessions and 
diminished wellbeing – is partly determined by individuals’ choice of adaptation strategy. To 
examine this relationship further, the object of this paper is to determine the extent to which 
risk attitudes are correlated with choice of adaptation strategy.   
 
The experiment reported in this paper replicates the design of Harrison and Rutström (2009) in 
which subjects are provided with 60 lottery tasks and, for each lottery task, choose between 
two lottery pairs. While the participants partake in either a gain, mixed or loss frame, 
endowments are used to equalise the payoffs across the frames. Participants also complete a 
survey, capturing information on their demographic characteristics as well as their attitudes to 
flood adaptation. The sample consists of 174 individuals living in the BM Section of 














The results imply that flood adaptation is correlated with risk preferences. Four flood 
adaptation strategies are incorporated into the model, ranging along the spectrum from least 
effective (least costly) to most effective (most costly), namely: opt to do nothing, rely solely 
on plastic sheeting for waterproofing the floor and/or walls of the dwelling, raise the home 
above ground using sandbags, pallets or stilts, and finally, slant the roof to facilitate rainwater 
runoff. The results indicate that participants opting to slant their roofs are more risk-averse 
relative to their counterparts who opt for the remaining strategies.  
 
2.2 Risk Preferences, Technology Adoption and Insurance Uptake 
 
Subsistence farmers in developing countries who are dependent on rain-fed crop production as 
a livelihood source are extremely vulnerable to climate variability. This vulnerability is 
exacerbated by widespread poverty and limited access to credit and insurance markets. Amid 
these circumstances, key factors in the slow rate of technology diffusion in developing 
countries include risk aversion and imperfect credit and insurance markets (Giné et al. 2008, 
Giné and Yang 2009, Humphrey and Verschoor 2004).  
 
Farmers’ investment behaviour is constrained in environments where they lack access to the 
credit facilities necessary to finance new farming practices, with a number of studies showing 
adoption of new farming technologies and inputs to be correlated with wealth (Croppenstedt et 
al. 2003, Cole at al. 2013, Giné et al. 2008 and Chirwa 2005). However, even in situations 
where credit is accessible but where access to insurance is limited or non-existent, potential 
borrowers are deterred from taking loans amid the high costs associated with loan default (for 
example, in the event of crop failure) (Giné and Yang 2009). More broadly, because modern 
farming practices are potentially more profitable but also more risky, households attempting to 
insulate themselves from fluctuations in income might opt to stay with traditional agricultural 
methods (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). Risk-averse farmers might therefore opt for lower-
yielding, traditional farming technologies that do not require financing (Giné and Yang 2009). 
As such, the provision of insurance, which minimises the default costs and consumption 
fluctuations associated with production failure, should, in theory, increase adoption rates 
among risk-averse farmers.  
To disentangle the effects of credit constraints from appetite for risk, the experiment reported 













framed game is used to identify which farmers choose low-risk, low-yield strategies. Next, the 
game tests whether the provision of insurance induces those individuals who choose the low-
risk strategies in the first part of the experiment to opt into more risky but potentially more 
profitable activities in the second part. Farmers’ risk preferences are also elicited using simple 
lottery tasks for real monetary prizes.  
 
The results of this experiment indicate that risk aversion is negatively correlated with adoption 
of new farming technologies. Specifically, within the context of the framed simulations, 
individuals who are more risk averse are less likely to opt into insurance relative to traditional 
farming strategies. These results provide empirical support for the risk-induced poverty-trap 
argument, and contribute to the debate around the surprisingly low uptake of index insurance 
products. While the insurance product in this experiment is designed to reduce the loss 
experienced by the participants in the event of crop failure, it does not remove this loss entirely, 
reflecting the reality that index insurance does not remove all risk from the production process 
under real-life circumstances; specifically, even if a particular index insurance product 
completely removed the production risk associated with rainfall variability, arguably the most 
important source of production risk for farmers in developing countries, it would not pay out 
for crop damage derived from other factors (such as pests), known as basis risk (Barrett et al. 
2007). Thus, in order to overcome risk aversion among poor individuals stuck in the poverty 
cycle, and to facilitate the uptake of insurance products, basis risk and residual production risk 
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What is Fair? An Experimental Guide to Climate Negotiations 
 
Kerri Brick and Martine Visser 
 
Abstract 
International commitments to reduce emissions should ideally be negotiated between countries 
in a manner considered to be fair or equitable. While the burden-sharing principles commonly 
advocated in climate negotiations reflect different views of what constitutes a fair way to 
distribute the abatement burden, their use can also be strategically motivated to legitimise a 
specific bargaining position. In this context, using a threshold public good game with a climate 
change framing, real monetary incentives and drawing on a sample of individuals from the 
United States, the European Union, China, India and South Africa, this multi-country study 
examines the degree to which the use of burden-sharing principles reflects material self-
interest. In an initial treatment, participants, who represent the country of which they are a 
national, choose between various burden-sharing principles. In a subsequent treatment, 
drawing from Rawls’ veil of ignorance, participants are unaware of which country they 
represent and are randomly allocated to a country after making their decision. A comparison 
of participants’ choices across these two treatments indicates that the use of the historical and 
future polluter-pays rules by American and Chinese participants is consistent with material 
self-interest, or, in other words, self-interested use of burden-sharing principles.   
 
Keywords: public good game, multi-country study, multilateral climate negotiations, fairness 
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Climate science indicates that a significant reduction of greenhouse gases is needed to reduce 
the risk of catastrophic climate change. Multilateral climate change negotiations, such as the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and international 
environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, are mechanisms through which to 
coordinate a global response to climate change. In this collective action problem, no single 
country can unilaterally provide the public good of mitigation, no supranational authority exists 
to enforce cooperation and countries are incentivised to free-ride given that while there is a 
private cost associated with mitigation, the benefits are shared equally between all countries 
(Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008, Lange et al. 2010). In this setting, where voluntary 
cooperation across countries is needed to reduce emissions, climate negotiators must reach 
consensus on emission-reduction targets that are considered by the majority to be fair or 
equitable (Ringius et al. 2002). 
 
Within this context, equity is an important subtext of the climate change debate with the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC, 1992) shaping the 
narrative. More specifically, equity principles are commonly used in multilateral climate 
negotiations to guide the formulation of burden-sharing agreements (Lange et al. 2007).  
 
While choice of burden-sharing principle purportedly reflects negotiators’ fairness ideals, 
because the application of different equity principles translates into different financial costs, 
reduction obligations and carbon entitlements1, and as negotiators are directed by domestic 
politics and sentiment, the use of equity principles likely also reflects economic or material 
self-interest (Ringius et al. 2002). In this context, several studies provide evidence of a self-
serving bias – where individuals’ judgements of what is fair are often aligned with their own 
self-interest (Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein 1996, Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, 
Babcock et al. 1997, Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008). This self-serving bias is of 
particular interest in the context of multilateral climate change negotiations where, as multiple 
burden-sharing principles can conceivably be advocated by a particular country, there is room 
for self-interested use of burden-sharing principles within a large set of legitimate equity 
                                                          













arguments (Ringius et al. 2002).  In this way, negotiators may use legitimate-sounding burden-
sharing principles to prevent their country being assigned a legally binding reduction target or, 
at the very least, to minimise the target (Lange et al. 2007, 2010).  
 
While there is a large body of literature reviewing the equity principles most commonly 
advocated during climate negotiations and assessing their implications at the country-level 
(Ringius et al. 1998, Cazorla and Toman 2000, Ringius et al. 2002, Torvanger and Ringius 
2002, Torvanger and Godal  2004, Winkler et al. 2001; see Carlsson et al. 2013 for a 
discussion), few studies elicit preferences for burden-sharing principles ( with the exception of 
Lange et al. 2007, Lange et al. 2010 and Carlsson et al. 2013).  
 
In this context, the experiment reported here examines the extent to which individuals’ use of 
equity principles reflects material self-interest (in other words, whether individuals use equity 
principles in a self-serving way). To do so, when playing a threshold public good game with a 
climate change framing, participants of different nationalities choose between various equity 
principles, where each equity principle denotes a specific public good contribution. More 
specifically, the cost rankings of the respective equity principles (in terms of the associated 
public good contributions) differ across regions: for example, as will be discussed, while the 
principles of equal per capita emissions and historical polluter-pays are most costly for the 
United States (specify the largest contribution to the public good), they are least costly for 
China and India. In an initial treatment, when choosing between the various equity principles, 
each player represents the country of which they are a national (for example, the payoff 
function of the United States is relevant for the American participant). In line with the findings 
of Lange et al. (2010) and Carlsson et al. (2013), choice of equity principle for American and 
Chinese players is found to be in line with material self-interest, with both American and 
Chinese participants opting for equity principles that prescribe the smallest contribution to the 
public good and are generally synonymous with the largest payoffs.      
 
This result, that choice of burden-sharing principle is (at least partly) derived from material 
self-interest, is important in the context of multilateral climate negotiations where the equity 
principle that an agent adheres to will likely affect or shape the negotiating process (and by 
extension, the negotiation outcome). Against this background, this experiment further 
examines the impact of self-interest on the negotiating process. To do so, in a second treatment, 













do so from behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971), where they no longer know which payoff 
function is applicable to them. The results indicate that American and Chinese participants are 
both more likely to select equity principles that prescribe a larger contribution to the public 
good in the veil-of-ignorance treatment; the outcome of which is greater success in meeting the 
threshold.   
 
The burden-sharing principles incorporated into the experiment are some of those most 
commonly found in the literature and advocated in climate negotiations, namely, the egalitarian 
rule (equal per capita emissions), the polluter-pays rule and the sovereignty rule (equal 
percentage reduction of current emissions) (Lange et al. 2007, Lange et al. 2010, Cazorla and 
Toman 2000, Winkler et al. 2001, Ringius et al. 2002).2  
 
The experiment draws on a sample of university students and what are referred to as 
“practitioners”. The term practitioner refers to those individuals who frequently engage with 
climate change related issues (for example, academics and researchers, individuals from non-
governmental organisations and government officials), while students are considered to be 
more representative of the general public.  Five regions are included in the experiment, namely 
the United States (US), European Union (EU), China, India and South Africa (SA); and each 
group consists of a national from one of these regions.  
 
Building on the design of Milinski et al. (2008) and Tavoni et al. (2011), the experiment is 
designed as a provision point (threshold) public good game. In terms of the structure of the 
game, participants are provided with an endowment that is to be allocated between a public 
good or private account, where allocations to the public good are framed as mitigation. When 
the groups’ total public good contributions equals or exceeds the provision point, which is 
framed as the threshold for dangerous climate change, public good contributions are multiplied 
by some factor and divided equally among the players. The setup is thus equivalent to a 
continuous public good game (Croson and Marks 1998). In terms of the experiment framing, 
participants are told that because there are no borders in the atmosphere, a reduction in 
                                                          
2 The Ability to Pay rule, whereby wealthier countries are responsible for a greater share of the abatement burden 
(Winkler et al. 2001) is also frequently cited in both the literature and negotiations but is omitted from this design. 
As the experiment was conducted online, in the interests of keeping the design as cognitively simple as possible, 
the number of equity principles incorporated into the experiment was limited. Equity principles that emphasized 














emissions by one country is shared by all countries and, furthermore, that the return from 
mitigation (the public good) signifies the global benefits synonymous with mitigation, such as 
reduced climate variability and a reduced probability of environmental disaster.  
 
Conversely, when contributions fail to meet the threshold, players do not receive any return 
from contributions to the public good. Additionally, players representing developed countries 
lose 25% of the experimental currency units (ECUs) allocated to the private account while 
developing countries lose 50%. Once again, in terms of the framing, it is assumed that 
mitigation was not sufficient to subvert the negative effects of climate change and that each 
player (region) is obliged to use a portion of the funds in his or her private account for 
adaptation and to fund disaster relief. Developing countries will need more severe adaptation 
and disaster relief measures and thus lose a greater portion of ECUs from their private accounts.  
With respect to the design, the cost rankings (in terms of contributions to the public good) of 
the equity principles differ among the regions included in the experiment (for example, the 
historical polluter-pays principle is more costly for developed countries and thus prescribes a 
larger public good contribution for the US and EU relative to China, India and SA).  
 
Lange et al. (2010) notes that, because the financial cost associated with each equity principle 
differs among regions (in other words, the cost ranking of equity principles differs among 
regions), self-interested use of burden-sharing principles necessitates that different regions 
support different equity principles to different degrees. As such, it was important to include 
both these elements (different cost rankings and different regions) into the design.  
 
Broadly, the estimation results reveal that the use of the historical and future polluter-pays rule 
by American and Chinese participants is consistent with material self-interest. Specifically, 
when representing the US, American participants are less likely to select the principle of 
historical polluter-pays relative to other nationalities; however, this effect disappears when 
participants are randomly allocated to a country. Chinese participants are less likely to select 
the principle of future polluter-pays when representing their own nationality, but this effect 
also dissipates when the participants are randomly assigned a country. Furthermore, when 
representing the country of which they are a national, the majority of American and Chinese 
participants favour the least costly burden-sharing principles. Conversely, there is no evidence 
of self-interested use of burden-sharing principles among European and Indian participants. In 













burden-sharing principles that are most costly for the EU and that are often advocated by 
negotiators from developing countries.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: a literature review is provided in Section 2, while Section 3 
provides a description of the sample. The experiment design is outlined in Section 4. The results 
are provided in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with a discussion.  
 
2 Literature review 
 
In the context of multilateral climate negotiations, a central point of contention surrounds how 
to share a given abatement burden (Dannenberg et al. 2010). With an  incentive for free-riding, 
the absence of a supranational authority to enforce cooperative behaviour, and the need for 
widespread participation, negotiators are faced with the challenge of finding a burden-sharing 
scheme that is considered to be “fair” by a majority of governments (Ringius et al. 2002). 
Experimental evidence indicates that people are concerned about being fair to others and about 
others being fair to them. For example, contrary to theory, people make positive (although often 
suboptimal) contributions in public good games (Ledyard 1995).3  
 
Dannenberg et al. (2010) consider whether climate negotiators have a personal preference for 
equity by measuring the inequity aversion of a sample of individuals involved in climate policy, 
using a multi-country (online) experiment. The authors find that participants are averse to both 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. Overall, the authors do not find inequity 
aversion to be correlated with nationality and conclude that equity preferences (within similar 
groups of people) are not greatly influenced by cultural circumstances.   
 
Lange et al. (2007) analyse the importance of equity principles via an online survey of 
individuals of different nationalities who are involved in climate policy. While all participants 
consider equity in international climate negotiations to be important, participants from poorer 
countries place greater importance on the role of equity (relative to individuals from wealthier 
                                                          
3 Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) find that cooperation reflects the norm of conditional 
cooperation which prescribes cooperation if group members cooperate and defection if group members defect. 
Laboratory experiments also provide evidence consistent with reciprocity, in which test subjects reward kind 
actions toward them and punish unkind actions (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008, Gachter and Hermann 
2009). In games with punishment opportunities, a number of authors have found that punishment increases as the 
differential between individual contributions and average group contributions widens (Fehr and Gächter 2000, 













countries). In terms of preferences for specific equity principles, the authors find evidence of 
pure economic self-interest. Specifically, respondents from wealthier countries are less in 
favour of the polluter-pays and ability-to-pay rules (relative to poorer countries). In a 
subsequent paper, Lange et al. (2010) analyse respondents’ perceptions of the negotiating 
positions taken by the US, EU, G77/China and Russia. In particular, respondents are asked the 
extent to which each region is (in their opinion) expected to support each burden-sharing 
principle. Overall, the authors find the perceived support of equity principles by a particular 
region to be in line with economic self-interest. Specifically, the authors find that the cost 
rankings of the respective equity principles (ranking of financial cost of each equity principle 
for a particular region) are significantly (and negatively) related to their perceived support by 
the US, EU and Russia (there was no significant relationship for G77/China), signalling 
economic costs to be a major determinant of perceived use of equity principles by climate 
negotiators.  
 
Carlsson et al. (2013) use a choice experiment to investigate preferences (willingness to pay) 
for various burden-sharing principles among individuals in the US and China. Overall, in line 
with self-interested use of burden-sharing principles, respondents are found to favour the rule 
that is least costly for their country.   
 
The results reported in this article support the findings of both Lange et al. (2010) and Carlsson 
et al. (2013). 
  
The design of the public good experiment reported here draws on the work of Milinski et al. 
(2008) and Tavoni et al. (2011) who both use threshold public good games to consider the 
social dilemma synonymous with climate change. 
  
Milinski et al. consider whether a group of individuals are able to collectively reach a target 
through individual contributions when the whole group suffers when the target is not reached. 
The authors design a provision point (threshold) public good game where failure to reach the 
threshold is interpreted as failure to prevent dangerous climate change. Participants, who are 
each endowed with €40, can contribute either €0, €2 or €4 to the public good (framed as a 
climate account and synonymous with investment in climate change mitigation) in each of ten 
rounds. If total contributions after all ten rounds reach or exceed €120 (the threshold), 













to meet the threshold means that players lose all of their remaining endowment with varying 
probability (with 90%, 50% and 10% probability over different treatments). While players are 
informed of the contributions of other group members after each round, they are unable to 
communicate with one another. The authors find that groups facing a higher probability of 
losing their private-account savings are more successful in meeting the collective target; 
however, only 50% of groups met the threshold in the 90% treatment. 
 
The social dilemma implicit in the game (as in the game reported here) is that the more a player 
invests, the greater the likelihood of her group reaching the target, but the less guaranteed 
savings she retains in her private account. In addition, the greater the contributions from her 
group members, the less she needs to individually invest to guarantee reaching the target.  
 
Tavoni et al. extend the design of Milinski et al. by incorporating endowment heterogeneity 
and communication to examine the impact of inequality on cooperation and the extent to which 
communication is able to mitigate the anticipated negative effect. In the event the threshold is 
not met, all players face a 50% probability of losing the funds in their private accounts. Once 
again, players are informed of their group members’ contributions after each round. 
Endowment inequality is incorporated into the design via three inactive rounds at the start of 
the game where players’ contributions are randomly determined: in the symmetric treatment, 
all players contribute €2 per round while, in the asymmetric treatment, half the group 
contributes €0 or €4 per round, respectively, In the asymmetric treatment, rich and poor players 
enter the fourth round with €40 and €28, respectively. In certain treatments, at different 
intervals over the ten rounds, players were able to make non-binding announcements with 
respect to their intended contribution level. The results signal that inequality negatively impacts 
on coordination success – with a smaller portion of groups meeting the threshold in the 
asymmetric treatment when compared to the symmetric treatment. With the introduction of the 
non-binding announcements, the proportion of asymmetric groups meeting the threshold 
tripled and did not differ significantly to that of the symmetric groups.4    
 
                                                          
4 The primary focus of the experiment reported here is to examine the extent to which individuals’ use of equity 
principles reflects self-interest and to consider the impact of self-interest on the negotiating process. Ultimately, 
we examine how equity principles shift across the two treatments (when players move from a known to unknown 
payoff function). As such, we do not incorporate communication into the design; however, considering the role 













The experiment reported here differs in several aspects from the design of Milinski et al. and 
Tavoni et al. Firstly, their design is structured around avoiding a public bad whereby 
participants contribute to the public good to avoid a probabilistic loss (if the target is met). In 
this setup, players do not receive a return from the public good and therefore do not derive a 
benefit from contributions in excess of the threshold. In the experiment reported here, players 
do earn a return from the public good (in the advent that the threshold is met), quantifying the 
benefits associated with a reduced risk of dangerous climate change.  
 
Secondly, as the focus of this paper relates to how preferences for equity principles shift under 
different circumstances (specifically when nationality is known versus unknown) and not the 
dilemma between immediate action and future consequences, this game is designed as a one-
shot public good game.  
 
Thirdly, as this game is concerned with individuals’ preferences for specific burden-sharing 
principles and the extent to which these preferences reflect fairness or self-interest, the framing 
was more extensive.5 For example, the endowment inequality introduced into the game was 
not randomly assigned to players as in the case of Tavoni et al., but is framed to reflect 
disparities in the levels of wealth of the regions included in the design. Furthermore, the 
contribution levels associated with each burden-sharing principle were derived from emissions 
data reported by the Word Resources Institute (WRI) (discussed in a subsequent section).  
 
Fourthly, instead of losing their savings with some probability, players are guaranteed to lose 
of portion of the funds in their private account. However, this portion differs for players 
representing developed and developing countries (signalling the greater vulnerability of 
developing countries to climate change).  
 
                                                          
5 With respect to framing, several studies show that adding context (framing) to experiment instructions 
significantly alters the results (Eckel and Grossman 1996, Lieberman et al. 2004, Burnham et al. 2000). More 
specifically, Eckel and Grossman (1996) argue that in order to introduce the social and psychological factors that 
affect economic decision making, abstraction needs to be (to some extent) abandoned. Lowenstein (1999) argues 
that the external validity of experimental results can be enhanced when appropriate context is added. In a climate 
change context, individuals are extremely divided on who bears the responsibility (and therefore cost) of reducing 
emissions. In addition, climate change discourses become extremely emotionally charged and clouded by issues 
of social and distributive justice. As such, as opposed to using abstract terminology, the framing used in this 
experiment enables subjects to draw on their own subjective (and country specific) perceptions around climate 














Finally, Dannenberg et al. (2011) consider the impact of threshold uncertainty on coordination 
in a threshold public good game. The authors find that threshold uncertainty impacts negatively 
on public good provision. More broadly, Barrett (2012) discusses the detrimental effect of 
threshold uncertainty on the success of collective action. As the focus of this paper is how 
preferences for burden-sharing principles shift with the introduction of the veil of ignorance, 
we do not incorporate threshold uncertainty into the design and instead assume the threshold 




As previously mentioned, the experiment draws on a sample of university students from the 
US, EU, China, India and SA as well as a small sample of “practitioners” (academics and 
researchers, individuals from non-governmental organisations and government officials) from 





Sample statistics are reflected in table 1. A total sample of 269 university students was recruited 
from: New York University (US) (51 students), The London School of Economics (EU) (51 
students),6 Peking University (China) (56 students), Jadavpur University (India) (60 students) 
and the University of Cape Town (SA) (51 students). In order to equalise the number of 
students from each nationality, five Chinese and nine Indian participants (the last to submit 
their questionnaires) were excluded from the sample, leaving a sample of 255 students (51 
groups comprising 5 nationalities each).   
 
Students were recruited via advertisements which were placed on announcement boards in 
various university departments (Jadavpur), published in a monthly student newsletter (LSE), 
advertised on Twitter and online classifieds (NYU) and other social network platforms (UCT 
and PKU).  
 
                                                          













 On average, subjects were 23 years old and around 45% were male – although this varied 
considerably according to country, particularly in the US and SA, where 75% and 71% of 
participants respectively were female. 
 
Table 1. Sample statistics (students) 











Gender       
Male 0.45 0.25 0.55 0.35 0.37 0.29 
Female 0.55 0.75 0.45 0.65 0.63 0.71 
Age 23.04 26.35 23.06 22.53 21.84 21.39 
(3.48) (4.91) (2.96) (2.18) (1.88) (2.11) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
As is evident from Appendix A, the students are also from a broad range of faculties. Overall, 
23% of students were economics majors (although 73% of Indian participants were studying 




A database of practitioners was compiled using online attendance lists from meetings and 
workshops hosted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 
UNFCCC. In addition, contact details were sourced from directory lists from government 
websites and university research centres.  
 
A total of 70 practitioners participated in the study (14 individuals from each of the represented 
nationalities). As appears from table 2, on average, practitioners were around 32 years of age 
and 57% were male. Just over 60% were in academia (academic staff, PhD students and post-
docs involved in climate-related research)8, although this figure was 29% for South Africa. 
One-fifth of the sample worked in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while the 
remainder was employed in the private sector or government organisations, although here too 
there was considerable variation across countries.  
                                                          
7 Despite the Indian student sub-sample being largely comprised of economic students, there is very little 
evidence of interest-based bargaining among Indian students.   















Table 2. Sample statistics (practitioners) 











Gender       
Male 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.43 0.64 0.43 
Female 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.57 0.36 0.57 
Age 32.20 34.21 32.21 33.07 30.29 31.21 
(7.22) (11.09) (3.62) (7.05) (7.10) (5.51) 
Sector       
Academia 0.61 0.57 0.79 0.64 0.77 0.29 
NGO 0.20 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.14 
Government 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.07 
Private Sector 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.50 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
As anticipated, given the recruitment strategy, the majority of practitioners were employed in 




The experiment reported here utilises a threshold public good game with a climate change 
framing to test for evidence of strategically-motivated use of burden-sharing principles. The 
instructions provided to participants are replicated in Appendix B. 
 
The design takes cognisance of the fact that parties to multilateral climate negotiations are 
heterogeneous in terms of wealth, historical absolute emissions, per capita emissions, projected 
future emissions and vulnerability to climate change, and that these asymmetries would be 
likely to cloud arguments around what is considered to be the fairest way to distribute the 
burden. As such, as will be discussed in the following subsection, heterogeneity is incorporated 
into the experiment design.  
 
The subsection that follows briefly outlines the experimental design while the framing and 


















Each group consists of n players. Furthermore, each participant is provided an endowed, yi, 
which is allocated between a public and a private account, where ci denotes subject i’s 
contribution to the public account and gj reflects the allocation to the public account by the 
group. When gj exceeds some threshold, T, every experimental currency unit (ECU) allocated 
to the public account generates a return of i for each group member, where 0 < i < 1, while 
each ECU contributed to the private account generates a return of i, where i = 1. Subject si'
earnings are reflected as: 
)()( jiiiii gcy  
  
if Tg j                                 (1) 
 
When the group’s contribution to the public account, gj, does not exceed threshold T, 
participants in that particular group do not earn a return from investing in the public account 
(i = 0). In addition, each group member retains only a portion,  i, of the ECUs allocated to 
their private account, where 0 < i < 1. In the case that the threshold is not met, subject i’s 
earnings are reflected as: 
iiiii cy  )(    if Tg j            (2) 
 
4.2 Parameters and framing 
 
Each group of five consists of one participant each from the US, EU, China, India and SA. 
Collectively, in 2006, these countries accounted for around 62% of global CO2 emissions 
(WRI, 2010). While the US and EU are historically responsible for the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, China and India, both rapidly growing economies, are 
likely to be large future emitters. In fact, China has overtaken the US as the largest current 
emitter and, in 2006, accounted for nearly 22% of global CO2 emissions (WRI 2010).  
 
However, while emerging economies are likely to be major future emitters, per capita 
emissions are significantly higher in developed economies. For example, per capita CO2 
emissions in the US (in 2006) were 19.3 MtCO2e as compared to 4.7 MtCO2e for China and 
1.2 MtCO2e for India (WRI 2010). While SA is the largest emitter in Africa, its share of 













to global emissions in 2006); however, it has per capita emissions comparable with those of 
the EU: 7.4 MtCO2e in 2006 as compared to 8.4 MtCO2e for the EU (WRI 2010).  
 
Group emissions 
Data reflecting the groups’ emissions were adapted from emissions data reported by the 
Climate Analysis Indicator Tool, World Resources Institute (WRI 2010). Specifically, annual 
MtCO2e emission levels9 reported by the WRI for the US, EU, China, India and SA were scaled 
downwards by 100 and reported for the periods: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2006 (table 
3). Using the same source and scaling, projected future emissions were also reported for 
periods: 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030.10 Table 3 was provided to participants.   
 
Table 3. Past, present and projected future emissions (MtCO2e) 
Countr
y 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2010* 2015* 2020* 2025* 2030* 
US 47 46 50 52 58 58 57 58 58 58 58 
EU 45 42 42 40 40 41 40 40 39 39 38 
China 14 18 23 32 33 62 69 88 100 110 117 
India 3 4 6 8 10 13 15 18 22 27 33 
SA 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 
Total 111 112 124 135 144 177 185 208 223 239 251 
Note: * projected emissions 
Source: adapted from Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (WRI 2010) 
 
By using emissions data that proportionately reflect the emission-realities of the countries 
represented in the study, we are able to ensure that the equity considerations pervasive 
throughout the climate change discourse are well-reflected in the design. For example, the data 
illustrate that while developed countries are historically the major emitters, emission levels have 
peaked in the US and are on a decline in the EU; China has surpassed the US as the world’s 
largest emitter, while emissions from China and India are projected to rise substantially; and, 
while South Africa’s emissions are also projected to rise, South Africa represents a very small 




                                                          
9 Excluding land use changes 














Signalling differences in wealth, heterogeneity is introduced by varying players’ endowments 
(yi), with developed-country players being allocated more ECUs than their developing-country 
counterparts. At the start of each treatment, US and EU participants are endowed with 70 ECUs 
each, Chinese participants are endowed with 50 ECUs and Indian and South African subjects 
are endowed with 25 and 15 ECUs, respectively.  
 
Mitigation 
Participants divide their endowments between a private and public account, where the public 
account is a mitigation account.11 By contributing towards the mitigation account, participants 
are investing in mitigation. The group’s total contribution to the mitigation account (gj) is 
multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally amongst the group, yielding i = 0.3.  
 
In terms of the framing, subjects are told that the total number of ECUs contributed to the 
mitigation account signifies the group’s investment in mitigation. This amount is then 
multiplied by an emissions factor of 1.5 to determine the emissions reduction of the group.12  
 
Threshold  
Again, in terms of the framing, participants are told that at a recent climate change summit, 
policy-makers from the US, EU, China, India and SA pledged to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to 62 MtCO2 by 2050 (half of the emissions level in 1990) (in order to meet the 
scientific threshold of keeping the mean global temperature increase below 2º Celsius). It was 
stressed that no individual country targets had been agreed to. Each participant thus has to 
decide how much s/he wants to contribute towards meeting this target. 
 
Because 2006 is the most recent year for which actual data are available, it is used as the basis 
for the group’s negotiations. Each group is given the target of reducing emissions by 115MtCO2 
                                                          
11 Mitigation was explained to participants during the experiment as an approach that decreases the sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions. An example of using renewable energy sources for electricity generation instead of 
fossil fuels was provided. Finally, the public good nature of mitigation was emphasized by stating that by lowering 
the quantity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere you reduce the severity of climate change. Because there are 
no borders in the atmosphere, a reduction in emissions by one country is shared by all countries. So everyone in 
your group will benefit from mitigation.   
12 The following example was provided to the subjects: Assume that your group puts a total of 80 ECUs in the 
mitigation account. This means that your group has invested 80 ECUs in mitigation. These 80 ECUs are multiplied 













by 2050.13 Each group thus has to contribute a minimum of 77 ECUs (gj ≥ 77) to the public 
(mitigation) account.14  
 
Assuming that the target (threshold) is met 
If a particular group meets the emission reduction target (gj ≥ T), the ECUs in the mitigation 
account are multiplied by 1.5 and distributed equally between all group members, irrespective 
of individual contribution. Furthermore, participants keep whatever ECUs they contribute to 
the private account.  
 
The return from mitigation (i) signifies the global benefits synonymous with mitigation and, 
more specifically, of keeping the temperature increase below 2º Celsius, the scientific threshold 
for dangerous climate change.15 These benefits include reduced climate variability and a 
reduced probability of environmental disaster. Importantly, the benefits from mitigation are 
shared equally by all countries (ECUs in the mitigation account are divided equally amongst 
the 5 group members), irrespective of individual investment in mitigation.  
 
Assuming that the target (threshold) is not met 
If a group fails to meet the abatement target, in terms of the framing, there is a temperature 
warming of above 2º Celsius. In this case, as countries do not experience the benefits of 
mitigation, such as reduced climate variability, there is no return from investing in the 
mitigation account: i = 0. 
 
Furthermore, as explained to participants, each player is obliged to use a portion of the funds in 
his or her private account for investment in adaptation and to fund disaster relief. As such, if 
the emission reduction target is not met, each player loses a portion of the ECUs in his/her 
private account (1-i). Developing countries, which are likely to be affected the most severely 
                                                          
13 177 MtCO2 - 115 MtCO2 = 62 MtCO2. 
14 77 ECUs multiplied by the emission factor of 1.5 = 115.5 MtCO2. 
15 Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) make the distinction between scientific thresholds and political targets. Within 
the context of the game, we have a specific provision point (threshold) of 77 ECUs. This provision point conveys 
the scientific threshold of a 2º Celsius increase in mean global temperature (the threshold for dangerous warming). 
Within the context of the game, if at least 77 ECUs are contributed to the public good, the provision point has 
been met and a temperature increase of above 2º Celsius has been avoided. In terms of the political target, 
policymakers have pledged to collectively reduce emissions by 115MtCO2 in order to meet this scientific 
threshold. As evident from footnote 14, this is the collective mitigation needed to ensure that the threshold is met 
(i.e. that 77 ECUs are contributed to the public good). Thus while a political target of reducing emissions by 













by climate change, will need more severe adaptation and disaster relief measures. As such, 
developing-country players lose a larger share of the ECUs in their private account. 
Specifically: i = 0.75 for the US and EU and i = 0.50 for China, India and SA (equation 2). 
In other words, if the threshold is not met, developed-country players lose 25% of the ECUs in 




In the first treatment (which will be referred to as “ON” for own nationality), participants 
represent their own country (for example an American player uses the US payoff function) and 
must select one of four equity principles, each one synonymous with a different ECU-value 
contribution to mitigation. The four burden-sharing principles, adapted from Lange et al. (2007, 
2010) are as follows: 
 
(1) Equal per capita entitlement to emissions (egalitarian principle) (EPC): If the 
population of your country represents x% of the global population, you are entitled to 
x% of global emissions entitlements.   
 
(2) Equal percentage reduction of current emissions (sovereignty rule) (EPR): If your 
country’s current emissions amount to x% of global emissions, you should get x% of 
global emissions entitlements.  
 
(3) Historical polluter-pays rule (HPP): The abatement burden is allocated according to 
historical responsibility (1980 – 2000). If your country’s emissions between 1980 and 
2000 amount to x% of global emissions in that time, you are responsible for x% of the 
reduction target.  
 
(4) Future polluter-pays rule (FPP): The abatement burden is allocated according to 
future responsibility (2010 – 2030). If your country’s projected emissions between 2010 
and 2030 will amount to x% of projected global emissions in that time, you are 














Each equity principle translates into different ECU obligations (and therefore income) for each 
country. Table 4 (a version of which was shown to the participants) illustrates the ECU 
contributions associated with each equity principle, for each region. The egalitarian (equal per 
capita emissions) and historical polluter-pays rules shift the majority of the abatement 
responsibility to developed countries who have high per capita emissions and historical 
responsibility for emissions (Cazorla and Toman 2000). As is evident from table 4, these equity 
principles prescribe the largest ECU contributions for the US and EU and the smallest 
contributions for China and India, relative to the other equity principles. Conversely, the future 
polluter-pays rule renders large emerging economies such as China and India more responsible 
for mitigation, relative to the other equity principles. This burden-sharing principle translates 
into the largest ECU contribution for China and India (relative to the other equity principles). 
Finally, the sovereignty rule (equal percentage reduction of current emissions) ensures that 
relative emission levels between countries remain unchanged. This principle is favourable for 
the US and EU relative to the historical polluter-pays rule and egalitarian rule.  
 
SA’s public good contributions do not vary significantly across the different equity principles, 
ranging between 1 and 2 ECUs (table 4). However, given South Africa’s status as the largest 
emitter in Africa and the country’s participation in on-going climate negotiations (for example, 
its role along with the other BASIC countries and the US in brokering the Copenhagen Accord), 
the region was included in the study.  
 
As illustrated in table 4, the cost ranking of equity principles (in terms of ECU contributions to 
the public good) for each region is as follows: 
 
(1) United States: EPC > HPP > EPR > FPP 
(2) European Union: HPP > EPC > EPR > FPP 
(3) China: FPP > EPR > EPC > HPP 
(4) India: FPP > EPR > HPP > EPC 















Table 4. ECU contribution to the mitigation account and payoff, by burden-sharing principle 
Panel A: equal per capita emissions (EPC) 













US 0.09 6 70 58 6 35 
EU 0.15 9 70 41 9 21 
China 0.40 25 50 62 25 25 
India 0.34 21 25 13 21 0 
SA 0.01 1 15 3 1 1 














US 58 0.33 20 70 20 25 
EU 41 0.23 14 70 14 18 
China 62 0.35 22 50 22 27 
India 13 0.07 4 25 4 6 
SA 3 0.02 1 15 1 1 
Panel C: historical polluter-pays (HPP) 













US 0.40 46 58 70 12 31 
EU 0.33 38 41 70 3 25 
China 0.20 23 62 50 39 15 
India 0.05 6 13 25 7 4 
SA 0.02 2 3 15 1 2 
Panel D: future polluter-pays (FPP) 













US 0.26 30.0 58 70 28 20 
EU 0.18 20.3 41 70 21 14 
China 0.44 50.6 62 50 11 34 
India 0.10 11.7 13 25 1 8 
SA 0.02 2.3 3 15 1 2 
Notes:  
a The group is entitled to emit 62 MtCO2 
b Using 2006 data for current emissions from table 3 
c The groups’ emission reduction burden is to reduce emissions by 115MtCO2 
The table illustrates that if all participants select the same burden-sharing principle, the cumulative 
contribution of the group is sufficient to meet the threshold. 
 
The second treatment (which will be referred to as “RN” for random nationality) is identical 
to the first with the exception that participants no longer represent the country of which they 














Subjects also participated in two additional treatments (described in the footnote) which are not 
discussed here.16   
 
4.4 Equilibria and best responses 
 
The experiment reported here is an n-person threshold public good game where each player has 
four possible actions. Because of the structure of the game, where equity principles denote 
varying contributions to the public good for the respective regions, all equilibria are asymmetric 
in terms of participants contributing different amounts (of ECUs) to the public good.  As the 
large number of equilibria makes classification difficult, we provide a number of examples of 
pure strategy Nash equilibria in table 5.  
 
The game has an inefficient pure strategy equilibrium whereby all players contribute the 
minimum permissible amount to the public good (as evident from table 4, it is not possible for 
players to contribute zero); in this case, group contributions are not sufficient to meet the 
threshold. As illustrated in table 5, the inefficient low-contribution equilibrium is reached when 
players select the following equity principles: (i) US: future polluter-pays, (ii) EU: future 
polluter-pays, (iii) China: historical polluter-pays, (iv) India: equal per capita emissions and (v) 
SA: equal per capita emissions or equal percentage reduction of current emissions.  
 
Additionally, all combinations of equity principles that result in the group reaching the 
threshold of 77 ECUs, irrespective of individual contribution levels, are Nash equilibria; the 
caveat is that a player must not be able to reduce their contribution level without cumulative 
group contributions decreasing below the threshold.17 Table 5 provides two further examples 
of combinations of equity principles that are Nash equilibria (we call these mixture strategies 
as the choice of equity principle is varied as opposed to being symmetric).  
 
                                                          
16 In the two additional treatments, which subjects were presented with first, participants don’t use burden-sharing 
principles, but rather specify how many ECUs they would like to contribute to mitigation (the public account). As 
with the treatments utilizing equity principles, subjects initially act as representative for the country of which they 
are a national while, in the subsequent treatment, they are randomly assigned to one of the countries in the game 
after making their decision.  
17 For example, a symmetric strategy whereby all players opt for the principle of equal per capita emissions results 
in a cumulative group contribution (82 ECUs) that exceeds the threshold (77 ECUs). This strategy is not a NE as 
the best response of the US player, given that all other players select equal per capita emissions, is to choose the 














Table 5. Equity principle combinations that are pure strategy Nash equilibria (corresponding 
ECU contribution in parenthesis) [corresponding total payoff for each region in square brackets] 





































Notes:   
 Abbreviations: EPC: equal per capita entitlement to emissions, EPR: equal percentage reduction 
of current emissions, HPP: historical polluter-pays and FPP: future polluter-pays.  
 Players can also have symmetric strategies in terms of all selecting the same equity principle. 
In this case symmetric strategies of HPP or EPR are Nash equilibria while symmetric strategies 
of EPC and FPP are not (footnote 17). 
 
More generally, the figures in Appendix C illustrate the individual best responses for each 
region (in the ON treatment this is also the best response for each nationality) given the 
cumulative contributions of the remaining group members. Given the large set of possible 
combinations of equity principles (and resultant cumulative group contributions), we provide 
only an example of possible contribution levels, spanning from minimum to maximum 
permissible contribution levels. An example of the combination of equity principles associated 
with each contribution level is provided in text boxes just below the horizontal axis. 
 
An interpretation of figure C1 for the US (and the American player in the ON treatment) is 
provided: if cumulative contributions of the remaining group members sum to below 42 ECUs, 
even the maximum US contribution of 35 ECUs (for the principle of equal per capita 
entitlement to emissions) is insufficient to push the group to the threshold. In this case, the best 
response for the US player is to contribute as little as possible to the public good by selecting 
the future polluter-pays principle. Thereafter, it is in the best interest of the US player to 
contribute the minimum permissible amount needed to reach the threshold. For example, if the 
remaining group members collectively contribute 50 ECUs to public good provision, the best 
response for the US is to select the historical polluter-pays principle (synonymous with a 
contribution of 31 ECUs to the public good). Once the others contribute a minimum of 57 
ECUs, the US player’s best response reverts back to selecting the future polluter-pays principle 

















The experiment was conducted as an online survey. Specifically, participants, who signalled 
interest by emailing one of the authors, were provided with the web address of the survey and 
a unique password. Anyone experiencing difficulty in accessing the online survey (mainly in 
Asia) was sent a word-document version.  
 
Once participants submitted their decisions, they were randomly assigned to groups and their 
payoffs were calculated (note: students were grouped with students; the same for practitioners). 
Participants were aware that their group consisted of players from the other countries 
represented in the experiment. Participants were also aware of each country’s endowment, 
payoff function and payoff tables. Participants were not aware that the sample consisted of 
practitioners and students.  
 
At the start of each treatment, participants were re-allocated their endowment. They remained 
in the same group for the duration of the experiment. 
 
The experiment referred to ECUs (experimental currency units). An exchange rate for the 
conversion of ECUs into US Dollars was specified in the introduction.18 In addition, students 
were provided with a $5 participation fee and practitioners a $15 participation fee. Each 
subject’s total dollar earnings were converted into their local currency using Purchasing Power 
Parity conversion rates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) April 2010 World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database (WEO 2010).  
 
With the exception of South Africans who were paid with cash cheques (students) and 
electronic bank transfers (practitioners), participants were paid via PayPal.  
 
In the treatments where participants are randomly assigned to a country, American, European, 
Chinese, Indian and South African participants were randomly assigned to SA, India, the US, 
China and the EU, respectively.  
 
                                                          













After all the treatments were concluded, the participants also completed a short survey that 





Across all treatments and including the participation fee, average dollar earnings (before 
conversion into PPP rates) for American, European, Chinese, Indian and South African 
students are $38, $43, $46, $36 and $39, respectively. Comparable earnings for American, 
European, Chinese, Indian and South African practitioners are $117, $116, $133, $102 and 
$115, respectively.   
The primary focus of the experiment reported here is to examine the extent to which 
individuals’ use of equity principles reflects self-interest and to consider the impact of self-
interest on the negotiating process. Ultimately, we examine how equity principles shift across 
the two treatments, when players move from a known to unknown payoff function. This allows 
us to examine how preferences for equity principles shift when all considerations other than 
fairness are stripped away. 
As previously mentioned, in terms of the design, as the financial cost associated with each 
equity principle differs among regions, self-interested use of equity principles necessitates that 
different regions support different equity principles to different degrees (Lange et al. 2010). 
Based on the findings by Lange et al. (2010) and Carlsson et al. (2013), which are compatible 
with self-interested use of equity principles, as well as the broader empirical findings in line 
with a self-serving bias (Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein 1996, Babcock and Loewenstein 
1997, Babcock et al. 1997, Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008), we expect self-interest in 
this game to manifest in the ON (own nationality) treatment as each player choosing the equity 
principle that is most likely to maximise his payoff. In the case of both US and EU players, the 
future polluter-pays and equal percentage reduction principles are generally most profitable, 
given the contributions of others, while, selecting the principles of historical polluter-pays and 
equal per capita emissions is generally in the best interests of China and India (figures in 
Appendix C). The case for the South African player differs in that the player’s payoff varies 













African players’ choices should thus solely reflect fairness and therefore vary little between the 
ON and RN treatments.19  
 
5.1 Experimental results 
 
In the ON (own nationality) and RN (random nationality) treatments, participants choose 
between four burden-sharing principles that determine their contribution to mitigation. In ON, 
subjects represent the country of which they are a national, while in RN, subjects are randomly 
allocated to a region.  
 
Table 6 reflects the percentage with which each principle was selected in both treatments (ON 
and RN) for the pooled sample (this information is replicated graphically in figure 1). Results 
for the student and practitioner subsamples are provided in Appendix D.    
 
American participants: 
In the ON treatment (where players represent the country of which they are a national), the 
majority of US players (64%) select either the future polluter-pays rule (26%) or the principle 
of equal percentage reduction (38%). These equity principles denote the smallest ECU 
contribution to public good provision for the US (table 4) and are the principles most 
synonymous with material self-interest in the case of the US (Figure C1, Appendix C). With 
respect to the on-going climate negotiations, Saran (2010) notes the refusal of the US to accept 
binding mitigation obligations without a reciprocal obligation from large emerging economies. 
In this context, the large proportion of US players favouring the future polluter-pays and equal 
percentage reduction rules is consistent with this preference for emerging economies to 
participate in emission reduction efforts.  
                                                          
19 The figures in Appendix C show that the return for a particular country is always higher when the threshold is 
met. More specifically, the worst outcome for a given country when the threshold is met is superior to the best 
outcome when the threshold is not met. The implication is that players’ decisions are likely to be influenced by 
their expectations of the likelihood of the threshold being met coupled with their risk attitudes (Tavoni et al. 2011). 
In addition, social preferences – and in particular inequity aversion – might further influence players’ choices 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Dannenberg et al. 2007). For an example of how risk aversion and inequity aversion can 
manifest in the game, consider an American player who is pessimistic about the threshold being met in the ON 
treatment. While opting for the future polluter-pays principle would ensure the highest return, the individual might 
rather select the equal percentage reduction rule to improve the outcome for other players. However, against this 
background, while risk attitudes and social preferences are likely to account for heterogeneity of preferences at 
the individual level, this article considers behaviour pooled across nationalities and, in particular, how preferences 














Conversely, in the RN treatment, where players are to be randomly assigned to a region 
irrespective of their own nationality, 62% of American players select either the historical 
polluter-pays rule (28%) or the principle of equal per capita entitlement to emissions (34%), 
the principles usually advocated by developing countries. It appears that American players are 
following a maximin strategy, assuring themselves of the highest possible payoff in the advent 
of being allocated to either China or India. 
 
More specifically, in the RN treatment, the proportion of American players favouring the 
principle of equal percentage reduction of current emissions declined significantly to 23% 
(McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.025), while the proportion favouring the future polluter-pays 
rule decreased to 15% (significant at the 10% level) (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.090). In 
addition, the proportion opting for the  historical polluter-pays rule, the second most expensive 
principle in terms of contributions to mitigation, increased significantly from 12% in ON to 
28% in RN (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.008).   
 
European participants: 
In the ON treatment, despite the future polluter-pays and equal percentage reduction rules 
generally being the best response for European players, the majority of European players (61%) 
select the principles of historical polluter-pays (26%) and equal per capita entitlement to 
emissions (35%), the principles requiring the largest contributions to mitigation for the EU and 
that are generally synonymous with the lowest payoff for the region. More so, the distribution 
of choices by European players does not change significantly in the RN treatment (McNemar 
Chi-square tests: p > 0.05 for all equity principles), with 62% of players selecting the same 
principles. Overall, this result is not in line with self-interested use of burden-sharing principles 






















Table 6. Burden sharing principles, by nationality 
Burden-sharing principle Participant nationality: 
 American European Chinese Indian South African 
 ON RN ON RN ON RN ON RN ON RN 
Equal per capita 0.23 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.23 0.40 0.25 0.28 0.40 0.28 
Equal % reduction 0.38 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.15 0.31 
Historical polluter-pays 0.12 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.52 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.18 
Future polluter-pays 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.23 
Notes:  
 ON: own nationality; RN: Random nationality;  
 N = 325 (merged sample of students and practitioners) 
 n = 65 (representatives of each nationality).  
 
 
Figure 1. Burden sharing principles, by nationality, for ON and RN 
 
Notes:  
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In the ON treatment, 75% of Chinese participants opt for the principle of historical polluter-
pays (52%) and equal per capita emissions (23%), the principles most compatible with material 
self-interest for China. Conversely, in RN, when participants are to be randomly allocated to a 
region, the proportion of Chinese participants favouring the historical polluter-pays rule 
decreases significantly by more than half to 22% (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.000), while 
the proportion choosing the principle of equal per capita emissions increases significantly to 
40% (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.028). While the proportion favouring the future polluter-
pays rule increases from 3% to 11%, this increase is only significant at the 10% level 
(McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.096).  
 
With 62% of participants in the RN treatment still favouring the principle of equal per capita 
emissions and the historical polluter-pays rule, it also appears as if Chinese players are 
following a maximin strategy, assuring themselves of the highest possible payoff in the advent 
of being allocated to either China or India. However, the redistribution of preferences from the 
principle of historical polluter-pays to the rule of equal per capita emissions, which prescribes 
a larger contribution to the public good of 25 ECUs as opposed to 15 ECUs for the historical 
polluter-pays rule and which is generally the second most profitable strategy (figure C3, 
Appendix C), might signal that the principle of equal per capita emissions is genuinely 
considered to be the more “fair” of the two strategies.   
 
Indian participants: 
The choices of Indian participants are distributed roughly equally amongst the four principles 
in the ON treatment (equal per capita emissions: 25%, equal percentage reduction of emissions: 
28%, historical polluter-pays: 23%, future polluter-pays: 25%).  
 
In RN, the proportion of participants selecting the future polluter-pays rule decreases 
significantly to 11% (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.029), while the proportion favouring 
equal percentage reduction of current emissions increases to 37% (although this increase is not 
significant; McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.157). The fact that the number of participants 
selecting the future-polluter-pays rule more than halves in RN is surprising. A possible 
explanation is that while a quarter of Indian participants think it genuinely fair that India be 













the participants are unsure as to which country/region they will be representing (for example 
the EU or SA).  
 
South African participants: 
In ON, the majority of South African participants (65%) favour the principles of equal per 
capita entitlement to emissions (40%) and historical polluter-pays (25%). In RN, the proportion 
selecting the principle of equal percentage reduction of current emissions doubles to 31% 
(McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.004), while the proportion selecting the principle of equal per 
capita entitlement to emissions decreases to 28% although this decrease is only significant at 
the 10% level (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.059).  
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
 
The relationship between nationality and choice of burden-sharing principle is further assessed 
using logistic regression analysis, the results of which are replicated in table 7. The dependent 
variables, historical polluter-pays (columns 1 and 2) and future polluter-pays (columns 3 and 
4), take on a value of 1 if subjects selected these principles. Explanatory variables incorporated 
into the model include: Practitioner (equals 1 if a participant is a practitioner as opposed to a 
student), dummy variables for nationality and gender and, finally, age in years. While the 
regression coefficients are reported in table 7, the marginal effects are provided in Appendix 
E.  
 
In columns 1 and 2 (dependent variable: historical polluter-pays), the reference nationality is 
American. The results for ON (own nationality) in column 1 indicate that practitioners are more 
likely to select the principle of historical polluter-pays relative to students (0.7999, p = 0.042). 
In addition, European, Chinese, Indian and South African participants are more likely to select 
the historical polluter-pays principle relative to their American counterparts (for Indian 
participants, the effect is only significant at the 10% level) (European: 1.044, p =  0.037; 
Chinese: 2.251, p = 0.000; Indian: 0.910, p = 0.069, South African: 0.978, p =  0.048). In RN, 
when subjects no longer represent their own regions and are randomly allocated to a country, 














In columns 3 and 4 of table 7 (dependent variable: future polluter-pays), the reference 
nationality is Chinese. The results for ON (own nationality) in column 3 indicate that all 
nationalities are more likely to select the principle of future polluter-pays relative to Chinese 
participants (Americans: 2.719, p = 0.001; Europeans: 1.842, p = 0.020; Indians: 2.293, p = 
0.003; South Africans: 1.860, p = 0.019). In RN, when subjects are randomly allocated to a 
country, these effects disappear for American, European and Indian participants (column 4) 
(Americans: 0.359, p = 0.515; Europeans: 0.233, p = 0.680; Indians: 0.017, p = 0.977; South 
Africans: 1.065, p = 0.046). In addition, in RN, practitioners are significantly less likely to 
select the future polluter-pays principle as compared to students (-2.092, p = 0.019).  
 
Table 7. Logistic regressions, historical and future polluter-pays principles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






 ON RN ON RN 
Practitioner 0.799* 0.428 -0.617 -2.092* (0.392) (0.396) (0.576) (0.893) 
American - - 2.719** 0.359 (0.795) (0.551) 
European 1.044* -0.108 1.842* 0.233 (0.499) (0.416) (0.790) (0.566) 
Chinese 2.251** -0.300 - - (0.487) (0.423) 
Indian 0.910 -0.111 2.293** 0.017 (0.501) (0.427) (0.782) (0.580) 
South 
African 
0.978* -0.479 1.860* 1.065* 
(0.494) (0.438) (0.792) (0.534) 
Age 0.028 0.011 -0.073 0.010 (0.029) (0.026) (0.062) (0.055) 
Female -0.133 -0.000 -0.506 0.321 (0.272) (0.278) (0.322) (0.336) 
Constant -2.921** -1.382 -1.347 -2.324 (0.875) (0.752) (1.565) (1.402) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively; standard errors adjusted for clustering; results reported as coefficients 
 
Table 8 reflects the results of ordinal random effects panel regressions for each nationality, 
aimed at determining how the correlation between cost rankings of equity principles and 
participants’ preferences differ between the RN and ON treatments. From the discussion of the 













are more likely to opt for equity principles that prescribe larger public good contributions in 
RN relative to ON.  
 
The dependent variable is a region-specific four level variable, that ranks the equity principles 
(for each region) according to cost (in terms of contribution to the public good). In addition to 
the explanatory variables for Age and Female included in the previous regressions, a dummy 
variable for treatment is incorporated into the model (where the RN treatment equals 1). As 
expected, the results indicate that, in the RN (random nationality) treatment, both American 
and Chinese participants are more likely to choose equity principles with a higher cost ranking 
(that prescribe larger contributions to the public good) relative to the ON treatment (American: 
0.927, p = 0.007; Chinese: 1.254, p = 0.000).  
 
Table 8. Ordinal random effects panel regressions examining the relationship between equity 
preferences and cost rankings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 American European Chinese Indian South 
African 
Practitioner 0.725 0.441 -0.729 0.190 1.043 
 (0.652) (0.588) (0.808) (0.521) (1.811) 
RN 0.927** 0.045 1.254** -0.436 -0.223 
 (0.343) (0.338) (0.335) (0.332) (0.478) 
Age -0.037 0.111 -0.036 -0.108 -0.043 
 (0.033) (0.059) (0.049) (0.062) (0.131) 
Female -0.015 0.546 0.923* -0.692 -1.109 
 (0.488) (0.384) (0.429) (0.430) (0.888) 
Observations 130 128 130 130 130 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% 
level, respectively; standard errors adjusted for clustering 
 
5.3 Meeting the target 
 
In ON (own nationality), approximately 37% of groups met the target. This proportion 
increased significantly to 57% in RN when participants were to be allocated a nationality at 
random (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.016).   
 
As previously mentioned, in the RN treatment, where participants are randomly assigned to a 
region: (i) Chinese participants were assigned to the US and (ii) Indian participants were 














In this context, table 9 compares: (i) the average ECU contributions for the US region in the 
ON treatment (contributions by Americans) relative to the RN treatment (contributions 
determined by the equity preferences of Chinese participants); and, (ii), the average ECU 
contributions for the China region in the ON treatment (contributions by Chinese participants) 
versus the RN treatment (contributions determined by the equity preferences of Indian 
participants). 
 
The increase in the proportion of groups meeting the target in RN is due to an increase in 
average contributions for the US and China regions in RN relative to ON. Specifically, average 
contributions for the US region increased from 26.5 in ON to 30 in RN; additionally, average 
contributions for the China region increased from 20.5 in ON to 24.5 in RN.  
 
Table 9. Average contributions to the public good for the US and China in ON and RN 
treatments 
Region: Nationality (Treatment) 
 American (ON) Chinese (RN) 
US 26.5 30 
 Chinese (ON) Indian (RN) 
China 20.5 24.5 
 
The increase in average contributions for the US region in RN (30) relative to ON (26.5) is due 
to the fact that, in ON, 64% of American participants opted for the principles of future polluter-
pays and equal percentage reduction of current emissions, both of which are synonymous with 
the smallest public good contribution; conversely, in RN, 62% of Chinese participants selected 
the principles of equal per capita entitlement to emissions and historical polluter-pays, the 
equity principles that denote the largest contributions for the US region.  
 
With respect to the China region, in ON, 52% of Chinese participants opt for the historical 
polluter-pays rule, which denotes the smallest public good contribution for China, while, in 
RN, the proportion of Indian participants selecting this principle is considerably less at 25%. 
In addition, while 22% and 3% of Chinese participants select the principles of equal percentage 
reduction of emissions and future polluter-pays, respectively (the principles commensurate 
with the largest ECU contribution for China), in RN, the proportion of Indian participants 















Despite global consensus on the science behind climate change, the inability to negotiate a 
post-2012 climate agreement, coupled with the decision of Russia, Canada, Japan and the US 
to reject the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, has created an atmosphere of 
pessimism around the success of future climate negotiations (Andonova and Alexieva 2012, 
Weiler 2012, Gupta 2012).  
 
Through the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, negotiations are underway on a new global 
climate agreement, to be completed by the end of 2015 and enter into force in 2020. This new 
treaty would need to amalgamate into a single regime the mixed bag of binding and non-
binding arrangements currently existing under the United Nations Climate Convention 
(European Commission 2013).  
 
Signalling the importance of burden-sharing principles in climate negotiations, government 
officials from the BASIC countries have emphasised that a “global goal for emission reductions 
should be preceded by the definition of a paradigm for equitable burden sharing’ (Winkler et 
al. 2011). Within this context, this study considers just one of the negotiating challenges 
prevalent in multilateral climate negotiations: namely, the potential for self-interested use of 
equity principles. For example, where negotiators advocate certain burden-sharing principles 
to legitimise their negotiating position rather than out of a genuine sense of fairness. In this 
context, this study considers a small selection of the burden-sharing principles prevalent in 
both the literature and the negotiations: specifically, the principle of equal percentage reduction 
of current emissions, the principle of equal per capita entitlement to emissions and two variants 
of the polluter-pays rule, namely, historical and future polluter-pays.   
 
In this context, the experiment reported here examines the extent to which individuals’ use of 
equity principles reflects material self-interest (in other words, whether individuals use equity 
principles in a self-serving way). To do so, we use a threshold public good game with a climate 
change framing, where groups of individuals, consisting of participants from the US, EU, 
China, India and SA, must collectively meet an emission reduction target. In the first treatment, 













when the cost ranking (in terms of contributions to the public good) of each principle is made 
explicit for each of their respective nationalities.  
 
In line with the findings of Lange et al. (2010) and Carlsson et al. (2013), choice of equity 
principle among American and Chinese players is found to be in line with material self-interest.  
Specifically, in the own nationality treatment (where players represent the country of which 
they are a national), the majority of US players (64%) select either the future polluter-pays rule 
(26%) or the principle of equal percentage reduction of current emissions (38%). These equity 
principles denote the smallest contribution to public good provision and are the principles most 
synonymous with material self-interest. Lange et al. (2010) find that the US is primarily 
perceived as supporting the principle of equal percentage reduction of current emissions. These 
findings are consistent with the refusal by the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol without large 
emerging economies accepting reciprocal mitigation obligations (Saran 2010).  
 
With respect to Chinese participants, in the own nationality treatment, 75% of Chinese 
participants select either the principle of equal per capita emissions or the historical polluter-
pays rule. This reflects the BASIC countries’ emphasis on equity and historical responsibility 
in the context of distributing an abatement burden (Winkler et al. 2011). 
 
This result, that choice of burden-sharing principle is (at least partly) derived from material 
self-interest, is important in the context of multilateral climate negotiations where the equity 
principle that an agent adheres to will likely affect or shape the negotiating process (and by 
extension, the negotiation outcome). Against this background, this experiment further 
examines the impact of self-interest on the negotiating process. To do so, in a second treatment, 
while participants must once again choose between the various burden-sharing principles, they 
do so from behind a veil of ignorance, where they no longer know which payoff function is 
applicable to them. This allows us to examine how preferences for equity principles shift when 
all considerations other than fairness are stripped away.  
 
The results indicate that both American and Chinese participants are more likely to opt for 
equity principles with a higher cost ranking in the random nationality treatment. More 
specifically, in the own nationality treatment, when representing America, the odds of selecting 
the principle of historical polluter-pays are lower for American participants relative to other 













Furthermore, in the random nationality treatment, 62% of American players select either the 
historical polluter-pays rule (28%) or the principle of equal per capital entitlement to emissions 
(34%), the principles usually advocated by developing countries. It appears that American 
players are following a maximin strategy, assuring themselves of the highest possible payoff 
in the advent of being allocated to either China or India. 
 
Chinese participants are less likely to select the principle of future polluter-pays in the own 
nationality treatment relative to other nationalities, an effect that disappears in the random 
nationality treatment. Furthermore, in the random nationality treatment, the proportion of 
Chinese participants selecting the principle of historical polluter-pays decreases significantly 
from 52% to 22%, while the proportion selecting the principle of equal per capita emissions, 
which requires a larger ECU contribution to mitigation, increases significantly from 23% to 
40%. 
 
In contrast to the findings for American and Chinese participants, the results for European 
players are not consistent with material self-interest. Specifically, in the own nationality 
treatment, despite the principles of future polluter-pays and equal percentage reduction of 
current emissions generally being the best response for European players, the majority (61%) 
opt for the principles of historical polluter-pays (26%) and equal per capita entitlement to 
emissions (35%), the principles requiring the largest contributions to mitigation for the EU and 
that are generally synonymous with the lowest payoff for the region. More so, the distribution 
of choices by European players does not change significantly across the two treatments.  
 
 
The discussion above illustrates that the preferences for equity principles by American and 
Chinese participants shifted in the random nationality treatment, where considerations other 
than fairness were stripped away. Furthermore, the results signal that the self-interested use of 
equity principles impedes success in meeting the specified threshold (in terms of the framing: 
the emission reduction target). Specifically, in the own nationality treatment, approximately 
37% of groups met the target; this proportion increased significantly to almost 57% in the 
random nationality treatment. The greater success in meeting the target in the random 
nationality treatment was due to an increase in average contributions for the US and China 
regions in the random nationality treatment. Specifically, while the majority of American and 













good in the own nationality treatment, the equity preferences in the subsequent random 
nationality treatment meant contributions for both regions were increased. This result signals 
that self-interested use of equity principles manifests in lower public good contributions.  
 
Within the context of ongoing climate policy, Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) note that, despite 
there being consensus around the 2 degree scientific threshold for dangerous climate change, 
the voluntary emission reduction pledges under the Copenhagen Accord (a pledge and review 
system of voluntary emission reduction targets) virtually guarantee that the target of keeping 
temperature warming to below 2 °C will be missed. While Barrett and Dannenberg show that 
threshold uncertainty impedes the negotiation process, the results of this article indicate that 
self-interested use of equity principles might additionally explain the gap between the 
voluntary pledges and scientific threshold: specifically, negotiators are able to make pledges 
that are more in line with their own material self-interest (and that collectively are insufficient 
to meet the threshold) while still legitimising their position through the use of equity principles. 
Tavoni et al. (2011) consider the impact of nonbinding pledges on success in meeting a 
threshold in a threshold public good game. The authors draw parallels with the nonbinding 
pledge and review system of the Copenhagen Accord. The authors find nonbinding pledges 
(acting as signals of commitment) to be an effective way to communicate intentions – with 
success in meeting the threshold increasing significantly with the introduction of the 
nonbinding announcements. Tavoni et al. argue that success in climate negotiations is 
predicated on wealthier countries accepting a larger share of the abatement burden and 
signalling this intent early on. In this context, the current pledge and review architecture is an 
avenue for regions with less of a self-serving bias (European and Indian players within the 
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Appendix A. Sample statistics  
 
Table A1. Students’ majors (%) 











Accounting 0.04  0.02   0.16 
Actuarial science 0.01     0.06 
Anthropology 0.00  0.02    
Archaeology 0.02   0.12   
Chemistry 0.00     0.02 
Computer science 0.02 0.02    0.06 
Economics 0.23 0.02 0.18  0.78 0.16 
Education 0.00   0.02   
Engineering 0.07   0.10 0.02 0.24 
Environment 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.06   
Film and media 0.01     0.04 
Finance 0.01  0.02 0.02  0.02 
Geography 0.02  0.04 0.08   
Geology 0.02   0.10   
Geomatics 0.00   0.02   
Geophysics 0.03 0.06  0.04  0.04 
Health sciences 0.00  0.02    
History 0.00  0.02    
Human resources 0.00     0.02 
Information systems 0.01   0.06   
Journalism 0.06 0.02  0.10 0.20  
Language & lit. 0.02  0.02 0.10   
Law 0.01   0.04   
Life sciences 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.02   
Management 0.02  0.02 0.02  0.04 
Maths & statistics 0.02  0.02 0.06   
Palaeontology 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.02  0.06 
Politics 0.01 0.02  0.02  0.02 
Psychology 0.12 0.49 0.08    
Public policy 0.00  0.02    
Research methods 0.00     0.02 
Sociology 0.02  0.04   0.06 














Appendix B. Experiment instructions (extract)  
Introduction 
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  
This research is being conducted by researchers from the Environmental Policy Research Unit at the 
School of Economics, University of Cape Town. 
Climate change is about sharing the responsibility to reduce global greenhouse gases and this study 
examines how the responsibility to reduce global emissions could be divided among different countries. 
The countries/regions represented in this study are: the United States (US), the European Union (EU), 
China, India and South Africa (SA).  
The experiment is played in groups of five. Each group consists of one person from each of the five 
countries/regions represented in the game: namely, the US, EU, China, India and SA.  
All the answers you provide will remain confidential. You will never be named as a participant in this 
study.   
You will be paid for you participation: you will earn a participation fee of $5. In addition to this, you 
may earn more money depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other players in your group. 
During the experiment we will not talk of dollars, but rather of ECUs. The ECUs you earn during the 
experiment will be converted to dollars at the following rate:  
1 ECU = $0.2 
 
Once all the surveys are completed and your earnings have been calculated, your total (dollar) earnings 
will be converted into your local currency using Purchasing Power Parity conversion rates from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.  
 
As each group consists of subjects from all over the world, we will not be able to pay you as soon as 
you submit this questionnaire. Rather, once all the questionnaires have been completed, without 
looking at your decisions and answers, we will randomly put you into groups of 5 in order to calculate 
your payoffs. Once this has been done, we will notify you via email of the results and your payoff.  
(For South Africa) We will use cash cheques to pay you your earnings and participation fee.  
(For US, EU, China and India) We will use PayPal (www.paypal.com) to pay you your earnings and 
participation fee. Note that your name and email address will only be used for payment purposes.  
The experiment consists of 4 parts and a short survey; and should take approximately an hour and a half 
to complete – however you can take as much time as you like (there is no time limit).  Please note that 
if you close this window before finishing the experiment, all your information will be lost. So please 


















You have been allocated to a group of 5 people.  
 
Each person in your group is acting as a representative for one of the following countries/regions: US, 
EU, China, India and SA. 
 
You are representing South Africa 
 
The table below reflects the past, present and most recent projected future emissions of your group.  
 
At a recent Climate Change Summit, policy-makers from the US, EU, China, India and SA pledged to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 62 MtCO2 by 2050. This is half of the emissions level in 1990. 
 
Note that no individual country targets have been agreed to!  
 
Your group must now decide how to meet this target!  
 
Because 2006 is the last date of actual data (it is not a projection), it has been used as the basis for your 
groups’ negotiations. Your goal as a group is to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2 by 2050: 
177 MtCO2 - 115 MtCO2 = 62 MtCO2 
 
Therefore, in Part 1 of the experiment, your group must decide how you (as a group) are going to reduce 
emissions by 115 MtCO2. 
 
Past present and most recent projected future emissions: 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2010* 2015* 2020* 2025* 2030* 
US 47 46 50 52 58 58 57 58 58 58 58 
EU 45 42 42 40 40 41 40 40 39 39 38 
China 14 18 23 32 33 62 69 88 100 110 117 
India 3 4 6 8 10 13 15 18 22 27 33 
SA 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 
Total 111 112 124 135 144 177 185 208 223 239 251 
Note: * indicates projected emissions 
 
From the table you can see that emissions in the US and EU have peaked, while China and India’s 
emissions are projected to rise between now and 2030. While SA’s emissions are also projected to rise, 



















Each player in your group receives an amount of ECUs. You must decide what to do with the ECUs you 
have been given. You can either: 
(i) Put all the ECUs into your private account 
(ii) Put all the ECUs into a mitigation account 
(iii) Divide the ECUs between the private account and the mitigation account   
 
What is mitigation? Mitigation is an approach that decreases greenhouse gas emissions. An example of 
this would be using renewable energy sources for electricity generation instead of fossil fuels. By 
lowering the quantity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere you reduce the severity of climate change. 
Because there are no borders in the atmosphere, a reduction in emissions by one country is shared by all 
countries. So everyone in your group will benefit from mitigation.   
 
So, if you put ECUs in the mitigation account, you are investing in mitigation.  
 
The countries/regions represented in the game have different levels of wealth. The ECUs you are given 
at the start of this game represent this wealth. As such, players representing developed countries start 
the experiment with more ECUs. The amount of ECUs each player starts the game with is shown below:  
Country/Region ECUs 
United States 70 
European Union 70 
China 50 
India 25 
South Africa 15 
 
Return from the mitigation account 
As we have mentioned, the benefits from investing in mitigation are shared equally between all the 
players in your group! 
 
The number of ECUs contributed to the mitigation account is your groups’ investment in mitigation.  
 
This amount will be multiplied by an emissions factor of 1.5 to determine the emissions reduction of 
the group. 
  
For example: Assume that your group puts a total of 80 ECUs in the mitigation account. This means 
that your group has invested 80 ECUs in mitigation. These 80 ECUs are multiplied by an emissions 
factor of 1.5. This means that your group has reduced emissions by 120 MtCO2.  
 
The reduction of emissions leads to global benefits which are equally shared by all countries. This 
is the global benefit of keeping the temperature below 2 degrees centigrade – which is the threshold for 
catastrophic climate change. Such benefits include reduced climate variability and a reduced probability 













Because your group shares the benefits of mitigation, the total number of ECUs in the mitigation account 
(after being multiplied by the emission factor of 1.5) is then divided equally among the group, 
irrespective of how much each member personally put in the mitigation account.  
 
For every 1 ECU contributed to the mitigation account, each of the five group members receives 
0.3 ECUs: 
 




= 0.3 ECUs 
 
So, every ECU contributed to the mitigation account (by you or one of your group members) reduces 
emissions by 1.5 MtCO2 and earns you and every person in your group a return of 0.3 ECUs. 
 
As your group is trying to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2, there must be at least 115 ECUs in the 
mitigation account after the ECUs are multiplied by the emissions factor of 1.5. This means that at 
least 77 ECUs must be contributed to the mitigation account by your group: 
 
77 ECUs × 1.5 = 115.5 ECUs ≡ 115.5 MtCO2 
 
Later, we will ask you how many ECUs (if any) you would like to contribute to the mitigation account.  
 
Return from the private account  
 
While the benefits of investing in mitigation are shared between all the members in your group, the 
benefit of contributions to the private account go only to you (as your country’s representative). As such, 
you keep whatever you contributed to the private account.  
 
So, every ECU invested in the private account earns you a return of 1 ECU. 
 
Total return: if your group meets the reduction target 
 
If your group meets the emission reduction target, your income is calculated as follows: 
 
 You keep the ECUs in your private account 
 The ECUs in the  mitigation account (after being multiplied by the emissions factor of 1.5) are 
divided equally between all 5 members in the group 
Total return: if your group FAILS to meet the reduction target  
 
Your group fails to meet the target if the number of ECUs in the mitigation account (after being 
multiplied by the emissions factor of 1.5) is less than 115. In other words, the group fails to meet the 














If the group fails to meet the abatement target, there will be a temperature warming above 2 degrees 
centigrade.  
 
In this case, each player will have to use of portion of the funds in their private account for investment 
in adaptation and to fund disaster relief.  
 
As such, if the emission reduction target is not met, each player looses a portion of the ECUs in 
his/her private account.  
 
Developing countries will need more severe adaptation measures and will likely be hit hardest by climate 
change. As such, players representing developing countries loose a larger share of the ECUs in their 
private account relative to players in the group who represent developed countries.  
The portion deducted from each player’s private account (if the group fails to meet the emission 
reduction target) is as follows: 
Country/Region Portion deducted from the private 
account if target is NOT met 
United States 25% 
European Union 25% 
China 50% 
India 50% 
South Africa 50% 
 
Finally, if the group fails to meet the emissions target, in addition to each player losing a share of the 
ECUs in his/her private account, there will be no return from investing in mitigation: the ECUs in 














Examples [A number of examples were provided to participants. Only 3 are replicated here.] 
 
Example 1  
 
Your group’s target is to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2. Use the information in the table below to 
calculate the amount of ECUs invested in mitigation, the emissions reduction of the group, the income 







US 70 20 
EU 70 25 
China 50 15 
India 25 15 
SA 15 10 
 
Investment in mitigation 
20US + 25EU + 15China + 15India + 10SA = 85 ECUs invested in mitigation 
 
Emissions reduced: 
= 85 ECUs × 1.5 
= 127.5 ECUs ≡  127.5 MtCO2 
 
Emissions have been reduced by 127.5 MtCO2. The group has met the target of reducing emissions by 
115 MtCO2. As such, players will earn a return from mitigation and will not lose any portion of the 
income in their private accounts.   
 

















US 70 20 25.5 50 75.5 
EU 70 25 25.5 45 70.5 
China 50 15 25.5 35 60.5 
India 25 15 25.5 10 35.5 
SA 15 10 25.5 5 30.5 
Note:  
The return from the private account is calculated as follows: Endowment – Investment in mitigation 

















Your group’s target is to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2. Use the information in the table below to 
calculate the amount of ECUs invested in mitigation, the emissions reduction of the group, the income 







US 70 10 
EU 70 15 
China 50 8 
India 25 6 
SA 15 5 
 
Investment in mitigation 
10US + 15EU + 8China + 6India + 5SA = 44 ECUs invested in mitigation 
 
Emissions reduced: 
= 44 ECUs × 1.5 
= 66 ECUs ≡  66 MtCO2 
 
Emissions have been reduced by 66 MtCO2. Note: the group has not met the target of reducing 
emissions by 115 MtCO2. In this case, players do not earn a return from mitigation and will lose a 
portion of the ECUs in their private accounts.   
 
Return from mitigation account: 



























US 70 10 0 60 25% 15 45 45.0 
EU 70 15 0 55 25% 13.8 41.2 41.2 
China 50 8 0 42 50% 21 21 21.0 
India 25 6 0 19 50% 9.5 9.5 9.5 
SA 15 5 0 10 50% 5 5 5.0 
Note:  
The investment in the private accounts is calculated as: Endowment – Investment in mitigation 
Return from the private account is calculated as: Investment in private account – ECUs deducted from 
private account 

















In this example, we introduce a table which summarizes the total income of one country, given its 
mitigation and the collective mitigation of the other countries in the group. We will now go 
through a similar example as the ones before, but show how each player can verify their total 
income using the table.  (Later, when you decide how many ECUs to contribute to the mitigation 
account, we will provide you with tables like this to help you make your decision.) 
 
Your group’s target is to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2. Use the information in the table below to 
calculate the amount of ECUs invested in mitigation, the emissions reduction of the group, the income 







US 70 39 
EU 70 51 
China 50 23 
India 25 7 
SA 15 5 
 
Investment in mitigation 
39US + 51EU + 23China + 7India + 5SA = 125 ECUs invested in mitigation 
 
Emissions reduced: 
= 125 × 1.5 
= 187.5 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 ≡  187.5 MtCO2 
 
Emissions have been reduced by 187.5 MtCO2.  The group has met the target of reducing emissions by 
115 MtCO2. As such, players will earn a return from mitigation and will not lose any ECUs from their 
private accounts.   
 
Return from mitigation account: 
187.5
5













US 70 39 37.5 31 68.5 
EU 70 51 37.5 19 56.5 
China 50 23 37.5 27 64.5 
India 25 7 37.5 18 55.5 
SA 15 5 37.5 10 47.5 
Note:  
The return from the private account is calculated as follows: Endowment – Investment in mitigation 














Using the table below, verify that South Africa’s total income is 47.5 ECUs: 



















0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
40 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
80 39.0 35.5 32.0 28.5 
120 51.0 47.5 44.0 40.5 
160 63.0 59.5 56.0 52.5 
200 75.0 71.5 68.0 64.5 
215 79.5 76.0 72.5 69.0 
 
 
Part 1 continued  
 
To help you make your decision, the payoff tables from the previous examples are replicated for you 
below.  
 
Payoff tables (Total income, by country):  




by the EU, 
China, India 
and SA 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
0 52.5 45.0 37.5 30.0 22.5 15.0 7.5 0.0 
40 52.5 45.0 37.5 30.0 54.0 47.0 40.0 33.0 
80 94.0 87.0 80.0 73.0 66.0 59.0 52.0 45.0 
120 106.0 99.0 92.0 85.0 78.0 71.0 64.0 57.0 
160 118.0 111.0 104.0 97.0 90.0 83.0 76.0 69.0 
 




by the US, 
China, India 
and SA 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
0 52.5 45.0 37.5 30.0 22.5 15.0 7.5 0.0 
40 52.5 45.0 37.5 30.0 54.0 47.0 40.0 33.0 
80 94.0 87.0 80.0 73.0 66.0 59.0 52.0 45.0 
120 106.0 99.0 92.0 85.0 78.0 71.0 64.0 57.0 
























the US, EU, 
India and SA 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 
0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
40 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 34.0 27.0 
80 74.0 67.0 60.0 53.0 46.0 39.0 
120 86.0 79.0 72.0 65.0 58.0 51.0 
160 98.0 91.0 84.0 77.0 70.0 63.0 
180 104.0 97.0 90.0 83.0 76.0 69.0 
 




the US, EU, 
China and SA 
 0 5 10 15 20 25 
0 12.5 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
40 12.5 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
80 49.0 45.5 42.0 38.5 35.0 31.5 
120 61.0 57.5 54.0 50.5 47.0 43.5 
160 73.0 69.5 66.0 62.5 59.0 55.5 
200 85.0 81.5 78.0 74.5 71.0 67.5 
205 86.5 83.0 79.5 76.0 72.5 69.0 
 




the US, EU, 
China and 
India  
 0 5 10 15 
0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
40 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
80 39.0 35.5 32.0 28.5 
120 51.0 47.5 44.0 40.5 
160 63.0 59.5 56.0 52.5 
200 75.0 71.5 68.0 64.5 
215 79.5 76.0 72.5 69.0 
 
Your group must reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2.  
This means that there must be at least 115 ECUs in the mitigation account after the ECUs are multiplied 
by the emissions factor of 1.5. This means that at least 77 ECUs must be contributed to the 
mitigation account by your group: 
You, as your county representative, must decide how many ECUs to contribute to the mitigation 
account.  
 
Please use the payoff tables above to help you make your decision. Additional information is replicated 
in the tables below: 
 














Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2010* 2015* 2020* 2025* 2030* 
US 47 46 50 52 58 58 57 58 58 58 58 
EU 45 42 42 40 40 41 40 40 39 39 38 
China 14 18 23 32 33 62 69 88 100 110 117 
India 3 4 6 8 10 13 15 18 22 27 33 
SA 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 
Total 111 112 124 135 144 177 185 208 223 239 251 




Portion deducted from the private 
account if target is NOT met 
United States 70 25% 
European Union 70 25% 
China 50 50% 
India 25 50% 
South Africa 15 50% 
 
 
Please indicate the number of ECUs you, as the representative for South Africa, wish to contribute to 
the mitigation account: 
 
Also, please indicate the number of ECUs you think your group members should contribute to the 
mitigation account:  
 
United States:  (Can only invest a maximum of 70 ECUs) 
European Union:  (Can only invest a maximum of 70 ECUs) 
China:  (Can only invest a maximum of 50 ECUs) 
India  (Can only invest a maximum of 25 ECUs) 

















You are now faced with a similar scenario to that of Part 1. Once again, each player in your group is 











As before, your group must reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2.  
To recap: this means that there must be at least 115 ECUs in the mitigation account after the ECUs are 
multiplied by the emissions factor of 1.5. This means that at least 77 ECUs must be contributed to 
the mitigation account by your group: 
Except now, you no longer represent South Africa!  
We will randomly assign you to a country/region without looking at your decision.  
 
You, as your (unknown) country representative, must decide how many ECUs to contribute to the 
mitigation account.  
 
[Participant are provided with the same summary information as in Part 1] 
 
Remember that you no longer represent South Africa!  
 
Please indicate the number of ECUs you think each country/region should contribute to the 
mitigation account; you will be randomly assigned as the representative for one of these countries: 
 
United States:  (Can only invest a maximum of 70 ECUs) 
European Union:  (Can only invest a maximum of 70 ECUs) 
China:  (Can only invest a maximum of 50 ECUs) 
India  (Can only invest a maximum of 25 ECUs) 


















You are now faced with a similar scenario to the ones before. Once again, each player in your group is 











As in Part 1, you are once again representing South Africa. 
 
The table below reflects the past, present and most recent projected future emissions of your group: 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2010* 2015* 2020* 2025* 2030* 
US 47 46 50 52 58 58 57 58 58 58 58 
EU 45 42 42 40 40 41 40 40 39 39 38 
China 14 18 23 32 33 62 69 88 100 110 117 
India 3 4 6 8 10 13 15 18 22 27 33 
SA 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 
Total 111 112 124 135 144 177 185 208 223 239 251 
Note: * indicates projected emissions 
 
Remember that your group has pledged to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2 to 62 MtCO2 by 2050.  
 
Your group must reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2 to meet its pledge. Therefore your group has an 
abatement burden of 115 MtCO2. 
 
As your group will be able to collectively emit 62 MtCO2 in 2050, your group has a global emission 
entitlement of 62 MtCO2. 
 
There are four burden-sharing principles that you can use to decide how your group is going to reduce 
emissions by 115 MtCO2 and share the global emission entitlement of 62 MtCO2. 
 
These burden-sharing principles are: 
 
Equal per capita entitlement to emissions: If the population of your country represents x% of the 
global population, you are entitled to x% of global emissions entitlements.   
 
Equal percentage reduction of current emissions: If your country’s current emissions amount to x% 














Historical polluter-pays rule: the abatement burden is allocated according to historical responsibility 
(1980 – 2000). If your country’s emissions between 1980 and 2000 amount to x% of global emissions 
in that time, you are responsible for x% of the reduction target.  
 
Future polluter-pays rule: the abatement burden is allocated according to future responsibility (2010 
– 2030). If your country’s projected emissions between 2010 and 2030 will amount to x% of projected 
global emissions in that time, you are responsible for x% of the reduction target.  
 
Of course these principles have different implications for the amount each country must invest in 
mitigation and therefore your total income. 
 
The tables below show the emission reduction and total payoff for each country when the entire group 
uses a particular burden-sharing formula to meet the emission reduction target. 
 
Payoffs and contributions under each burden-sharing principle: 
 
If all group members use the principle of equal per capita emissions: 













US 0.09 6 70 58 6 35 60 
EU 0.15 9 70 41 9 21 74 
China 0.40 25 50 62 25 25 50 
India 0.34 21 25 13 21 0 50 
SA 0.01 1 15 3 1 1 38 
 
















US 58 0.33 20 70 20 25 68 
EU 41 0.23 14 70 14 18 75 
China 62 0.35 22 50 22 27 46 
India 13 0.07 4 25 4 6 42 















If all group members use the principle of historical polluter-pays: 














US 0.40 46 58 70 12 31 62 
EU 0.33 38 41 70 3 25 68 
China 0.20 23 62 50 39 15 58 
India 0.05 6 13 25 7 4 44 
SA 0.02 2 3 15 1 2 36 
 
If all group members use the principle of future polluter-pays: 














US 0.26 30.0 58 70 28 20 73 
EU 0.18 20.3 41 70 21 14 79 
China 0.44 50.6 62 50 11 34 39 
India 0.10 11.7 13 25 1 8 40 
SA 0.02 2.3 3 15 1 2 36 
 
 
You can see from the tables above that different principles imply different contributions to the mitigation 
account by your country. We summarize this inf rmation for you in the tables below: 
 
US investment in mitigation under each principle: 
Principle: ECUs invested in mitigation: 
Equal per capital emissions 35 
Equal % reduction of current emissions 25 
Historical polluter-pays 31 
Future polluter-pays 20 
 
 
EU investment in mitigation under each principle: 
Principle: ECUs invested in mitigation: 
Equal per capital emissions 21 
Equal % reduction of current emissions 18 
Historical polluter-pays 25 


















China investment in mitigation under each principle: 
Principle: ECUs invested in mitigation: 
Equal per capital emissions 25 
Equal % reduction of current emissions 27 
Historical polluter-pays 15 
Future polluter-pays 34 
 
India investment in mitigation under each principle: 
Principle: ECUs invested in mitigation: 
Equal per capital emissions 0 
Equal % reduction of current emissions 6 
Historical polluter-pays 4 
Future polluter-pays 8 
 
South Africa investment in mitigation under each principle: 
Principle: ECUs invested in mitigation: 
Equal per capital emissions 1 
Equal % reduction of current emissions 1 
Historical polluter-pays 2 
Future polluter-pays 2 
 
Remember that your group has pledged to reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2.  
This means that there must be at least 115 ECUs in the mitigation account after the ECUs are multiplied 
by the emissions factor of 1.5. This means that at least 77 ECUs must be contributed to the 
mitigation account by your group. 
 
Using the tables above, you can see that there are certain instances when the target will not be met. Let’s 
assume that each of the player’s in your group chooses the principle listed in the table below. Each 
country’s associated investment in mitigation is also shown in the table.  
Country/Region Burden-sharing principle Contribution to the mitigation account 
United States Future polluter pays 20 
European Union Future polluter pays 14 
China Historical polluter pays 15 
India Equal per capital emissions 0 
South Africa Equal per capital emissions 1 
A total of 50 ECUs are contributed to the mitigation account. By multiplying this with the emissions 
factor of 1.5, we can see that emissions have been reduced by 75 MtCO2. This means the group has not 
met the target of reducing emissions by 115 MtCO2. 
 
Remember that if the target is not met, there is no income from mitigation and each player loses a portion 
of the ECUs in their private account. The portion deducted from each player’s private account (if the 













Country/Region Portion deducted from the private 
account if target is NOT met 
United States 25% 
European Union 25% 
China 50% 
India 50% 
South Africa 50% 
 
 
After considering all the information given above, please choose the burden-sharing principle that you, 
as the country representative for South Africa; the United States; the European Union; China; India, 
would like to use to meet the target: 
 
Note: you can only choose one fairness principle 
 
 Equal per capita entitlement to emissions 
 Equal percentage reduction of current emissions 
 Historical polluter-pays rule 

















You are now faced with a similar scenario to the one in Part 3. Once again, each player in your group is 











As before, your group must reduce emissions by 115 MtCO2 to 62 MtCO2 by 2050.  
 
As before, you must choose the burden-sharing principle that you would like to use to meet the target.  
 
Except now, you no longer represent South Africa!  
We will randomly assign you to a country/region without looking at your decision.  
 
 
The table below reflects the past, present and most recent projected future emissions of your group: 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2010* 2015* 2020* 2025* 2030* 
US 47 46 50 52 58 58 57 58 58 58 58 
EU 45 42 42 40 40 41 40 40 39 39 38 
China 14 18 23 32 33 62 69 88 100 110 117 
India 3 4 6 8 10 13 15 18 22 27 33 
SA 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 
Total 111 112 124 135 144 177 185 208 223 239 251 
Note: * indicates projected emissions 
 
To recap:   
 
There are four burden-sharing principles that you can use to decide how your group is going to reduce 
emissions by 115 MtCO2 and share the global emission entitlement of 62 MtCO2. 
These burden-sharing principles are: 
 
Equal per capita entitlement to emissions: If the population of your country represents x% of the 
global population, you are entitled to x% of global emissions entitlements.   
 
Equal percentage reduction of current emissions: If your country’s current emissions amount to x% 














Historical polluter-pays rule: the abatement burden is allocated according to historical responsibility 
(1980 – 2000). If your country’s emissions between 1980 and 2000 amount to x% of global emissions 
in that time, you are responsible for x% of the reduction target.  
 
Future polluter-pays rule: the abatement burden is allocated according to future responsibility (2010 
– 2030). If your country’s projected emissions between 2010 and 2030 will amount to x% of projected 
global emissions in that time, you are responsible for x% of the reduction target.  
 
Of course these principles have different implications for the amount each country must invest in 
mitigation and therefore your total income. 
 
[Participant are provided with the same summary information as in Part 3] 
 
Remember that you no longer represent South Africa.  
We will randomly assign you to a country without looking at your decision. 
 
Please indicate which of the fairness principles listed below you, as your (unknown) country 
representative, would like to use to meet the target: 
 
Note: you can only choose one fairness principle 
 
 Equal per capita entitlement to emissions 
 Equal percentage reduction of current emissions 
 Historical polluter-pays rule 















Appendix C. Best response given the cumulative contribution of remaining 
group members  
Figure C1. United States   
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Figure C3. China   
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Appendix D. Burden sharing principles  
 
Table D1. Burden sharing principles, by nationality and sample   
Burden-sharing principle Participant nationality: 
 American European Chinese Indian South African 
 ON RN ON RN ON RN ON RN ON RN 
Panel A: Students (N = 255, n = 51) 
Equal per capita 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.35 0.24 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.45 0.32 
Equal % reduction 0.39 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.14 0.25 
Historical polluter-pays 0.10 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.47 0.20 0.16 0.24 0.20 0.16 
Future polluter-pays 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.29 0.14 0.22 0.27 
Panel B: Practitioners (N = 70, n = 14) 
Equal per capita 0.21 0.36 0.57 0.43 0.21 0.57 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.14 
Equal % reduction 0.36 0.36 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.50 0.21 0.50 
Historical polluter-pays 0.21 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.71 0.29 0.50 0.29 0.43 0.29 
Future polluter-pays 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.07 
Notes:  
 ON: own nationality; RN: Random nationality;  
 N = sample or sub-sample size, n = number of individuals of a particular nationality (for example, there 














Appendix E. Logistic regressions, historical and future polluter-pays 
principles (marginal effects at the mean)  
 
Table E1. Logistic regressions, historical and future polluter-pays principles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Historical polluter-pays 
Reference nationality: American 
Future polluter-pays 
Reference nationality: Chinese 
 ON RN ON RN 
Practitioner 0.166 0.081 -0.065 -0.147** 
(0.087) (0.079) (0.054) (0.037) 
American - - 0.501** 0.040 (0.148) (0.066) 
European 0.223* -0.019 0.313* 0.025 
(0.114) (0.071) (0.153) (0.064) 
Chinese 0.494* -0.051 - - (0.098) (0.068) 
Indian 0.192 -0.019 0.409** 0.002 
(0.113) (0.073) (0.153) (0.060) 
South African 0.207 -0.078 0.316* 0.140 
(0.112) (0.066) (0.157) (0.083) 
Age 0.005 0.002 -0.009 0.001 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Female -0.025 0.000 -0.061 0.033 
(0.051) (0.049) (0.038) (0.033) 
Notes:  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 Standard errors adjusted for clustering 
 Results reported as marginal effects at the mean (MEM) 
 For binary independent variables, the marginal effects indicate how the predicted 















Cooperation and Climate Change: Can Communication Facilitate the 
Provision of Public Goods in Heterogeneous Agents? 
 
Kerri Brick, Martine Visser and Zoe Van der Hoven 
 
Abstract 
International and domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions require a coordinated 
effort from heterogeneous actors. In this context, using a public good game with a climate 
change framing, the experiment reported here examines whether groups of heterogeneous 
individuals can meet a collective emission-reduction target through individual contributions. 
In terms of the framing, participants differ in terms of their marginal costs of abatement. The 
experiment consists of two games: a counterfactual baseline scenario examining the scope for 
voluntary cooperation and a communication game examining the role of stakeholder 
participation in facilitating cooperation. During the communication treatment, subjects are able 
to communicate with one another in order to coordinate contribution strategies. The results 
suggest that relying on the voluntary cooperation of individuals will not be sufficient to meet 
the mitigation target. Furthermore, while communication plays a role in promoting 
cooperation, even when heterogeneity is present, the non-binding nature of communication 
results in significant levels of free-riding. In particular, with the introduction of 
communication, two dominant contribution norms of free-riding and perfect-cooperation 
emerge. This outcome emphasises the importance of sanctioning opportunities in ensuring 
compliance with mitigation obligations.   
 

















Climate change mitigation exemplifies the public good dilemma: specifically, while there is 
broad consensus that a significant reduction of greenhouse gases is needed to reduce the risk 
of catastrophic climate change, as the benefits of (costly) mitigation are shared equally by all 
irrespective of individual contribution, there is considerable incentive to free ride (Hasson et 
al. 2010, Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008). 
 
The current model for tackling climate change is a top-down approach whereby emission 
reduction targets are negotiated at multilateral climate talks and then implemented at a 
domestic-level by national governments through the formulation of climate policy. In both this 
international and domestic setting, no one country or individual can adequately provide the 
public good of mitigation, significant incentives for free-riding prevail and widespread 
participation is needed for climate policy to be effective (Ringius et al. 2002). With respect to 
the implementation of international environmental agre ments, no single supranational 
authority can enforce cooperation and, in a domestic setting, in instances where cooperation 
can be enforced through penalties for non-compliance, monitoring, verification and 
enforcement is costly. 
 
In this context, empirical evidence from public good games indicates that communication can 
be effective in facilitating a greater degree of cooperation among players (Gächter and 
Herrmann 2009, Oprea et al. 2013). As such, this article considers the extent to which 
communication is a useful mechanism for promoting compliance with climate policy. As it is 
not possible to alter the degree of communication in a real negotiation context, the research 
question is addressed in an experimental setting through a public good game with a climate 
change framing.  
 
On a global scale, international environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol require 
countries with divergent levels of income and historical responsibility for emissions to agree 
on how best to distribute an abatement burden and apportion future entitlements to emissions. 
On a country level, reducing a national greenhouse-gas inventory requires a change in 
behaviour from both industry sectors and individuals – who are asymmetric with regard to 













change mitigation is a prime example of a public good dilemma in which stakeholders are 
heterogeneous. 
 
In this context, stakeholder participation in domestic climate-policy-making processes and 
domestic climate negotiations occur in extremely complex environments amid large 
divergences in historical energy usage among different sectors of society, party-politics, 
special-interest lobbying, alternative developmental priorities and environmental objectives 
and concerns relating to social and distributive justice.1 Despite this complexity, the need for 
public good provision (meeting a target) in this domestic setting is extremely important given 
that, as mentioned, while the current multilateral, top-down, rules-based approach of the Kyoto 
Protocol assigns each country a quantifiable and binding emission reduction target, each 
country itself formulates and implements its own domestic climate policy agenda. In this 
context, this article considers the role of communication (and by extension, stakeholder 
participation) in facilitating success in meeting a national mitigation obligation when a large 
degree of heterogeneity exists amongst those engaging in the policy process.   
 
To do so, using a linear public good game with a climate change framing, the experiment 
reported here examines whether groups of heterogeneous individuals can meet a collective 
emission-reduction target through individual contributions. Heterogeneity is introduced into 
the experiment by varying players’ marginal productivity to the public good as well as their 
absolute returns to the private account, such that their relative, external marginal contribution 
cost is kept constant. In terms of the experiment framing, this means that players have different 
marginal abatement costs, meaning that it is cheaper for a particular player type to reduce an 
additional unit of emissions relative to another player type. The experiment consists of two 
games: a standard public good game and a communication game where participants are able to 
communicate with their group members in order to discuss how best to meet the target.  
 
As previously mentioned, communication has been found (in an experimental setting) to be a 
useful conduit for improving contribution rates in public good games (Ledyard 1995). 
However, it is less clear whether this will still be the case when players have asymmetric 
                                                          
1 Stakeholder participation in this context refers to government engagement with various groups of affected 
individuals in the design of policy. For example, active involvement of coal mining and the oil and gas industries, 
corporates, non-governmental and environmental organizations, and households in the design of a domestic 













marginal abatement costs. In this instance, stakeholder engagement could be counterproductive 
by emphasising dissimilarities between players and amplifying disagreement.2  
 
In this context, Reuben and Riedl (2013) note that the experimental evidence from public good 
games with symmetric players and sanctioning reflects the contribution norm of equal 
contributions, which, because players are symmetric, are all synonymous with the fairness 
principles of efficiency, equality and equity as applied to income.3 But in a setting where 
players are heterogeneous, these same principles can have markedly different implications for 
contribution behaviour, making it more difficult for players to reach consensus on a 
contribution norm (Reuben and Riedl 2013). For example, in a climate change context where 
individuals differ in terms of their marginal abatement costs (as is the case in the experiment 
reported here), should individuals with a low marginal cost of abatement (MCA) contribute 
more to mitigation (the public good) even though all individuals derive the same benefit from 
mitigation? In the laboratory setting, a player with a low MCA might well adopt the principle 
of equality as applied to mitigation. In this context, as both low and high-MCA types must 
reduce emissions equally, low-MCA types benefit by being able to generate the same emission 
reduction as high types through smaller contributions to the public good. Conversely, players 
with a high MCA might advocate for equality as applied to emissions. In this case, if low types 
are twice as productive in reducing emissions relative to high types, they will be responsible 
for reducing twice as many emissions. An additional layer of complexity in a climate change 
context arises from the notion of historical responsibility (reflecting the polluter-pays 
principle): specifically, does the fact that a particular player type is less responsible for the 
current stock of emissions in the atmosphere make them less responsible for public good 
provision? As such, with respect to the negotiation of domestic climate policy, heterogeneous 
stakeholder have an array of legitimate-sounding fairness principles from which to choose. In 
this context, several studies find evidence of a self-serving bias – whereby individuals’ 
judgements of what is fair are aligned with their own self-interest (Babcock, Wang and 
Loewenstein 1996, Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, Babcock et al. 1997).  
 
The results indicate that heterogeneity does diminish the impact of communication by making 
it harder for groups to reach consensus on a contribution strategy. Specifically, around 21% of 
                                                          
2 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.  
3 For example, Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Anderson and Putterman (2006) find that 













groups were unable to reach agreement. Of those that did reach a consensus, there was 
overwhelming support for a contribution strategy that reflected the principle of equality of 
income (and which specified that all group members contribute their full endowment to 
mitigation (public account).   
 
Furthermore, with communication permitted between players, average contributions of both 
player-types increased significantly (relative to the baseline), as did the proportion of perfect 
co-operators (players contributing their full endowment to mitigation), suggesting that 
communication helps “high cooperators” to coordinate strategies (Gächter and Herrmann 
2009). These results suggest that communication (and more broadly, stakeholder participation) 
is an important component of the policy-making process.  
 
However, less encouragingly, while communication does improve cooperation, on average, it 
does not adequately facilitate public good provision. With the introduction of communication, 
two dominant contribution norms of free-riding and perfect cooperation emerge. In addition, 
while two thirds of groups agreed that all players should contribute their full endowment to 
mitigation, there was no instance where all group members actually complied with this 
agreement. The experimental design afforded participants are significant degree of anonymity 
(i.e. feedback on the individual contributions of group members was not provided) and it is 
likely that this anonymity coupled with non-binding nature of the group consensus accounts 
for the pervasive free riding evidence from both player types (and particularly players with a 
high-MCA). While the introduction of communication significantly increased the proportion 
of groups that met that target, from 35% in the baseline game to 50% with communication, in 
the context of meeting the mitigation target necessary to avoid a warming above 2°C, 50% 
compliance with the target is not sufficient to prevent catastrophic climate change.  
 
Within a climate change setting, these combined results highlight the potential for 
communication as a mechanism to promote cooperation and the problems associated with non-
binding agreements; and emphasise the need for stripping away of anonymity (for example 
through mandatory reporting)  and for enhancing accountability (through fines for 
noncompliance).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: a literature review is provided in Section 2 while the rationale 













procedures are outlined in Section 4 while the experimental results are described in Section 5. 
Finally, the paper concludes in Section 6.  
 
2 Literature review 
 
While the usual theoretical assumptions predict that non-binding communication will not deter 
free-riding, the experimental evidence suggests that communication within a homogeneous 
public good-game setting significantly improves cooperation (Gächter and Herrmann 2009, 
Ledyard 1995, Sally 1995, Ostrom et al. 1992, Ostrom 1998). Oprea et al. (2013) assess the 
impact of communication on continuous and discrete-time public good games using non-
binding, chat-room-based communication. In both the discrete and continuous time settings, 
cooperation is modest at the outset and decays over time. With the introduction of 
communication, average contributions increase for both discrete and continuous treatments - 
but mean and median contribution rates are significantly higher in continuous time. As players 
in the continuous time interaction were able to constantly monitor each other’s allocations and 
respond immediately, the authors argue that such responsiveness resolved the coordination 
problem.  
 
However, as mentioned, if one considers stakeholder participation to be a real-world extension 
of communication in a laboratory setting, a key characteristic of stakeholder participation is 
that a large degree of heterogeneity exists amongst those engaging in the policy process.  
 
In terms of voluntary public good provisions (without communication as a mechanism to 
improve cooperation) the evidence from public good games with homogenous players show 
that players make positive but suboptimal contributions to public good provision (Ledyard 
1995, Cherry et al. 2005, Gächter and Herrmann 2009). In contrast, the effect of heterogeneity 
on cooperation is not fully clear from the literature. For example, while the effect of income 
heterogeneity on contributions has been examined via introducing endowment heterogeneity, 
the results of such studies are mixed with some authors finding endowment asymmetry 
increases cooperation (Chan et al. 1996, 1999; Buckley and Croson, 2006), and others 
concluding that cooperation is diminished (Anderson et al. 2008, Cherry et al. 2005). Palfrey 
and Prisbrey (1997) assign subjects different rates of return for their private accounts and find 













contribution), the lower the cooperation rates. Fisher et al. (1995) examine heterogeneity by 
varying the marginal per capita return (MPCR) within groups.4 High types have a MPCR of 
0.3 while low types have a MPCR of 0.75. While subjects were told not to assume that all 
participants have the same MPCR, they were not explicitly told that within-group MPCRs 
differed. The game was played in two ten-period sessions. Upon commencement of the second 
period, participants swapped player-type (with low types adopting the MPCR of high types and 
vice versa). While the descriptive statistics indicate that in both ten-year sessions, high-MPCR 
players contribute more to public good provision relative to low-MPCR players, these 
differentials are only significant in the second session. The authors conclude that contributions 
to the public good are strongly incentivised by the MPCR. 
 
Additionally, the impact of communication on public good provision is less clear when 
heterogeneity is present. Using a linear public good game, Isaac and Walker (1998) find non-
binding communication to increase voluntary contributions significantly when players have 
symmetric and asymmetric endowments (relative to a no-communication-symmetric-
endowment treatment). However, contribution levels are significantly higher when players 
have symmetric endowments (relative to asymmetric endowments). The authors conclude that 
the efficiency of communication decreases as choice environments become more complex (for 
example through introducing asymmetry, varying information provision and increasing group 
size).  
 
A number of studies examine the impact of sanctioning and communication in a heterogeneous 
setting by varying the MPCR (Reuben and Riedl 2009, 2013) or the marginal productivity to 
the public good (Tan 2008, Noussair and Tan 2011, Fellner et al. 2011).  
 
Reuben and Riedl (2009) examine the impact of sanctioning when heterogeneity is present. 
Participants are in “priviledged groups” where one player has a MPCR of 1.5 and a dominant 
strategy of contributing his full endowment while the remaining players have a MPCR of 0.5 
(with the usual dominant strategy of free riding). The authors find that in the absence of 
punishment opporunities, there is significant underprovision of the public good in privildged 
groups – although when compared to normal groups, average contributions in priviledged 
                                                          














groups are significantly higher. While average contributions in both priviledged and normal 
groups increase with the introduction of sanctioning, punishment is less effective in a 
priviledged group setting. Specifically, relative to normal groups, contributions of low-benefit 
members in priviledged groups are less responsive to punishment. Reuben and Riedl (2013) 
introduce heterogeneity by varying (in different treatments): (i) players’ endowments, 
maximum permissable contribution and MPCR. In the absence of punishment, differentials in 
the contributions of different player types (across all groups) are small and diminish over time, 
with free-riding by both player types emerging as the dominant contribution behaviour. With 
the introduction of punishment, average contributions of both player types increase in all 
groups. In addition, contributions differ markedly across group types. The authors find that 
different kinds of heterogeneity are associated with different contributions norms – with the 
most normatively appealing contribution rules seemingly being the efficiency rule, equal 
contributions rule and and a rule denoting that contributions be proportional to endowment.  
 
Tan (2008) examines the impact of productive heterogeneity on cooperation. In the asymmetric 
treatment, players benefit equally from mitigation but the contributions of high types generate 
higher returns than the contributions of low types. In the absence of punishment, the author 
finds average group contributions to be signi icantly lower when heterogeneity is present 
(relative to a homogeneous control group) amid dramatic free-riding among low types coupled 
with insufficient contributions from high types (the results of the experiment reported here 
support this finding). However, average contribution rates of high types are found to be 
significantly higher than that of low types. Average contribution levels increase with the 
introduction of punishment. Furthermore, high productivity players are punished the most and 
also respond more actively to that punishment – implying a general consensus around a social 
norm dictating that high-productivity types bear more responsibility for fostering cooperation.  
Noussair and Tan (2011) similarly consider the impact of productive heterogeneity on 
cooperation. Players vote at regular intervals to punish below-average and/or above-average 
contributors of each player-type. While the institution enabling the punishment of below-
average contributors, regardless of type, is the most efficient (as measured in the metrics of 
contributions and earnings), the authors find that groups seldom enact this institution as 
participants veto punishment institutions that sanction their type. Consequently inefficient 














Fellner et al. (2011) examine the role of information provision on contribution patterns in a 
public-good-game setting with productive heterogeneity. Information provision is varied 
across treatments: in an initial treatment players are aware of their own type and of the nominal 
contributions of other players, in a subsequent treatment players are additionally made aware 
of the distribution of productivity types within their group and, in a final treatment, players are 
able to link contributions to productivity type. When information provision is incomplete and 
players can’t link contributions to player type, low-productivity types contribute significantly 
more than high types. Conversely, under full information, when productivity type is linked to 
individual contribution, high types contribute significantly more than low types. The authors 




As previously mentioned, the experiment reported here considers whether groups of 
heterogeneous individuals can meet a collective emission-r duction target through individual 
contributions. While the emission-reduction target (as per the framing) is not binding in the 
games discussed in this paper, it is emphasised to participants. Zizzo (2010) discusses 
experimenter demand effects (EDEs) whereby subjects modify their behaviour in response to 
cues from the experimenter with regard to what is appropriate behaviour. We are not concerned 
about the confounding effects of EDEs in this design given that, in a climate change context, 
governmental bodies place explicit pressure on citizens to, amongst others, use less electricity, 
use public transport and recycle. By emphasising the emission reduction target, we are merely 
providing the same social cues as government, which is necessary given the framing of the 
experiment.  
 
Various studies have shown that adding context (framing) to experimental instructions 
significantly alters the results (Eckel and Grossman 1996, Lieberman et al. 2004, Burnham et 
al. 2000).5 Eckel and Grossman (1996) argue that in order to introduce the social and 
                                                          
5 Eckel and Grossman (1996) use a double-anonymous dictator game but frame the instructions by replacing the 
anonymous recipient with a well-known charity. Altruistic giving is significantly increased. Lieberman et al. 
(2004) conduct a repeated public good game with undergraduate students and Israeli pilots. The game is labelled 
as the Wall Street Game for half the participants and the Community Game for the other half. Cooperation was 
significantly less in the Wall Street Game. In a 2-person trust game, Burnham et al. (2000) substitute either the 
word “partner” or “opponent” into the instructions. Across pooled data, the authors find partners are significantly 













psychological factors that affect economic decision making, abstraction needs to be abandoned, 
at least to some extent. Lowenstein (1999) argues that the external validity of experimental 
results can be enhanced when appropriate context is added. The previous studies are compared 
to a paper by Abbink and Schmidt (2006), who contrast context-free and in-context instructions 
in a bribery experiment, and find no significant difference between the two frames. The authors 
argue that as the neutral version of the experiment adequately conveys the essential features of 
a bribery situation, framing the instructions does not enhance the subjects’ interpretation of the 
game.  
 
However, in the real-world climate change context, individuals are extremely divided on who 
bears the responsibility of reducing emissions, which policy instruments would be most 
effective (carbon tax or emission trading scheme, for example) and who should bear the cost 
of mitigation (the consumer or producer). In addition, climate change discourses become 
extremely emotionally charged and clouded by issues of social and distributive justice. In the 
United States support for climate change legislation even has a political dimension, with the 
Democratic Party associated with being pro-climate legislation and Republicans perceived as 
opponents.  
 
As a result, it is the contention of this paper that, unlike in the case of Abbink and Schmidt 
(2006), completely abstract terminology does not sufficiently encapsulate all the dimensions 
of the real-life context.6 While we do not claim that the framing successfully encapsulates all 
these dimensions, it does enable subjects to draw on their own subjective perceptions about 
climate mitigation when deciding on their contribution strategy.  
 
As will be discussed, subjects are referred to in the instructions as capital (firms) and labour 
(households). Subjects are merely told that these classifications represent different sectors of 
society with different abatement costs. We do not make any judgements about capital or labour 
in the text – for example that capital is “dirty” and is responsible for a greater proportion of 
emissions relative to labour, or that, according to income and historical responsibility, capital 
                                                          
6 Note that this study does not consider the extent to which context affects behaviour. We are rather assuming that 













should be responsible for the bulk of emission reduction. All the wording in the instructions, 
beyond the framing of reduction of an emissions inventory, is neutral.7  
 
4 Experiment 
   
The experiment was conducted with 204 students recruited from the University of Cape Town 
in South Africa. On average, subjects were 21 years old and over 60% were male. Students 
from a broad spectrum of faculties, including commerce, humanities and the built environment, 
were targeted for participation. Sample statistics are provided in Appendix B.  
 
Thirty-four groups of four students each participated in a series of one-shot linear public good 
games. As mentioned, the public good games were framed in terms of climate change 
mitigation and subjects allocated their endowment of 10 experimental currency units (ECUs) 
between mitigation (public account) and business-as-usual (private account). While 
participants were urged to meet a national emission reduction target, this target was not binding 
in the games discussed in this article.  
 
Heterogeneity was introduced by varying players’ marginal abatement costs. Within each 
group, two players were allocated a low MCA (high-productivity types) and two players are 
allocated a high MCA (low-productivity types). In terms of the framing, low-MCA players 
were told to think of themselves as representing capital (and in particular firms) while high-
MCA players were framed in terms of labour (and in particular as households). Throughout the 
paper, these two player types are hereafter referred to as low and high-MCA players. The reader 





                                                          
7 What emerges is that subjects have clear attitudes about climate change (Appendix A). Specifically, 77% of 
subjects feel that firms should definitely be obligated to meet emission reduction targets, while only 15% feel that 










































ccc                                                                        (2) 
 
where cl and ch signify investments in mitigation (the public account) by low-MCA and high-
MCA players, respectively. 
 
A player with a low marginal abatement cost is able to reduce more emissions with one ECU 
relative to a player with a high MCA. This is reflected in the players’ payoff functions as 
asymmetric marginal contributions to the public account (productive heterogeneity has been 
introduced) (Tan 2008). Specifically, every ECU contributed towards mitigation (public 
account) by low and high-MCA players is multiplied by a factor of 20 and 10, respectively 
(equations 1 and 2).8 The accumulated total of ECUs in the public account (after being 
multiplied by the relevant factor of 20 and/or 10) denotes the emission reduction of the group. 
Appendix D denotes emissions reductions, by player type, per ECU allocated to mitigation 
(public good). 
 
Participants are told that government has set a national emission reduction target of 240 units. 
This target can be met through low and high-MCA player-types contributing different 
combinations of EC s to the public account (Appendix D). Note that although players are 
urged to meet the target, the target is not binding in the baseline and communication games. 
As will be discussed in the following sub-section, the target becomes binding in two tax games 
which are not discussed here.9 More broadly, in terms of the framing, as South Africa is party 
                                                          
8 Households have limited avenues with which to achieve significant reductions in electricity consumption; 
specifically, households can purchase solar water heaters, geyser blankets, replace incandescent light bulbs with 
more efficient Compact Fluorescent Light bulbs (CFLs), and reduce heating requirements by improving 
insulation. While expensive for the average household, many of these measures are prohibitively expensive for 
low-income households. Conversely, in addition to the above measures, the commercial sector can take advantage 
of “low hanging fruit” (decommission lifts and revolving doors, use timers to switch off lights in buildings and 
parking lots etc.).  It is therefore assumed that capital has a lower marginal cost of abatement relative to labour, 
and is able to reduce more emissions with one ECU. 
9 In the first tax scenario, both player types must reduce emissions equally, irrespective of the difference in the cost of 













to the United Nations climate change convention, specifying a particular target is equivalent to 
Government agreeing to a specific quantifiable mitigation obligation under the Copenhagen 
Accord and then engaging stakeholders around this target. 
 
Players earn a return from investing in mitigation (public account). On a global scale, given 
the assumption that a country’s national abatement target forms part of a multilateral 
commitment (such as the Kyoto Protocol), returns to mitigation quantify the benefits of reduced 
likelihood of dangerous climate change (such as an extreme weather event). On a national 
scale, the returns quantify reduced pressure on the grid as mitigation is translated into a 
reduction in electricity usage. As everyone benefits equally from mitigation and no one is 
excluded from these benefits, the accumulated total of ECUs in the public account is distributed 
equally among the four group members – irrespective of individual contribution. As such, one 
ECU invested in mitigation by a low-MCA player generates a return, for each group member, 
of five ECUs; similarly, one ECU invested in mitigation by a high-MCA player generates a 
return, for each group member, of 2.5 ECUs. 
 
In terms of the framing, participants were told that the private account represents investment 
opportunities other than mitigation. Since capital (low-MCA players) can more easily invest in 
productive (income-generating) activities, as compared to labour, capital generates a higher 
return from money invested in the private account. As such, each ECU contributed by low-
MCA players (capital) to the private account generates a return of 12 ECUs as compared to a 
return of 6 for high-MCA players (labour) (equations 1 and 2). As such, the marginal per capita 
return, which is the ratio between the marginal value of an ECU invested in the public account 
and the marginal value of an ECU invested in the private account, is 0.42, the same for both 
player types, again indicating that everyone derives the same benefits from mitigation. 
 
As evident from equations (1) and (2) and the preceding discussion, there are two sources of 
heterogeneity. Specifically, heterogeneity is introduced into the design by varying players’ 
marginal productivity to the public good as well as their absolute returns to the private account. 
Despite this fact, the social dilemma structure of the game remains intact: specifically, for both 
                                                          
both player-types can reduce emissions by different quantities as long as they contribute the same amount in ECUs. If 
each player contributes four ECUs, each group will collectively meet the emission reduction target but low-MCA 














player types, the return to allocating an ECU to the private account is greater than the return 
from allocating an ECU to the public account (MPCR < 1) ensuring that the dominant strategy 
is to contribute zero ECUs (Goeree et al. (2002). While the incentive structure of the game 
remains intact by keeping the MPCR constant (at 0.42 for both player types), we wanted the 
framing to be consistent with the external context that these different types of players or firms 
would normally face with regards to the climate change dilemma – hence the differences in 
returns to private investment and also the differences in marginal abatement costs.  
 
Goeree et al. (2002) denote the differential between the return on the public account (internal 
return) and the return on the private account as the “net cost of contribution”. While player’s 
MPCR don’t differ, their net cost of contributions do differ: high-MCA players have a net cost 
of contribution of 3.5 while low-MCA players have a net cost of contribution of 7. While it is 
possible this differential might impact on players’ contribution decisions, from the chat 
transcripts (to be discussed later in this article) it is evident that players are almost exclusively 
focused on the MCA component of the design and on productive heterogeneity in terms of 
contributions to the public account. As such, the discussion through the text focuses around the 
impact of the heterogeneity of marginal abatement costs.  
 
The communication game is identical to the baseline game except that, before contributing to 
the public account, group members are allowed to participate in costless online communication 
in order to discuss, as a group, how best to meet the target. However, prior to the 
commencement of the chat, players were informed that the group decision was not binding, 




The experiment treatments are outlined in table 1. Treatment 1 (T1) consists of the baseline 
games and acts as a control. Treatments 2 and 3 (T2 and T3) consist of baseline, communication 
and tax games, and differ only in the ordering of the games.  
 
Note that this article reports the results of the baseline and communication games only.10  
                                                          
10 In T2 and T3, once games 1 – 4 were concluded, subjects were asked to vote on which game they would like 














Table 1. Experiment summary 
Games Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 











1 Baseline1 Baseline1 Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline 
2 Baseline2 Baseline2 Comm. Comm. Tax44 Tax44 
3 Baseline3 Baseline3 Tax36 Tax36 Tax36 Tax36 
4 Baseline4 Baseline4 Tax44 Tax44 Comm. Comm. 
Note:  
 Only the Baseline and Communication games are relevant to this study 
 Each treatment was repeated on two separate days with different participants on each day (in 
the table this is referred to as Session 1 and Session 2) 
 No individual participated in more than 1 session 
 
Participants were recruited through: an advertisement emailed to students and posted on 
various student networking sites, word of mouth, and announcements in lecture theatres. Upon 
entering the lab, participants were randomly allocated an experiment number and player type 
(low or high-MCA type). Participants were provided a R20 show-up fee and an ECU/ZAR 
exchange rate was specified in advance.11  
 
The experiments were conducted over a period of a week. As is evident from table 1, each of 
the three treatments were repeated over two days (referred to in the table as Session 1 and 
Session 2), with different participants in each day/session. Each treatment lasted approximately 
2-3 hours (including payment).  Participants were given four envelopes, each containing a 
summary sheet and set of instructions for the first four games.12 The instructions were read 
aloud by the same enumerator over the week.  
 
Throughout all the games, players were aware of the payoff functions of both player types as 
well as of the distribution of types within their group. Given the climate change framing, 
subjects were not provided any feedback information regarding the contribution behaviour of 
their group members, the rationale being that, in a real-world setting, emission reduction totals 
are often estimates, there is a lag between mitigation activities and reporting by authorities and, 
in many instances, reporting is voluntary as opposed to mandatory (as is currently the case in 
South Africa). Additionally, participants were not provided any feedback regarding their 
payoffs.  
 
                                                          
11 ECU/ZAR = 0.25  













In addition to a number of worked examples, participants were provided with a payoff table 
reflecting the payoff for each player type given their contributions and the contributions of the 
other players. Finally, Excel-based calculators reflecting the payoffs for each player-type were 
made available to the participants in an effort to lighten their cognitive load.   
 
At the end of each game, subjects would enter their contribution on a decision sheet. These 
were collected by invigilators so that the enumerator could calculate the group’s total 
contribution and thus each individual’s earnings.  
 
In all games discussed here, groups were reassigned after each game so that no person was in 
the same group twice.  
 
During the communication game, players were able to communicate with their group members 
via an online chat programme. For the duration of the chat, players were provided with 
pseudonyms and individual identities remained anonymous.  The chat sessions lasted 
approximately 20 minutes. While the chat sessions were monitored to prevent inappropriate 
language, no further restrictions were placed on participants. The communication game was 
the only game in which participants were able to interact with one another.  
 
Anticipating that multiple contribution strategies could be proposed by the different members 
of the group and that a group might not necessarily reach consensus during the discussion, 
towards the end of the chat session the group members informally voted on which contribution 
strategy to adopt. For groups that had reached consensus during the chat, this vote simply 
amounted to a confirmation of the chosen contribution strategy. For groups that had not agreed 
on a contribution strategy, the vote provided a last opportunity for the players to reach 
consensus. However, even if the group reached agreement during the discussion and vote, 
players were informed that the group decision was not binding, and that they remained free to 
make their own contribution decisions. Information around the proportion of groups that 
reached consensus and the proposed contribution strategies is provided in Section 5.5. Groups 















Finally, once all the games were completed, participants answered a short questionnaire that 
captured their demographic information and attempted to gauge attitudes towards climate 
change (some of these attitudes are reflected in Appendix A). 
 
While the experiment had a climate change framing, the instructions were neutrally-worded in 
relation to issues around distributive justice; ideas such as equity, equality and fairness were 




Mann-Whitney tests confirm there to be no significant difference in the distribution of the 
baseline and communication experiments in session 1 versus 2 of treatment 2 (baseline: p = 
0.9751, communication: p = 0.6887) and session 1 versus 2 of treatment 3 (baseline: p = 0.1306, 
communication: p = 0.1600). As such, sessions are pooled across treatments. Furthermore, 
baseline and communication games in treatments 2 and 3 are also pooled (Mann-Whitney tests: 
baseline: p = 0.1624 and communication: p = 0.1273). 
 
5.1 Average contributions 
 
Average contributions for the (pooled) baseline and communication games are reflected in 
table 2.  
 
Observation 1: Participants make voluntary but suboptimal contributions to public good 
provision 
Observation 2: Contributions do not significantly differ by player-type 
 
Climate change epitomises the public good dilemma of acting in ones’ own interest versus 
acting in the interest of the collective. While the dominant strategy in a linear public good game 
is for each player to free-ride, as evident from table 2, average contributions as a percentage of 
endowment (across both player-types) range between 22% and 29% in the four baseline games 
in treatment 1, and are 32% in the baseline game in treatments 2 & 3 (pooled). These 
contributions are consistent with evidence from empirical data which suggest that people make 













2005, Gächter and Herrmann 2009). In a climate change setting, instances of voluntary (but 
suboptimal) mitigation are evident at the individual level, where people voluntarily reduce 
energy consumption, invest in energy saving technologies (such as solar panels and solar water 
heaters) and support producers who have taken steps to reduce their carbon footprint.  
 
However, the contribution levels in the baseline games reflected in table 2 are lower than those 
found in the literature, where contributions to public good provision in one-shot public good 
games typically average between 40% and 60% of endowments. The low contribution rates 
revealed by this experiment are likely driven by the high return from investing in business-as-
usual (private account) relative to investing in mitigation (public account). The experimental 
evidence shows that contributions are higher the more attractive the marginal return from 
investing in the public account (Gächter and Herrmann 2009).  In the design of this experiment, 
an ECU invested in mitigation by a low-MCA player (high-MCA player) generates a return of 
5 (2.5) ECUs relative to a return of 12 (6) for an ECU invested in the private account (equations 
1 and 2). This conflict epitomises the climate change dilemma where individual returns on 
mitigation, particularly in the short term, are extremely low.  
 
Table 2. Average contributions 















































    






    
Notes:  
 Participants are provided with an endowment of ten ECUs at the start of each game 
 See Appendix E for average contributions for treatments 2 and 3 separately.  
 
When comparing average contribution rates, Mann-Whitney tests reveal there to be no 
significant difference between the contributions of capital and labour in the four baseline games 
in treatment 1 as well as the baseline game in treatments 2 & 3 (pooled) (p > 0.080 for all 
games). The implication is that investment in mitigation does not differ according to productive 













opportunities, heterogeneity is not relevant and, furthermore, that the dominant contribution 
norm is that of free-riding.  
 
5.2 The distribution of contributions to mitigation 
 
Observation 3: Free-riding is the dominant contribution norm for both player-types 
 
An examination of individual contribution rates reveals that the dominant contribution strategy 
for both players is to free-ride (contribute nothing towards public good provision).  
 
Table 3 depicts the frequency of contributions of between zero and ten ECUs to public good 
provision for the baseline games in treatment 1 and treatments 2 & 3 (pooled).  
 
It is apparent from the table that free-riding is the dominant contribution strategy for both player 
types: in all the baseline games, binomial tests indicate that the proportion of contributions of 
zero ECUs significantly differs from the proportion of contributions at all other contribution 
levels at the 5% level.13 
 
Table 3. Frequency distribution of contributions to the public good in the baseline games 
 Contribution 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Treatment 1 
 Low-MCA player type (n=34) 
 Baseline 1 0.324 0.029 0.177 0.206 0.059 0.088 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 Baseline 2 0.529 0.118 0.059 0.059 0.088 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.000 
 Baseline 3 0.353 0.147 0.147 0.118 0.029 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.059 0.000 0.000 
 Baseline 4 0.382 0.147 0.088 0.118 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.059 
 High-MCA player type (n=34) 
 Baseline 1 0.294 0.088 0.118 0.088 0.177 0.059 0.029 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.088 
 Baseline 2 0.324 0.088 0.147 0.059 0.147 0.059 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.088 
 Baseline 3 0.500 0.088 0.177 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.059 
 Baseline 4 0.353 0.177 0.088 0.118 0.059 0.029 0.088 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.029 
Treatment 2 & 3 (pooled)  
 Low-MCA player type (n=34) 
 Baseline 0.206 0.103 0.059 0.191 0.162 0.074 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.000 0.059 
 High-MCA player type (n=34) 
 Baseline 0.338 0.074 0.088 0.059 0.132 0.132 0.074 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.059 
 
                                                          
13 With the exception of Baseline 1 in treatment 1 for the low-MCA player, where the proportion of contributions 
of zero ECUs (0.324) significantly differs from the proportion of contributions of 3 ECUs  













The results from the baseline games indicate that, while there is a degree of voluntary 
cooperation, there is a significant amount of free-riding. Likewise, in a climate change context, 
not all developed and large emerging economies are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol and, on 
a domestic level, not all individuals take steps to reduce their carbon footprints. As 
communication has been shown significantly to improve cooperation in homogeneous public 
good games, the opportunity for communication is introduced.  
 
5.3 Average contributions (treatments 2 & 3pooled) 
 
Observation 4: Communication significantly improves average contributions  
 
With communication, average contributions of low-MCA players increased to 47.5% of 
endowment as compared to 41.3% for high-MCA player-types (table 2). Relative to the 
baseline game, average contributions increased significantly for both player-types with the 
introduction of communication (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: Average: p = 0.001; capital: p = 
0.018; labour: p = 0.034). In addition, average contributions of the two player-types do not 
differ significantly with communication (Mann-Whitney test: p=0.184), once again implying 
that investment in mitigation does not differ according to productive heterogeneity. 
 
The impact of communication on contributions to the public good (mitigation) is also examined 
via OLS regression using the pooled data from the baseline and communication games in 
treatments 2 & 3 (table 4). Dummy variables for experimental treatment (treatment 2 relative 
to 3) and session, player type (low-MCA type) and game (communication relative to baseline) 
are included in the model. In addition variables reflecting participants’ demographics (gender 
and age) as well as their attitudes towards climate change are included in the model. The 
climate change attitudinal variables are dummy variables relating to whether participants think 
greenhouse gases have a large (as opposed to partial) effect on global warming (GHGs), 
whether human activities are largely (as opposed to partially) responsible for climate change 
(Human) and, finally, whether South Africa should definitely/probably adopt quantifiable 
emission reduction targets (as opposed to probably or definitely not) (Climate policy). 
Equations 2 - 4 in table 4 are random effects panel data regressions. The dependent variable is 














Table 4. Contributions to the public good, by game and player type, treatments 2 & 3 (pooled) 
Dep. variable: Contribution level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables (Baseline) (Baseline & 
Comm.) 
(Baseline & 








      
Treatment  -0.796 -0.950 -1.882** -0.161 -1.107 
 (0.487) (0.529) (0.714) (0.753) (0.755) 
Session -0.564 -0.493 -1.389* 0.249 -0.416 
 (0.480) (0.518) (0.673) (0.776) (0.736) 
Low-MCA player 0.0604    0.305 
 (0.509)    (0.750) 
Communication  1.250** 1.338** 1.164*  
  (0.328) (0.454) (0.489)  
Female 0.344 0.110 0.500 0.0109 -0.122 
 (0.474) (0.529) (0.687) (0.785) (0.758) 
Age < 20 -0.211 0.369 0.634 0.125 0.981 
 (0.474) (0.522) (0.707) (0.765) (0.763) 
GHGs -0.908 -0.631 -0.0480 -1.110 -0.318 
 (0.683) (0.673) (0.805) (1.063) (0.910) 
Human -0.310 -0.338 0.143 -0.949 -0.344 
 (0.554) (0.641) (0.812) (1.007) (0.918) 
Climate policy 2.052** 2.811** 4.285** 3.142** 3.434* 
 (0.628) (0.786) (1.059) (1.052) (1.332) 
Constant 3.250** 2.194 1.586 1.321 2.276 
 (0.867) (1.141) (1.047) (1.752) (1.842) 
Prob > F/ Wald chi2 0.008 0.000 0.0000 0.068 0.122 
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Regression 2 confirms that average contributions are significantly higher in the communication 
game. Regression 3 confirms that contributions of players with low abatement costs 
significantly increase with communication. While Regression 4 indicates that high-MCA 
player-types significantly increased average contributions after communication, the p-value 
associated with the Wald chi-square statistic indicates that the null hypothesis that all model 
coefficients are zero can only be rejected at the 10% level. Regression 1 and 5 indicate that 
contributions do not differ significantly by player-type in both the baseline and communication 
experiments. 14 Finally, indicating that the climate change framing does matter, there appears 
                                                          
14 To control for possible ordering effects, a dummy variable for both treatment and session have been included 
in the regression analysis (table 4). As ordering effects are evident in regression 3, for low-MCA player types, 
auxiliary regressions were run for treatments 2 and 3 separately (see results in appendix F). While auxiliary 
regression 1 suggests that contributions of low-MCA players do not increase significantly with communication in 
treatment 2, communication is synonymous with greater cooperation in treatment 3 (auxiliary regression 2). To 
further test for ordering effects, the analysis is replicated for both treatments 2 and 3 separately. Broadly, the 
results of the paper remain unchanged. Specifically: (i) free-riding among both player-types is pervasive in both 













to be a general result whereby individuals that support South Africa adopting quantifiable 
emission reduction targets are more cooperative within the game. In terms of magnitude of 
result, this positive attitudinal variable has a larger effect on contribution that the provision of 
communication.  
 
5.4 The distribution of contributions to emissions (treatments 2 & 3 
pooled) 
 
Observation 5: Contributions are polarised between free-riding and perfect cooperation 
Observation 6: Players with high marginal abatement costs are more likely to free-ride  
 
Table 5 reflects the frequency of contributions to mitigation (public good) for the pooled 
baseline and communication games by player-type.  
 
As is evident from table 5, the frequency of free-riding (contributing zero ECUs) increases with 
the introduction of communication. Specifically, the proportion of capital free-riders increases 
from 20.6% in the baseline game to 26.4% with communication, although this increase is not 
significant (McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.248). The proportion of labour players free-riding 
increases significantly from 33.8% in the baseline game to 45.6% with communication 
(McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.033). The tendency to free-ride generally persists across 
treatments with approximately 71% of capital players and 87% of labour players who free-ride 
in the baseline game continuing to free-ride with the introduction of communication.  
 
Finally, labour players free-ride with greater frequency relative to capital players in both the 
baseline and communication games (although this result is only significant in the 
communication game) (Chi-square tests: Baseline: p = 0.083; Communication: p = 0.020). This 
result suggests that high-MCA players under-contribute to the public good relative to their 
capital counterparts with a lower marginal cost. 
                                                          
are polarized between free-riding and perfect cooperation, (iii) the frequency of perfect cooperation increases 
significantly for both player-types with communication and (iv) public good provision (in terms of the proportion 
of groups meeting the target) increases with communication. In addition, the chat transcripts indicate there to be 
no significant difference in subjects’ negotiation attitudes in treatments 2 and 3. In both treatments, the majority 















Table 5. Frequency distributions of contributions – treatments 2 & 3 (pooled) 
Game Contribution (ECUs) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Average (n=136) 
Baseline 0.272 0.088 0.073 0.125 0.147 0.103 0.066 0.022 0.044 0.000 0.059 
Comm. 0.360 0.037 0.052 0.037 0.059 0.059 0.037 0.029 0.022 0.029 0.279 
Low-MCA players (n=68) 
Baseline 0.206 0.103 0.059 0.191 0.162 0.074 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.00 0.059 
Comm. 0.264 0.044 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.088 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.015 0.309 
High-MCA players (n=68) 
Baseline 0.338 0.074 0.088 0.059 0.132 0.132 0.074 0.014 0.029 0.00 0.059 
Comm. 0.456 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.044 0.250 
 
Players who contribute their full endowment to mitigation (public good) are referred to as 
perfect co-operators. The percentage of capital players contributing 10 ECUs to the public good 
increased significantly from 5.9% in the baseline phase to 30.9% with communication 
(McNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.000). Labour players also shows a marked increase in 
cooperation with the introduction of communication – with the proportion of perfect co-
operators increasing significantly from 5.9% to 25% (MacNemar Chi-square test: p = 0.002). 
 
Testing the relationship between player-type and perfect cooperation does not yield a 
statistically significant association in either the baseline or communication games (Chi-square 
tests: Baseline: p =1.000; Communication: p = 0.445). This means that the propensity to 
contribute one’s full endowment to public good provision is independent of player-type.  
 
As is evident from table 5, contributions are polarised between free-riding and perfect 
cooperation. In the baseline game, 26.5% of capital players contribute either 0 or 10 ECUS to 
the public good. This proportion increases to 57.3% with communication. Likewise, the 
proportion of labour players contributing either 0 or 10 ECUs increases from 39.7% in the 
baseline to 70.6% in the communication game.  
 
The impact of communication and player-type on contributions to the public good (mitigation) 
is further examined using a hurdle model, the results of which are reported in table 6. Once 
again the dependent variable is participants’ contributions in the relevant game. The 
explanatory variables are familiar from table 4. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2010) and 
Garcia (2013), it is assumed that the decision to cooperate (contribute to the public good of 













subject decides whether s/he wants to contribute or free-ride (the participation decision) and, 
secondly, determines the optimal contribution amount (quantity decision) assuming the 
decision to not free ride. The participation outcome (zero vs. positive) is modelled using 
logistic regression while the quantity outcome is modelled using a zero-truncated negative 
binomial regression. The corner solution in this context is zero given that free-riders will 
contribute zero tokens and contributions to the public good can’t be negative.  
 
With respect to the interpretation of the results, a positive coefficient in panel A (logit model) 
indicates that the given regressor increases the probability of a positive observation (not free 
riding); in panel B, a positively signed coefficient indicates that, conditional on not free-riding, 
the regressor increases the level of contribution (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). The results of 
the hurdle model echo the preliminary discussion.  
 
The results from panel A indicate that, in the communication treatment (regression 5), low-
MCA players are more likely to contribute positively to the public good (and not free-ride) 
relative to high-MCA players. As evident from table 5, 26% of low-MCA players contributed 
zero ECUs in the pooled communication game, significantly less relative to 46% of high-MCA 
players (Chi-square test: p = 0.020). Furthermore, high-MCA players are more likely to free 
ride in the communication treatment relative to the baseline treatment (regression 4). Also 
reflected in table 5, the proportion of high-MCA players free-riding increases significantly 
from 33.8% in the baseline game to 45.6% with communication (McNemar Chi-square test: p 
= 0.033). 
 
The results from panel B indicate that once the decision to contribute (and not free-ride) has 
been made, contributions are higher for both low and high-MCA players in the communication 
treatment relative to the baseline treatment (regressions 3 & 4). The descriptive statistics 
confirm this. More specifically, conditional on not contributing zero, low and high-MCA 
players contributed on average 4.3 and 4.5 ECUs in the baseline treatment, respectively. In 
contrast, again conditional on not contributing zero, low and high-MCA players contribute on 

















Table 6. Hurdle model estimates, treatments 2 & 3 (pooled) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables (Baseline) (Baseline & 
Comm.) 
(Baseline & 








Panel A: Participation  
Treatment  -0.147 -0.164 -0.624 0.404 -0.0763 
 (0.433) (0.803) (1.028) (1.139) (0.393) 
Session 0.0709 -0.243 -1.114 0.746 -0.206 
 (0.410) (0.768) (1.053) (1.137) (0.379) 
Low-MCA player 0.549    0.799* 
 (0.413)    (0.378) 
Communication  -1.002* -0.699 -1.300*  
  (0.443) (0.623) (0.651)  
Female 0.982* 1.340 0.836 2.228 0.339 
 (0.463) (0.832) (1.053) (1.290) (0.399) 
Age < 20 0.0701 0.747 2.293 -0.291 0.589 
 (0.412) (0.792) (1.247) (1.123) (0.388) 
GHGs -0.576 -0.619 0.155 -0.939 0.0456 
 (0.610) (1.005) (1.291) (1.470) (0.501) 
Human -0.490 -0.523 0.726 -2.031 0.0761 
 (0.518) (0.956) (1.186) (1.621) (0.487) 
Climate policy 0.825 2.277 3.965* 2.618 0.689 
 (0.884) (2.165) (1.784) (2.793) (1.209) 
Constant 0.366 0.688 -0.830 -0.443 -0.568 
 (1.052) (2.264) (1.530) (3.267) (1.357) 
Panel B: Quantity  
Treatment  -0.246* -0.252** -0.429** -0.185 -0.274* 
 (0.114) (0.093) (0.147) (0.106) (0.109) 
Session -0.205 -0.077 -0.228 0.031 0.003 
 (0.117) (0.087) (0.125) (0.110) (0.101) 
Low-MCA player -0.124    -0.241* 
 (0.113)    (0.097) 
Communication  0.487** 0.436** 0.541**  
  (0.066) (0.096) (0.092)  
Female -0.136 -0.121 0.080 -0.298* -0.125 
 (0.114) (0.086) (0.122) (0.123) (0.103) 
Age < 20 -0.079 -0.015 -0.018 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.120) (0.087) (0.131) (0.112) (0.101) 
GHGs -0.065 -0.030 0.063 -0.052 -0.019 
 (0.156) (0.117) (0.167) (0.123) (0.135) 
Human -0.0042 -0.070 -0.064 -0.027 -0.109 
 (0.132) (0.105) (0.132) (0.145) (0.128) 
Climate policy 0.735** 0.831** 0.634** 0.939* 1.086 
 (0.152) (0.322) (0.164) (0.365) (0.564) 
Constant 1.339** 0.984** 1.257** 0.815* 1.258* 
 (0.208) (0.344) (0.178) (0.400) (0.585) 
Notes: Results reported as coefficients; Standard errors in parenthesis; Standard errors are adjusted for 













5.5 Consensus around contribution strategies 
 
As previously mentioned, in a climate change setting where stakeholders engaging in the policy 
process are heterogeneous (for example in their marginal abatement costs), parties to the 
negotiations may struggle to reach consensus on a “fair” way to distribute the abatement 
burden. In this sense, stakeholder engagement could be counterproductive by emphasising 
dissimilarities between players and amplifying disagreement. In this context, in this section we 
examine whether participants were able to reach consensus on a contribution strategy and 
whether a generalisable notion of fairness emerged from the group discussions.  
 
The following discussion on contribution rules is derived from Reuben and Riedl (2013) and 
Fellner et al. (2011) who distinguish between the efficiency rule and the relative contribution 
rule. Additional references are cited in the text.  
 
The efficiency rule relates to maximising collective wellbeing and denotes that participants 
contribute their full endowment to the public good. The relative contribution rule defines a 
“fair contribution” as fair in relation to the contributions of others. Two fairness principles that 
reflect this rule are that of equality and equity (Konow 2003). Equality relates to the 
equalisation of outcomes (for example income or contributions) regardless of individual 
capacity whereas equity denotes a fair outcome to be one where the outcome is proportionate 
to individual capabilities. In the experiment reported here, the application of the principle of 
equality would render irrelevant the heterogeneity in marginal abatement costs of high and 
low-MCA players. Conversely, an application of the equity principle would account for the 
fact that low-MCA types are twice as productive as high types in reducing emissions.  
 
An application of the equality principle to emissions reduction implies that high-MCA players 
contribute twice as much to mitigation as low-MCA players (in order to reduce emissions by 
the same quantity (Appendix D). Conversely, the application of the equity principle to 
emissions reduction denotes that both player types contribute the same amount of ECUs to 
mitigation (in this case low-MCA players are reducing twice the amount of emissions as high 
types) (Appendix D). Due to the heterogeneity in the payoff functions of players, an application 
of equality to income implies that both player types contribute their full endowment to 



















 Equality of income 




Variant of equality 
of emissions 
0.206 0.588 0.147 0.029 0.029 
 Ch = Cl = 10 Ch = Cl Ch = 2Cl Ch = 1.67Ch 
 
Table 7 reflects the proportion of groups reaching consensus on a particular fairness strategy 
(if any). Around 21% of groups were unable to reach any consensus while nearly 60% of groups 
reached consensus on the principle of equality of income. In the context of the experimental 
design, equality of income denotes that all group members (irrespective of player type) 
contribute all ECUs to mitigation. Equality of income is thus also synonymous with efficiency 
as participants are maximising collective wellbeing by contributing their full endowment. The 
discussion in the chat sessions were primarily centred on the idea that the most “fair” strategy 
was one where everyone derived the same income, while efficiency was a secondary focus. 
Around 15% of groups agreed on a contribution strategy reflecting the principle of equity as 
applied to emissions. This strategy specifies equal contributions to public good provision 
(although contributions are less than full endowment). In terms of the framing, this means that 
low-MCA players are reducing twice the am unt of emissions relative to high types. Finally, 
just less than 6% of groups reached consensus on a strategy of equality as applied to emissions 
(both types reduce emissions equally despite differences in marginal abatement costs). In this 
case, high-MCA contribute approximately twice the amount of ECUs to public good provision 
than that of low types.  
 
As mentioned previously, regardless of whether a group reached consensus on a particular 
contribution strategy, the group consensus was not binding and players were free to decide 
their own contribution. Furthermore, as the results from the previous section indicated that 
contributions were polarised between free riding and perfect cooperation, it is evident that there 
was significant noncompliance in terms of participants acting in accordance with the group 
consensus. In particular, in this context of the agreements reached by groups during their online 
discussion, there was no instance where all four group members complied in terms of the 
contributions required by their group’s adopted contribution strategy (for example, despite 59% 
of groups agreeing that all players should contribute their full endowment to mitigation, there 













clear that even though groups were often successful in reaching consensus, the non-binding 
nature of the agreements and lack of enforcement mechanisms allowed players to deviate 
significantly from their agreements.  
 
5.6 Meeting the emission reduction target 
 
The introduction of communication facilitated greater success in reaching the emission 
reduction target. As evident from table 8, in T1, on average, only 18% of groups met the target 
in the four baseline phases. In T2 and T3 (pooled), 35% of groups met the target during the 
baseline phase. This increased significantly to 50% when participants were allowed to 
communicate with one another (McNemar test: p = 0.0075).  
 
Table 8. Success in meeting the Emission Reduction Target 
Group Emission Reduction Target: 2401 










% of groups that met the target 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.50 
Average group emission reduction  169.4 128.8 132.4 141.8 196.8 272.6 
No. of groups 17 17 17 17 34 34 
 
In addition, while an emission reduction of 240 was urged, average group contributions in all 
the baseline games fall short of this target: average group contributions across the four baseline 
games in treatment 1 are 143.1, while the average group contribution in the pooled baseline 
game in treatments 2 and 3 is 196.8. Conversely, average group contributions in the pooled 




While multilateral climate negotiations act as a mechanism for cooperation, they have failed to 
induce widespread participation. The experiment reported here considers whether cooperation 
is possible in such a climate change context. As heterogeneity is a crucial characteristic of 
climate talks, we use a public good game with a climate change framing to examine whether 
groups of heterogeneous individuals can meet a collective emission-reduction target through 
individual contributions. Subjects are able to communicate with one another in order to 














The current model for tackling climate change is a top-down approach in terms of which 
emission reduction targets are negotiated at international climate talks and then implemented 
at a domestic-level. This implementation phase requires a diversity of groups, including 
businesses, rich and poor households, farmers, lobbyists, environmentalists and oil and mining 
companies, to work together to reduce emissions.  
 
The experiment reported here considers the role of communication (and by extension, 
stakeholder participation) in facilitating success in meeting a national mitigation obligation 
when players are asymmetric. Stakeholder participation is increasingly seen as an important 
component of the formulation of policy responses to climate change (and more generally in 
natural resource management) (Few et al. 2006, Parkins and Mitchell 2005, Kasemir et al. 
2003). Without incorporating the publics’ viewpoints, climate policy is likely to be stalled very 
early on in the implementation phase (Kasemir et al. 2003). Accordingly, our results show that 
communication (and by extension, stakeholder participation) plays a valuable role in helping 
players to coordinate mitigation strategies and subsequently reach the reduction target, even 
when those players are heterogeneous. As detailed earlier, players were urged to meet a 
national emission-reduction target of 240 units. Without the opportunity to communicate with 
group members, only 35% of groups (in treatments 2 and 3 (pooled)) were able to meet the 
target. When able to coordinate strategy via online communication, however, this proportion 
increased significantly to 50%. Furthermore, with the introduction of communication, average 
contributions of both low and high-MCA players increased significantly relative to the baseline 
game. Finally, the proportion of perfect co-operators of both player-types (players who 
contribute their full endowment to public good provision) also increased significantly with the 
introduction of communication (Low MCA-players: 30.9%, High MCA-players: 25%).      
 
However, the results also illustrate the problem with non-binding, piecemeal agreements. There 
was significant noncompliance in terms of the group consensus: for example, while 65% of 
groups agreed that each member would contribute their full endowment to the public account, 
there was no group in which this actually happened. In actuality, there was no instance where 
all group members complied with the agreed contribution strategy. In addition, with the 
introduction of communication, the prevalence of free-riding increased significantly (by 
11.8%) among high-MCA players. Furthermore, for both player types, cooperation was 














Fellner et al. (2011) illustrate the impact of information provision on cooperation – particularly 
in instances where individuals contributing to joint tasks have heterogeneous capacities (for 
example different marginal abatement costs). Information provision in this context relates to 
having feedback on the individual contributions of your group members. The authors illustrate 
that as one moves along the spectrum from incomplete information (no information of the 
distribution of types in your group) to complete information (where players can link 
contributions to player type), average contributions of both player types generally increase and 
high-productivity players contribute significantly more than low types. Tan (2008) who also 
provides feedback information to players and Fisher et al. (1995) (who alters the information 
structure by swapping players’ MPCRs) similarly find that high types contribute significantly 
more than low types.  
 
In the experiment reported here, players were aware of the payoff functions of both player types 
as well as of the distribution of types within their group, but, given the climate change framing 
and context, subjects were not provided any information regarding the contribution behaviour 
of their group members: the rationale for this being that in a real-world setting, emission 
reduction totals are often estimates, there is a lag between mitigation activities and reporting 
by authorities and institutions and reporting of emission reduction activities are often voluntary 
(as is the case currently in South Africa). In this context it is likely that the non-binding nature 
of the group consensus coupled with the extreme anonymity of players (i.e. no feedback on 
contribution behaviour was provided) underpinned (i) the significant degree of free-riding, (ii) 
non-compliance with the group decision and (iii) the finding that contributions do not differ by 
player type. Ultimately, in terms of policy relevance in a climate change context, the 
implication is that anonymity needs to be stripped away, for example through mandatory 
reporting. This is no doubt an area for future research.  
 
Furthermore, within the context of the game, while the majority of groups were able to reach 
consensus (with a majority of groups agreeing to contribute their full endowment) free-riding 
was pervasive. These results indicate that while stakeholder participation is important in 
promoting cooperation, there is always the risk that free-riders will engage in participatory 
processes on the formulation of climate policy, but then thwart efforts at the implementation 
phase by reneging on an agreed-to mitigation obligation (the anonymity implicit in the design 













role in compelling cooperation. In this context, a number of studies have shown that in a 
heterogeneous public good context, sanctioning improves cooperation (Reuben and Riedl 
2009, Tan 2008, Noussair and Tan 2009). Relatedly, high-MCA players were found to free-
ride significantly more than low types in the communication game. The implication is that the 
presence of heterogeneity – which is translated within the framework of the game as an 
inequality – provides individuals with a justification to renege on an agreement. In a climate 
change context, parties to the negotiations who view themselves as unfairly disadvantaged 
might be more prone to non-compliance. Participatory processes must thus take cognisance of 
the equity contexts within which the negotiations are happening (for example, equity is an 
important subtext in multilateral climate change negotiations). 
 
Finally, while communication increased cooperation, the outcome was not sufficient. If one 
hypothesises that the specified target of 240 units was part of a multilateral climate treaty – the 
aim of which was to keep temperature warming below 2 degrees, the threshold for catastrophic 
climate change – if only 50% of the population met the target, catastrophic climate change 
would not have been subverted. Thus, while participatory processes play an important role in 
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Appendix A. Sample statistics  
 
Table A1. Attitudes towards climate change 
 Subjects 
N=204 
Do GHG emissions effect global warming?  
   Yes, to a large extent 0.73 
   Yes, partially 0.25 
   No 0.02 
Are human activities responsible for climate change?  
   Yes, to a large extent 0.71 
   Yes, partially 0.27 
   No 0.01 
Should the government be formulating a climate change policy 
which includes quantifiable emission reduction targets? 
 
   Yes, definitely 0.59 
   Yes, probably 0.37 
   No, probably not 0.02 
   No, definitely not 0.02 
Should firms be obligated to meet emission reduction targets?  
   Yes, definitely 0.77 
   Yes, probably 0.19 
   No, probably not 0.04 
   No, definitely not 0.00 
Should households be obligated to meet emission reduction 
targets? 
 
   Yes, definitely 0.15 
   Yes, probably 0.36 
   No, probably not 0.38 















Appendix B. Sample statistics  
 




   Male 0.63 
   Female 0.37 
Race  
   Black  0.78 
   Coloured 0.07 
   Indian 0.05 
   White 0.07 
   Other 0.02 
Schooling   
   Public 0.65 
   Private 0.35 
Nationality  
   South African 0.69 
   Other 0.31 
Age 20.92 
 (1.76) 
Household size 5.56 
 (2.55) 
Family’s financial situation  
   Upper income 0.05 
   Middle income 0.67 
   Lower income 0.28 
















Appendix C. Instructions (excerpt)  
Baseline Game15 
You are about to participate in an economics experiment that is part of a long term research project on 
how best to combat the negative effects of climate change.  
The following pages contain the instructions, which we are going to go through now. You will need to 
make various decisions throughout the experiment so it is important to ensure that you understand the 
instructions. If at any point something is unclear to you please raise your hand and someone will 
respond. In addition to making various decisions during the course of the experiment, you will be 
required to answer some questions.  
Please note that the researchers will not attempt to identify you with any of the decisions made or 
answers provided during the experiment or to name you as a participant in the study; nor will they 
facilitate anyone else's doing so. We have given each person an experiment number in order to ensure 
anonymity.  
Unless told otherwise, communication with anybody except the experimenters is strictly 
prohibited.  
The game is played in groups of four - thus it will be you and three other players in your group. Nobody 
except for the experimenters will know who is in which group. You will not learn the identity of the 
other three members of your group, neither during nor after the experiment. Please note that your group 
members will change throughout the experiment: the experiment consists of various different 
parts and you will be randomly assigned to a new group at the start of each part.  
Players can represent either Capital or Labour. You can also think of this as players either representing 
firms (Capital) or households (Labour). We have handed out a piece of paper to all of you which 
specifies which factor of production you represent. Please take a look now.  
Please note that your factor of production allocation will remain the same throughout the experiment.    
Note that in each group of four: two players will be representatives for Labour and two players will 
be representatives for Capital.  
Everyone in the group has the same initial wealth and is given the same information to help make their 
decisions.   
 
 
                                                          














Just for participating you will be paid R20. Depending on your decisions and the decisions of other 
players in your group, you may earn considerably more money. The amount you make will be paid to 
you at the end of this experiment as a cash cheque, which you can exchange for cash at any ABSA 
bank. 
During the experiment we will not speak of Rands but rather of tokens. First your whole income will 
be calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment, the whole amount you have earned in tokens will 
be converted to Rand at the following rate and paid out as a cash cheque: 
1 token = R0.20 
You will need to fill in and sign a receipt in order to receive your payment, but this information is 
strictly for UCT payment purposes and will not be used in the experiment. 
Context 
This experiment deals with how to distribute the burden of reducing harmful greenhouse gas emissions 
between different sectors of society.   
For the purposes of this experiment we assume that the South African government sets a national 
target for the reduction of emissions.  
You must decide how to allocate the responsibility of meeting this target between Capital (firms) and 
Labour (households).  
You (representing either labour or capital), and each of your group members, will be given an initial 
endowment of 10 tokens. You must decide how much of this endowment to invest in the environment. 
When you invest in the environment, you are investing in the reduction of harmful greenhouse gas 
emissions to combat climate change.  
Procedure of the Experiment 
Each member of the group receives 10 tokens and has to decide how to invest these 10 tokens.  
You can contribute to either a Private Account or a Public Account. 
You can either:  
(i) put all these 10 tokens into your Private Account and nothing into the Public Account 
(ii) put nothing into the Private Account and all 10 tokens into the Public Account 
(iii) put some of the 10 tokens into the Public Account and the remainder in the Private Account.  
Therefore, each group member has to decide for himself or herself how much of his or her 10 tokens to 














By contributing to the Public Account you are choosing to invest in the environment and combat 
climate change through a reduction of harmful greenhouse gas emissions.   
Income from the Private Account 
Capital and Labour representatives earn income from investing in the Private Account.  
 
The Private Account represents investment opportunities other than investing in the environment (i.e. 
in mitigation). Because Capital (Firms) can more easily invest in productive (income-generating) 
activities as compared to Labour (households), Capital earns a higher return from money invested in 
the Private Account relative to Labour. 
 
Capital’s income from the Private Account: 
 
For each token that a Capital player chooses to invest in the Private Account, he/she will earn 12 tokens: 
 
Capital Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) ×12 
 
Labour’s income from the Private Account: 
 
For each token that a Labour player chooses to invest in the Private Account, he/she will earn 6 tokens: 
 








Capital Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) ×12 
Capital Player’s private income = 10 ×12 
Capital Player’s private income = 120 
 
Labour Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) ×6 
Labour Player’s private income = 10 ×6 
Labour Player’s private income = 60 
 


















Example 2:  
 




Capital Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) ×12 
Capital Player’s private income = 6 ×12 
Capital Player’s private income = 72 
 
Labour Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) ×6 
Labour Player’s private income = 6 ×6 
Labour Player’s private income = 36 
 
(If a player invests 4 tokens in the public account, then they keep all 6 tokens for their private account) 
 
Contributions to the Public Account (reducing emissions) 
As previously mentioned, when you allocate tokens to the Public Account, you are investing in the 
environment and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the total sum of tokens in the Public 
Account represents the emissions reductions of your group. 
Because firms emit more pollution than households, it is cheaper for them – relative to households - to 
reduce emissions. This means that Capital is able to reduce more emissions with 1 token than Labour 
is able to.  
Therefore Capital’s contribution to the Public Account is multiplied by 20 while Labour’s 
contribution to the Public Account is multiplied by 10. 
The total amount of pollution reduced by your group is calculated as follows: 
Emissions reduced = (K1 ×20) + (K2 ×20) + (L1 ×10) + (L2 ×10) 
Where K1 = Capital Player 1’s contribution to the Public Account 
K2 = Capital Player 2’s contribution to the Public Account 
L1 = Labour Player 1’s contribution to the Public Account 
















We can see from the formula that Capital is able to contribute more to emissions reductions. This is 
also clear from the table below which shows emissions reductions per token. 
Emissions reduction per token contributed by Capital and Labour 
Tokens Capital Labour 
0 0  (0*20) 0  (0*10) 
1 20  (1*20) 10  (1*10) 
2 40  (2*20) 20  (2*10) 
3 60  (3*20) 30  (3*10) 
4 80  (4*20) 40  (4*10) 
5 100  (5*20) 50  (5*10) 
6 120  (6*20) 60  (6*10) 
7 140  (7*20) 70  (7*10) 
8 160  (8*20) 80  (8*10) 
9 180  (9*20) 90  (9*10) 
10 200  (10*20) 100  (10*10) 
   
 When Capital allocates 5 tokens to the Public Account, there is a reduction of 100 units of 
emissions 
 When Labour allocates 5 tokens to the Public Account, there is a reduction of 50 units of emissions  
So if Capital contributes 1 token to the Public Account, the decrease in emissions is greater than 
if Labour contributes 1 token. 
Example 1:  
Calculate the reduction in emissions if both Capital players each contribute 10 tokens to the Public 
Account and both Labour players each contribute 0 tokens to the Public Account.  
K1 K2 L1 L2 
= 400 
K1×20 K2×20 L1×10 L2×10 
(10) × 20 (10) × 20 (0) × 10 (0) × 10 
    
400 0  

















Example 2:  
Calculate the reduction in emissions if both Capital players each contribute 0 tokens to the Public 
Account and both Labour players each contribute 10 tokens to the Public Account 
K1 K2 L1 L2 
= 200 
K1×20 K2×20 L1×10 L2×10 
(0) × 20 (0) × 20 (10) × 10 (10) × 10 
    
0 200  
 
In this case, pollution is reduced by 200 units.  
Example 3:  
Calculate the reduction in emissions if Capital1 contributes 3 tokens, Capital2 contributes 2 tokens, 
Labour1 contributes 6 tokens and Labour2 contributes 7 tokens to the Public Account, respectively. 
K1 K2 L1 L2 
= 230 
K1×20 K2×20 L1×10 L2×10 
(3) × 20 (2) × 20 (6) × 10 (7) × 10 
    
100 130  
In this case, pollution is reduced by 230 units.  
Income from the Public Account (reducing emissions) 
Players earn a payoff/income from investing in the Public Account – there is a payoff from reducing 
emissions. You can think of this payoff as representing a package of benefits from emissions reductions: 
increased air quality, reduced probability of environmental disasters, greater rainfall in certain parts of 
the country (greater availability of water resources) and a reduced threat to public health from the 
increased incidence of malaria. 
As previously mentioned, once every group member has decided how much to contribute to the Public 
Account, the experimenter will multiply capital’s total contribution by 20 and labour’s total 
contribution by 10 (this determines the groups’ contribution to emission reduction). The total 
















So the income each group member receives from the Public Account is calculated as follows: 
(K1 ×20) + (K2 ×20) + (L1 ×10) + (L2 ×10) 
4 
Where K1 contribution = Capital Player 1’s contribution to the Public Account 
K2 contribution = Capital Player 2’s contribution to the Public Account 
L1 contribution = Labour Player 1’s contribution to the Public Account 
L2 contribution = Labour Player 2’s contribution to the Public Account 
Note that because the environment is a public good no one can be excluded from reaping the benefits 
of emissions reductions so every group member receives the same amount of money out of the Public 
Account, no matter what his or her contribution was.  
Example 1:  
Calculate your income from the Public Account if both Capital players each contribute 3 tokens to the 
Public Account and both Labour players each contribute 6 tokens to the Public Account. 
Your income from the Public Account:  (this income is the same for all group members) 
K1 K2 L1 L2  
K1×20 K2×20 L1×10 L2×10 
= 60 tokens 
(3) × 20 (3) × 20 (6) × 10 (6) ×10 
    
120 120 
 4 
Example 2:  
Calculate your income from the Public Account if both Capital players each contribute 6 tokens to the 
Public Account and both Labour players each contribute 3 tokens to the Public Account. 
Your income from the Public Account: 
K1 K2 L1 L2  
K1×20 K2×20 L1×10 L2×10 
= 75 tokens 
(6) × 20 (6) × 20 (3) × 10 (3) ×10 

















Follow 3 steps to calculate your total income: 
Step 1: Calculate your income from the Private Account: 
Capital Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) × 12 
Labour Player’s private income = (tokens invested in the Private Account) × 6 
Step 2: Calculate your income from the Public Account: 
(K1 ×20) + (K2 ×20) + (L1 ×10) + (L2 ×10) 
4 
Step 3: Add your PRIVATE income and your PUBLIC income together 
Total income = Private Income + Public Income 
Now let’s use the payoff tables that have been handed out to you (orange sheet) to look at the following 
symmetric examples:  
Example 1:  
Calculate your TOTAL income if all players contribute 0 tokens to the Public Account.  
Example 2:  
Calculate your TOTAL income if both Capital players each contribute 10 tokens to the Public Account 
and both Labour players each contribute 10 tokens to the Public Account. 
Example 3:  
Calculate your TOTAL income if both Capital players each contribute 10 tokens to the Public Account 
and both Labour players each contribute 0 tokens to the Public Account. 
Example 4:  
Calculate your TOTAL income if both Capital players each contribute 0 tokens to the Public Account 
















Emissions reduction target 
The South African government has set a national emission reduction target of 240. This target is in 
line with government’s multilateral climate change obligations.  
The Government is committed to meeting this target and asks Capital and Labour players to 
ensure that this target is met.  
However, at this stage, players won’t be penalised for failing to meet the target. 
Government envisions that this target will be split between Capital and Labour.  
As evident from the table below, the emissions reduction target of 240 can be met through Capital and 
Labour investing different combinations of tokens in the Public Account.  
You can look on your calculator to see some of the many combinations of Capital and Labour 
contributions that amount to an emissions reduction of 240. We will go through two examples in a 
moment.  
Emissions reduction per token contributed by Capital and Labour 
Tokens Capital Labour 
0 0  (0*20) 0  (0*10) 
1 20  (1*20) 10  (1*10) 
2 40  (2*20) 20  (2*10) 
3 60  (3*20) 30  (3*10) 
4 80  (4*20) 40  (4*10) 
5 100  (5*20) 50  (5*10) 
6 120  (6*20) 60  (6*10) 
7 140  (7*20) 70  (7*10) 
8 160  (8*20) 80  (8*10) 
9 180  (9*20) 90  (9*10) 
10 200  (10*20) 100  (10*10) 


















The following examples indicate the reduction in emissions through Capital and Labour investing 
different combinations of tokens in the Public Account.  
Example 1: 
K1  K2  L1  L2 
= 0 
K1×20 + K2×20 + L1×10 + L2×10 
(0) × 20  (0) × 20  (0) × 10  (0) × 10 
       
0  0  
Government’s pollution reduction target is not met. 
Example 2: 
K1  K2  L1  L2 
= 240 
K1×20 + K2×20 + L1×10 + L2×10 
(4) × 20  (4) × 20  (4) × 10  (4) × 10 
       
160  80  
Government’s pollution reduction target is met. 
Note: the emission reduction target has been met with all players contributing 4 tokens. This means that 
each Capital player reduced emissions by 80 while each Labour player reduced emissions by 40. 
Example 3: 
K1  K2  L1  L2 
= 240 
K1×20 + K2×20 + L1×10 + L2×10 
(3) × 20  (3) × 20  (6) × 10  (6) × 10 
       
120  120  
Government’s pollution reduction target is met. 
Note: the emission reduction target has been met with Capital players contributing 3 tokens and Labour 


















K1  K2  L1  L2 
= 600 
K1×20 + K2×20 + L1×10 + L2×10 
(10) × 20  (10) × 20  (10) × 
10 
 (10) × 10 
       
400  200  
Government’s pollution reduction target is exceeded. 















Your experiment number: ______ 
Decision Sheet 
Experiment 1 
You have been allocated 10 tokens. You must decide how to allocate these tokens between the Public 
and Private Accounts. 
Government has publicly announced a national Emission Reduction Target of 240 in line with its 
multilateral obligations. The government is committed to meeting this target and asks Capital and 
Labour to ensure that the target is met. However, at this stage, players won’t be penalised for failing 
to meet the target.  
Please write down how many tokens you want to contribute to the Public Account (invest in the 
environment):  
                                                                         
                  tokens 
 
(You can only invest a maximum of 10 tokens; use only whole numbers; the rest is automatically put 

















Once again, you have been allocated ten tokens which you must allocate between the Private Account 
and the Public Account.  
You have now been assigned to a new group; your factor of production allocation has not changed.   
The South African government has set a national emission reduction target of 240. This target is in 
line with government’s multilateral climate change obligations.  
The Government is committed to meeting this target and asks Capital and Labour players to 
ensure that this target is met.  
However, at this stage, players won’t be penalised for failing to meet the target. 
The target of 240 can be reached through Capital and Labour investing different combinations of tokens 
in the Public Account.  
During this experiment, you may communicate online with the players in your group in order to 
discuss how much you each think each player should each contribute to the Public Account. 
You now have an opportunity to discuss what would be best for the group and decide how to meet the 
target.  
Towards the end of the online discussion session, once you have discussed what you each feel is an 
appropriate contribution from each player, each group must vote on the amount of tokens that Capital 
and Labour should contribute to the Public Account. You will be prompted when it is time to vote. 
Note that whatever group consensus is reached, the final decision you make is still your own and your 
decision will not be made public.  
If you have any questions or are unsure about anything please raise your hand. Once everyone is ready 
you may begin communicating online with the members of your group.  

















Your experiment number: ______ 
Decision Sheet 
Experiment 2 
Once again, you have been allocated 10 tokens. You must decide how to allocate these tokens between 
the Public and Private Accounts.  
Government has publicly announced a national Emission Reduction Target of 240 in line with its 
multilateral obligations. The government is committed to meeting this target and asks Capital and 
Labour to ensure that the target is met. However, at this stage, players won’t be penalised for failing 
to meet the target.  
Please write down how many tokens you want to contribute to the Public Account (invest in the 
environment):  
                                                                         
                  tokens 
 
(You can only invest a maximum of 10 tokens; use only whole numbers; the rest is automatically put 























Appendix D. Emission reduction  
 
Table D1. Emission reduction, by player type (per ECU invested in mitigation) 
ECUs Player-type 
 Low-MCA High-MCA 
0 0 0 
1 20 10 
2 40 20 
3 60 30 
4 80 40 
5 100 50 
6 120 60 
7 140 70 
8 160 80 
9 180 90 
10 200 100 
 
Appendix E. Average contributions  
 
Table E1. Average contributions 
 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 






















































Appendix F. Auxiliary regressions 
 
Table F1. Auxiliary regressions for low-MCA players 
Dep. variable: Contribution level 
 (1) (2) 
Variables (Baseline & 
Comm.)        T2 
(Baseline & 
Comm.)        T3 
   
Session -0.847 -1.724 
 (0.725) (1.094) 
Communication 0.727 1.969** 
 (0.558) (0.737) 
Female 0.998 -0.125 
 (0.748) (1.154) 
Age < 20 1.026 -1.627 
 (0.650) (1.200) 
GHGs 2.217** -3.123** 
 (0.846) (1.167) 
Human -0.261 1.137 
 (0.790) (1.414) 
Climate policy1 - 4.669** 
 (1.505) 
Constant 1.651 3.866** 
 (1.541) (1.487) 
p 0.000 0.000 
Note:  
 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering;* and ** indicate 
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 1 Variable excluded from regression because all participants 















Risk Attitudes and Adaptation: Experimental Evidence from a Flood-





This study characterises the risk attitudes of a sample of individuals living in a flood-prone, 
urban informal settlement, assuming Prospect Theory as the primary model for decision-
making under uncertainty. A number of Cape Town’s informal settlements are situated on the 
low-lying, flood-prone Cape Flats, where inadequate infrastructure combined with a high water 
table leave residents extremely vulnerable to flooding. Vulnerability to flood risk (and the 
associated diminished wellbeing and damage to property and possessions that are experienced 
in the aftermath) are determined, in part, by participants’ adaptation strategies. In this context, 
the objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which risk attitudes are correlated with 
choice of adaptation strategy. Risk attitudes are elicited from participants’ choices over a series 
of lottery tasks for real monetary prizes. Lottery tasks are provided in either a gain, mixed or 
loss framing. The results indicate that individuals adopting more effective (and costly) 
adaptation strategies are more risk averse.  
 







                                                          
 Many thanks to Glenn Harrison, Elisabet Rutstrӧm and Morten Lau for providing the Stata codes, and to Morten 
















This study characterises the risk attitudes of a sample of individuals living in a flood-prone 
urban informal settlement in Cape Town, South Africa. The risk attitudes of this unique sample 
and, more specifically, the relationship between risk attitudes and flood adaptation, are 
particularly interesting given that decisions related to flood adaptation involve significant 
stakes. In particular, vulnerability to flood risk (and associated loss of property, possessions 
and diminished wellbeing) are determined, in part, by decisions over how to mitigate the risk 
of damage from flooding (in other words, choice of adaptation strategy). In this context, 
assuming Prospect Theory (PT) as the primary model for decision-making under uncertainty,1 
the objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which risk attitudes are correlated with 
choice of adaptation strategy.  
 
By way of background, a number of Cape Town’s informal settlements are situated on the low-
lying, flood prone Cape Flats, where inadequate infrastructure combined with a high water 
table leave residents extremely vulnerable to flooding. These informal settlements are flooded 
annually during the wet, rainy season, resulting in damage to dwellings and property and, in 
some cases, negatively affecting health as residents are left living in damp conditions. With the 
frequency of extreme weather events (such as storms and floods) projected to increase with 
climate change (Mukheibir and Ziervogel 2006), coupled with few prospects for short-term 
relocation, this situation is likely to worsen.2  
 
As will be discussed in the proceeding section, while there are a number of adaptation strategies 
that individuals can adopt to reduce their vulnerability to the negative impacts of a flood (for 
                                                          
1 As will be discussed later in the paper, the PT results are compared to an Expected Utility Theory model – the 
results of which are included in an appendix. 
2 The City of Cape Town (2009) defines flooding as a “temporary rise in water level or the overflow of water onto 
land not normally covered by water that results in socio-economic disruption, property damage or threatens the 
health and safety of the public” (City of Cape Town 2009: 5). Informal settlements are considered as being flooded 
when water is covering floors and areas around dwellings for more than 48 hours (City of Cape Town 2009). Note 
that the severity of flooding (measured in terms of displaced households) does vary across years. Major flood 
events were experienced in July 2001, August 2004, July 2007, July 2008 and July 2009, with the number of 
households displaced by flooding estimated to be 11 000, 4 500, 8 000, 8 600 and 8 050, respectively (Ziervogel 
and Smit 2009, City of Cape Town 2009). Flood risk within this urban-settlement context differs from more 
commonly understood flood risk emanating from coastal, riverine or estuarine flooding (Holloway et al. 2008). 
Types of flooding within this context include ponding: where rain pools on the surface of the ground in poorly 
drained, low-lying areas; seepage: water rises up to the ground surface (usually in areas where there is a high 
water table); surface run-off: water drains off hardened surfaces (such as roads) in the absence of adequate 
stormwater drainage; leaking: indoor flooding occurs as rainwater leaks through inadequately water-proofed and 













example raising one’s home above ground level and/or slanting the roof), there is substantial 
variation in the degree to which these strategies are implemented. In this context, Olorunfemi 
(2010) highlights two major factors aggravating flood disasters: (i) building too low to the 
ground; and (ii) leaking roofs. In particular, improvement of building structures is considered 
to be an important component of community-led measures to reduce risk of flooding 
(Olorunfemi 2010). In line with this, in its Winter Preparedness Strategy, the City of Cape 
Town notes that even when informal settlements are situated on relatively well sloped land, 
flooding of dwellings is inevitable given both construction techniques and standards, including, 
in particular, floors at ground level and leaking roofs (City of Cape Town 2009).   
 
The risk of a household being impacted by flooding is therefore strongly influenced by the 
level of active engagement in adaptive strategies by the household occupants. Since experiment 
participants live in the same geographical area and are exposed to largely the same risk of 
flooding, the experiment reported here examines whether choice of adaptation strategy is 
correlated with risk attitudes.3  
 
Much of the literature around adaptation focuses on the technology-adoption decisions of 
small-scale farmers. In this context, studies indicate that risk preferences impact on farmers’ 
adaptation choices. Specifically, Liu (2008), who relates Chinese farmers’ risk attitudes to the 
adoption of a new production technology, finds that farmers who are more risk and loss averse 
adopt new technologies later. Similarly, Simtowe (2006) finds that the adoption of hybrid 
maize is lower for Malawian farmers who exhibit risk aversion around the use of fertiliser (a 
complementary input for maize).4  
 
There is a large experimental literature covering the elicitation of risk preferences in both 
developed and developing countries: Binswanger (1980) in India, Holt and Laury (2002) in the 
United States (US), Barr (2003) in Zimbabwe, Wik et al. (2004) in Zambia, Engle-Warnick et 
al. (2007) in Peru, Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) in Ethiopia, Harrison et al. (2010) in Ethiopia, 
                                                          
3 Given that the decision to invest in adaptation entails a trade-off between short-term costs and longer-term 
benefits (this is probably most applicable to the strategy of slanting the roof relative to using plastic sheeting), 
future work in the area of adaptation should additionally include elicitation of discount rates. Furthermore, 
studies relating risk preferences to adaptation assume that subjects have beliefs around the probabilities of a 
particular outcome. However, in the context of climate change and adaptation, as the likelihood of an extreme 
future event (such as drought or flood) is unknown, the decision to adapt is likely characterized by both risk and 
ambiguity (Alpizar et al. 2011).   
4 More broadly, a number of studies find adoption of new farming technologies to be correlated with wealth 













India and Uganda, Humphrey and Verschoor (2004a, 2004b) in Uganda, Harrison et al. (2007) 
in Denmark, Harrison and Rutström (2009) in the US, Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) in the 
US,  Galarza (2009) in rural Peru, Liu (2008) in China, and Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen 
(2010) in Vietnam. 
 
Many of the risk experiments conducted in developing countries assume that decisions under 
uncertainty are characterised by Expected Utility Theory (EUT) solely as the curvature of the 
utility function (Binswanger 1980, Bar 2003, Wik et al. 2004, Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). 
However, several studies have found observed behaviour to be inconsistent with EUT (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992, Humphrey and Verschoor 2004a and 2004b, Mosley and Verschoor 
2005), while others have found evidence of heterogeneity in decision making, such that 
subjects’ choices are not best represented by one single theory (Harrison and Ruström 2009; 
Harrison et al. 2010). 
  
In Original Prospect Theory (OPT), developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), risk 
preferences are also influenced by loss aversion (the value function is steeper for losses than 
for gains) and probability weighting (Andersen et al. 2010). With the evolution towards 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) apply the rank-dependent 
method introduced by Quiggin (1982) separately over gains and losses to transform cumulative 
probabilities into subjective ones (Fennema and Wakker 1997). If a participant subjectively 
underweights probabilities, s/he behaves as if the probability of a particular outcome occurring 
is less than that of the lottery probability associated with that outcome (Harrison et al. 2010). 
In the gain frame, this manifests as risk aversion, while in the loss frame, it is synonymous with 
risk seeking behaviour (Harrison and Swarthout 2012). Furthermore, while EUT implies local 
asset integration in terms of which individuals evaluate net gains and losses, CPT assumes that 
individuals do not locally asset-integrate, and rather evaluate gross gains and losses (Harrison 
and Swarthout 2012).  
 
Laboratory and field experiments focusing on lottery-choice tasks for real monetary stakes 
provide some evidence of loss aversion and/or probability weighting (Wik et al. 2009, Yesuf 
and Bluffstone 2009, Harrison and Rustrӧm 2009, Harrison et al. 2010, Tanaka et al. 2010, Liu 
2008, Humphrey and Verschoor 2004a and 2004b). More specifically, Tanaka, Camerer and 
Nguyen (2010) measure risk attitudes in Vietnam using a mix of gain-only and gain-and-loss 













low probabilities. Liu (2008) replicates the design of Tanaka et al. (2010) with Chinese cotton 
farmers, finding that the farmers who are more loss averse adopt a particular technology later 
while farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt earlier. These findings signal the 
impact of loss aversion on individuals’ decision-making. Harrison et al. 2010, conducting risk 
experiments in India, Ethiopia and Uganda, find that subjects behaving in accordance with OPT 
have a tendency to underweight probabilities. The authors, noting that the OPT specification 
captured general pessimism among the participants, account for this trend by noting that the 
visited regions were experiencing drought at the time of the field experiments. Humphrey and 
Verschoor (2004a, 2004b) find observed behaviour to be consistent with probability weighting.  
 
With respect to the specification of the CPT model reported here, a Constant Relative Risk 
Averse (CRRA) utility function is defined separately over gains and losses relative to a 
reference point, which is assumed to be zero. In addition, the experiment adopts the probability 
weighting function suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (TK) (1992) (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992, Andersen et al. 2010).5  
 
The experiment reported here replicates the design of Harrison and Rutström (2009), whereby 
subjects are provided with 60 lottery tasks and, for each lottery task, choose between two 
lottery pairs. While the participants partake in either a gain, mixed or loss frame, endowments 
are used to equalise the payoffs across the frames. Participants also complete a survey capturing 
information on their demographic characteristics as well as their attitudes to flood adaptation.  
 
The results of the CPT model suggest the fourfold pattern of risk aversion typically assumed 
under PT, namely: (i) risk seeking over low probability gains; (ii) risk aversion over high-
probability gains; (iii) risk aversion over low probability losses; and (iv), risk seeking over high 
probability losses (Harbaugh et al. 2009, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Specifically, the utility 
function is found to be concave (reflecting risk aversion) over gains and convex (reflecting risk 
seeking) over losses. In addition, in both the gain and loss frames, the TK inverse-S probability 
weighting function reflects overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high 
probabilities (although this result is quantitatively small). 
 
                                                          
5 As will be discussed, the TK probability weighting function is compared to other popular weighting functions 













With regard to flood adaptation, the results suggest that flood adaptation is correlated with risk 
preferences. Specifically, the results indicate that individuals that (i) elect to do nothing (in 
terms of adaptation); (ii) rely solely on plastic sheeting for their roof or floor; and (iii), raise 
their home above ground, are less risk averse relative to individuals who (iv) slant their roofs 
to facilitate rainwater runoff. More detailed information about these adaptation strategies is 
provided in a subsequent section.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides general background and sample specifics, 
while Section 3 describes the experiment design, procedures and recruitment. In Section 4, the 
estimation method is discussed, Section 5 provides the results of the CPT model, and Section 
6 concludes.  
 
2 General background and sample specifics 
 
As alluded to above, many of Cape Town’s informal settlements are situated on the flood prone 
Cape Flats, a low lying area with a high water table. The informal settlements themselves are 
often situated in low lying areas, in flood plains, adjacent to rivers and canals or in retention 
ponds (City of Cape Town 2009). Amid inadequate stormwater infrastructure and refuse 
blockages in drainage pipes, the residents of these marginalised communities are extremely 
vulnerable to the risk of flooding (Bouchard et al. 2007). As such, bouts of heavy rainfall during 
the wet winter months give rise to pools of stagnant water in and around informal dwellings as 
the ground becomes saturated (Ziervogel and Smit 2009).  
 
Flooding does not affect one or two people, but rather, entire communities. A 2005 survey of 
three informal settlements in the Cape Flats revealed that 83% of residents had been affected 
by flooding (City of Cape Town 2005). As part of an inter-departmental Winter Preparedness 
Strategy, the Flooding and Storm Planning Task Team of the City of Cape Town has identified 
20 informal settlements that are at high risk of winter flooding, and an additional 14 at such 
high risk that they need to be relocated (personal communication with City officials). The 
reality, however, is that relocation is a very long, protracted and difficult process, characterised 
by land shortages and objections from people living in surrounding areas when empty land is 













the allocation of formal housing to informal sector residents is not likely to be a short-term 
solution (personal communication). 
 
In the experiment reported here, 174 individuals were recruited from BM section in 
Khayelitsha, a particularly flood-prone urban informal settlement situated on the Cape Flats. 
Table 1 reflects some general sample statistics, both for the sample as a whole and for each 
experiment treatment (gain, mixed and loss). Note that these treatments were conducted on 
separate days. On average, participants are 32 years old and around 60% are female (although 
there is considerable variation across the three treatments).  
 
In terms of highest level of education completed, the majority of the sample (across all 
treatment frames) has either obtained some high school (secondary) education or matriculated 
with their school-leaving (Grade 12) certificate; however, the proportion of participants that 
has completed Grade 12 is substantially higher in treatment 3 (loss frame). Participants in this 
treatment are also younger, on average, and have almost certainly benefitted from more 
universal school attendance. As such, it is important to control for age and education effects in 
the subsequent analysis.  
 
For around 78% of the sample, household income is less than $290 (R3 000) per month.6 
Around 71% of households receive at least one government grant. Specifically, nearly 16% of 
households receive a pension, over 61% receive a child care grant, and around 6% receive a 
disability grant. Unemployment is high, at around 39% of the sample.  
 
Responses to the survey indicate that approximately 80% of the sample experience flooding on 
an annual basis (table 2).7 Around 36% of subjects describe their experience of flooding as 
water coming up through the ground, just over 49% describe it as water coming in through the 
roof, and almost 15% describe it as both. Just under 10% of the sample report never having 
experienced flooding.  
 
                                                          
6 R/$ = R10.36 on 18 May 2014  
7 Note that the survey merely asked respondents questions around their experiences of the frequency of flooding. 
The questions did not define flooding – for example that the floor of the dwelling and surrounding areas are 













There are a number of individual adaptation strategies that residents and communities can adopt 
in a bid to reduce the risk of flooding. Such strategies include: ensuring that one’s floor is 
elevated above ground level on pallets, stilts or sandbags; performing general maintenance on 
one’s roof before the start of the rainy season; ensuring one’s roof is slanted to assist with 
rainwater runoff; securing plastic sheeting to one’s roof prior to the advent of the rainy season; 
making sure that the trenches/channels around one’s home are not blocked with refuse 
(Bouchard et al. 2007, personal communication).  
 
Table 1. Sample statistics (participants from BM Section, Khayelitsha) 




Treatment 3  
(Loss) 
 n = 174 n = 60 n = 60 n = 54 
Age      
Mean 32.42 35.42 31.87 29.65 
Std. dev. 9.88 9.74 10.87 7.95 
Median 30.00 34.50 30.00 28.00 
Female (%) 0.60 0.67 0.65 0.48 
Education (%)     
No schooling 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Incomplete primary school 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Complete primary school 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.00 
Incomplete secondary school 0.48 0.73 0.42 0.26 
Grade 12 (matric) 0.47 0.22 0.49 0.74 
HH size      
Mean 5.21 5.30 5.49 4.79 
Std. dev. 2.32 2.11 2.27 2.57 
Median 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 
HH income bracket (%)     
R0 – R2000 0.54 0.62 0.45 0.56 
R0 – R3000  0.78 0.82 0.68 0.83 
Unemployed (%)  39.08 46.67 36.67 33.33 
 
These strategies would go some way to reducing the risk of flooding. However, 
notwithstanding education initiatives by local government, the levels of implementation across 
households are highly varied (personal communication). More specifically, table 2 illustrates 
the uptake of various flood adaptation strategies amongst the sample in this experiment. 
Approximately 10% of the sample has done nothing to mitigate the risk of flooding (around 
half of these individuals have never experienced flooding). Around 37% of participants have 













(18%).8 Around 45% of subjects have put plastic sheeting on their roofs, and 14% on their 
floors. Less than 9% of the sample has raised one side of their roof to aid in rainwater runoff.  
 
Table 2. Sample statistics: experience of flooding and flood mitigation strategies 
 All Treatment 1 (Gains) 
Treatment 2 
(Mixed) 
Treatment 3  
(Loss) 
 n = 174 n = 60 n = 60 n = 54 
Annual flooding (%)  0.80 0.75 0.85 0.80 
Flood risk mitigation strategies (%) 
Do nothing  0.10 0.15 0.08 0.06 
Use pallets to raise home above ground  0.16 0.15 0.15 0.19 
Use stilts to raise home above ground  0.07 0.05 0.13 0.03 
Use bags of sand to raise home above ground  0.18 0.15 0.15 0.24 
Put plastic sheeting on the roof  0.45 0.43 0.48 0.43 
Put plastic sheeting on the floor  0.14 0.13 0.10 0.20 
Raise one side of the roof  0.09 0.07 0.03 0.17 
Perform general maintenance on the roof 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.18 
Move to another area  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Waiting to be moved to another area  0.14 0.17 0.15 0.09 
Waiting to be given formal housing  0.22 0.27 0.23 0.17 
 
The consequences of flooding are far reaching and include damage to the informal dwelling as 
well as the contents therein; after a flood, unpaved roads in and around the flooded area often 
become inaccessible, hindering the efforts of relief teams and making it difficult for residents 
to leave the area; stagnant pools of flood water can become polluted and a hazard to health 
(Ziervogel and Smit 2009); communal toilets, taps and rubbish skips in the flooded area can 
become inaccessible.  
 
The survey also captures information on the aftermath of a flood. Here again, the feedback 
obtained indicates that the level of damage or discomfort experienced by households varies 
significantly. Around 33% of the sample report damage to the structures of their homes, with 
48% reporting damage to their possessions. Approximately 24% of those sampled indicate that 
their floor is either wet or underwater following flooding. Over 30% indicate that the roads 
around their home become wet and muddy, making it difficult for people to access the area. 
Almost 30% report difficulties in reaching communal toilets. Just over 43% report that people 
(especially children) become sick from the pools of stagnant flood water. Finally, nearly 26% 
report electricity outages. When asked if they elected to stay in an emergency shelter (for 
example, a community hall) after a flood event, around 35% indicate that they have moved to 
                                                          














an emergency shelter in the wake of a flood, while just over 52% report a preference for 





The experiment replicates the design of Harrison and Rutström (2009), which is itself an 
extension of the design of Hey and Orme (1994). Subjects are presented with 60 lottery tasks. 
In each lottery task, subjects choose between two lottery pairs (Lottery 1 or Lottery 2). 
 
There are three treatments: a gains-only treatment, a mixed (gains and losses) treatment, and a 
loss treatment. In the gain frame, there is no endowment, and the lottery prizes are R0, R50, 
R100 and R150. In the loss frame, the lottery prizes are -R150, -R100, -R50 and R0. In addition, 
participants in the loss frame are provided with an initial per game endowment of R150 so that 
total payoffs are equalised across the treatments. In the mixed frame, participants are provided 
with a R75 per game endowment, and the payoffs are R75, -R25, R25 and R75.  
 
The probabilities of each prize vary with each lottery task (Appendix A reflects the 
probabilities used in the first 10 lottery tasks). In the first lottery task of the gain frame, if a 
participant chooses Lottery 1, s/he has a 13% chance of earning nothing, a 25% chance of 
earning R100 and a 62% chance of earning R150. Conversely, if s/he chooses Lottery 2, s/he 
is guaranteed R100. Appendix B displays the decision sheet for the first lottery task in the gains 
treatment. Subjects choose either Lottery 1 or Lottery 2 (no explicit indifference option was 
provided).  
 
Average earnings (including the participation fee) in the gain, mixed and loss frames were $22 




The lottery probabilities are depicted as pie charts in Appendix B. In the experimental design, 
the probabilities are operationalised through the use of a spinning wheel. In as much as the 













care must be (and was) taken to make the lottery task as cognitively accessible as possible. 
While the actual probabilities associated with each lottery outcome are provided in the decision 
sheets, participants are able to supplement this metric by also looking at the graphics provided. 
By way of illustration, by looking at the pie charts in Appendix B (of the first lottery task), it 
is immediately apparent that, with Lottery 1, the participant has a significant chance of earning 
R150 and a small (but existent) chance of winning nothing. This is contrasted with Lottery 2, 
where it is clear that the participant is guaranteed to earn R100.   
 
Using the random lottery incentive mechanism, two out of the 60 lottery tasks are randomly 
selected for playing and payment.9 In terms of the mechanics of the random selection: 60 pieces 
of paper, numbered 1 to 60 for the 60 lottery tasks, were placed in a bag; the two numbers 
drawn from the bag determined which lottery tasks were to be played for real money. The 
respective pie charts for both Lottery 1 and Lottery 2 of the selected lottery tasks were in turn 
placed on a spinning wheel. The combination of participants’ preferences (i.e. whether Lottery 
1 or Lottery 2 was chosen by a participant), as well as the outcome of the spinning wheel, 
determined the participants’ payoff in the selected lottery task.  
 
The three treatments were conducted on separate days. At each treatment, the same enumerator 
explained the instructions in detail. A projector was used to display the lottery tasks while the 
enumerator went through the instructions. The participants provided answers in printed 
booklets.  
   
As mentioned above, at the start of each treatment, participants completed a survey which, in 
addition to capturing information on demographic characteristics, included a number of 
questions around participants’ experience of flooding and their associated flood-mitigation 
strategies. In order to eliminate house money effects (as far as possible), in both the mixed and 
loss treatments, the endowment was framed as payment for filling out this survey. However, it 
was emphasised that any money earned throughout the course of the day would be added to 
                                                          
9 As discussed by Cox et al. (2014, 2014a) and Harrison and Swarthout.(2012a), assuming the axiom of reduction 
of compound lotteries, the random lottery incentive mechanism will only provide incentives for truthful reporting 
if subjects’ preferences satisfy the independence axiom. As the independence axiom is rejected by CPT (for 
example the independence axiom implies linearity-in-probabilities while PT allows for non-linear probability 
weighting) (Andreoni et al. 2011) there is an implied inconsistency in using the random lottery incentive 
mechanism when estimating PT. Notwithstanding this discussion, the random lottery incentive mechanism is 
almost exclusively used as the incentive system in the risk-elicitation literature (for example, Holt and Laury 2002, 














this amount and any money lost while playing the lottery tasks would be deducted from this 
amount.  
 
In addition to the endowment, participants in all treatments receive a participation fee of R50. 
Subjects were paid their total earnings at the end of the day by cash cheque.  
 




A list of those informal settlements flagged as being at high risk of flooding was obtained from 
local government. A number of these informal settlements are located within Khayelitsha, a 
large informal settlement situated on the Cape Flats. BM section in Khayelitsha was selected 
as the study site. The decision to use BM section was partly determined by accessibility, as 
strikes and protests in other sections of the informal settlement rendered inclusion of these 
areas at the time of the experiment impractical.  
 
Using December 2011 aerial photography obtained from local government, 283 informal 
dwellings situated in the study site were randomly selected, and the GPS coordinates affiliated 
with each dwelling recorded. These GPS coordinates were used in the recruitment of 
individuals for participation in the experiment. 
 
In total, 174 individuals were recruited (1 person per household); 60 individuals participated 
in the gains-only treatment, 60 individuals participated in the gains-and-losses treatment and 
54 participated in the loss treatment.   
 
4 Estimating risk preferences 
 
The discussion that follows briefly outlines the elicitation procedure, and is derived from the 
following articles: Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Andersen et al. (2008, 2010 and 2012), 
Harrison and Rutström (2008 and 2009), Harrison et al. (2010) and Harrison and Swarthout 














Expected Utility Theory 
 
While the results of the EUT model are provided in an appendix, a brief explanation of the 
EUT specification follows.  
 
Under the EUT specification, expected utility for each lottery pair is the probability-weighted 
utility of the four lottery prizes, namely:  
 




where 𝑝𝑘 is the objective probability associated with each lottery outcome k.  
 







where e reflects the endowment, x signifies the lottery prize, and r is the CRRA coefficient to 
be estimated, where 𝑟 = 0 denotes risk neutrality, 𝑟 > 0 denotes risk aversion, and 𝑟 < 0 denotes 
risk seeking.  
 
The expected utility (EU) of each lottery pair is “calculated for a candidate estimate of r” 
(Harrison and Rutström 2009: 140) and the following index is calculated: ∇𝐸𝑈 = 𝐸𝑈2 − 𝐸𝑈1, 
where EU2 is the expected utility associated with Lottery 2 and EU1 is the expected utility 
associated with Lottery 1.  
 
A cumulative logistic distribution function, 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈), is used to link the latent index, ∇𝐸𝑈𝑖, to 
subjects’ observed lottery choices. As this function transforms any value between   into a 
value between 0 and 1, the probability that Lottery 2 is chosen over Lottery 1 is 
Pr(𝐸𝑈2 − 𝐸𝑈1) > 0 =  𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈). As 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈) reflects the probability of choosing Lottery 2, 
[1- 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈)] signifies the probability of choosing Lottery 1. Lottery 2 is selected when ∇𝐸𝑈 > 














The conditional log-likelihood is reflected as: 
ln 𝐿𝐸𝑈𝑇 (𝑟; 𝑦, 𝑋) = ∑[(ln 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈𝑖) × 𝐼(𝑦𝑖 = 1) + (ln(1 − 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈𝑖)) × 𝐼(𝑦𝑖 = 0))] 
 
where I(.) is a function indicating the subject’s choice: 𝑦𝑖 = 1(0) denotes the choice of Lottery 
2 (Lottery 1), and X is a vector of individual characteristics (to be discussed in the following 
section). 
 
The Fechner error specification is incorporated into the model to account for any behavioural 
errors made by the subjects (Hey and Orme 1994). In the case of a binary lottery, this is, for 
example, when the probability of selecting Lottery 2 is not equal to one despite the expected 
utility of Lottery 2 exceeding the expected utility of Lottery 1. With the inclusion of the Fechner 
error term: ∇𝐸𝑈 = (𝐸𝑈2 − 𝐸𝑈1)/𝜇 where 𝜇 is the Fechner noise parameter.  
 
In addition, the “contextual error” specification developed by Wilcox (2011) and advocated by 
Harrison and Swarthout (2012) is incorporated into the model so that: ∇𝐸𝑈 = ((𝐸𝑈2 −
𝐸𝑈1)/𝑣)/𝜇 where 𝑣 is a normalising term which, for each lottery pair, is defined as the 
difference between the maximum and minimum utility over all lottery prizes in a particular 
lottery pair. Note that, as 𝑣 is provided by the data, it is not a parameter that needs to be 
estimated. 
 
With the inclusion of the Fechner error term (Hey and Orme 1994) and Wilcox’s (2011) 
contextual error, the conditional log-likelihood is reflected as: 
ln 𝐿𝐸𝑈𝑇 (𝑟, 𝜇; 𝑦, 𝑋) = ∑[(ln 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈𝑖) × 𝐼(𝑦𝑖 = 1) + (ln(1 − 𝛷(∇𝐸𝑈𝑖)) × 𝐼(𝑦𝑖 = 0))] 
where r and µ are the parameters to be estimated.  
 
Given the possibility of correlation between responses by the same subject, the standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering. 
 
Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 


















𝑊𝑖 = 𝜔(𝑝𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛) −  𝜔(𝑝𝑖+1 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛)  for i = 1,…, n -1, and 
𝑊𝑖 = 𝜔(𝑝𝑖)  for i = n, and  
𝑊𝑖 is the subjective decision weight, 𝑝𝑖 is the objective probability associated with lottery 
outcome 𝑥𝑖 and ω(p) is some probability weighting function. Harrison and Swarthout (2012) 
provide a detailed discussion around calculating the subjective decision weights. In particular, 
while lottery prizes are rank ordered from best to worst in the gain frame, they are rank ordered 
from worst to best in the loss frame. In the mixed frame, lotteries are first separated into gain 
and loss-frame components and evaluated separately (the two positive prizes are rank ordered 
from best to worst and the two negative prizes are rank ordered from worst two best).  
 



















−  for x < 0 
 
where, if γ+/- < 1, the function exhibits an inverse S-shape reflecting overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities. Conversely, if γ+/- > 1, the function is 
S-shaped, indicating underweighting of small probabilities and overweighting of large 
probabilities.  
 
The TK weighting function is also compared to the Power weighting function: 𝜔(𝑝) = 𝑝𝛾 
(Quiggin 1982) and the two-parameter Prelec weighting function: 𝜔(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝{− − ln 𝑝𝜗} 
(Prelec 1998). 
 
Following TK (1992) and using the CRRA utility specification, utility is defined separately 





















]  when x < 0        
 
where α is the risk aversion parameter, with α > 0 implying concave utility for gains (risk 
aversion) and convex utility for losses (risk seeking); and where λ is the loss aversion 
parameter, with λ > 1 indicating loss aversion and λ = 1 indicating loss neutrality.  
 
In estimating the parameters, the log-likelihood is the same as that reflected under the EUT 
specification; however, parameters α, λ, γ+, γ- are to be estimated (instead of r), as well as the 
Fechner error term µ. Note that, when estimating CPT, “contextual utility” is not incorporated 
(Harrison and Swarthout 2012b).  
 





Relative to EUT, the CPT model allows for a more detailed breakdown of the various sources 
of risk aversion; specifically, in the CPT model: (i) probability weighting is incorporated, 
allowing objective probabilities to be transformed into subjective decision weights, thus 
enabling an assessment of the degree to which risk attitudes are attributed to probability 
weighting; and (ii) utility functions are defined separately over gains and losses, facilitating the 
identification of loss aversion (Harrison et al. 2010).  
 
Table 3 reflects the results of the CPT model with no covariates. As α > 0 (α = 0.277, p = 0.000; 
CI: 0.198, 0.356), the model signals concavity of the value function over gains (risk aversion 
over gains), and convexity over losses (risk loving over losses).  
 
Loss aversion is evident if λ > 1; however, while λ = 1.247 (p = 0.000; CI: 0.830, 1.664), the 
hypothesis that λ = 1 (hypothesis of loss neutrality) cannot be rejected (p = 0.2456), implying 














As γ+ and γ- are both significantly different from 1 (p < 0.01 in both the loss and gain frames), 
the data signal that participants transform objective probabilities into subjective decision 
weights. More specifically, γ < 1 implies that the probability weighting function has an inverse 
S-shape, characterised by a concave segment indicating the overweighting of small 
probabilities, a cross-over point where ω(p) = p, and a convex section signalling 
underweighting of large probabilities (Andersen et al. 2010).10 Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) provide empirical support for an inverse S-shaped weighting 
function. 
 
Figure 1 shows the estimated CPT probability weighting function and implied decision weights 
for gains and losses. Following Harrison and Swarthout (2012), decision weights are 
constructed for three reference lotteries: the 2-prize lottery has 2 prizes with a probability of ½ 
each; the 3-prize lottery has 3 prizes each with a probability of ⅓; in the 4-prize lottery, the 
prizes have a probability of ¼ each. With respect to the conversion of probability weights into 
decision weights, in the gain frame, where lottery prizes are presented from worst prize to best 
prize in figure 1, the decision weights place (marginally) greater weight on the worst outcome 
as compared to the best outcome, implying moderate risk aversion.11 Conversely, in the loss 
frame, where lottery prizes are presented from best to worst prize, the decision weights place 
greater weight on the best outcome as opposed to the worst, implying moderate risk seeking.  
 
The TK probability weighting function is compared to two alternatives – namely the Power 
and 2-parameter Prelec weighting functions (Quiggin 1982, Prelec 1998). These alternative 
probability weighting functions are illustrated in figure 2. The TK weighting function is 
consistent with the Prelec function, with the exception of low probabilities in the gain domain. 
The estimates for the conditional CPT model (with no covariates) with the Power and Prelec 
functions are provided in Appendix D. The estimates of risk and loss aversion are comparable 
between all three models. Specifically: αTK = 0.277, αPower = 0.322, αPrelec = 0.247; in all models, 
the hypothesis of loss neutrality cannot be rejected: pTK = 0.246, pPower = 0.086, pPrelec = 0.466. 
 
                                                          
10 Note that we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that γ+ = γ-. 
11 For example, while the objective probability for each prize in the 4-prize case is 0.25, the decision weight for 
the worst prize is 0.3 as compared to 0.28 for the best prize. In the case of a linear utility function (with utility 
calculated using the decision weights), the certainty equivalent (CE) would be lower than the expected value 














Table 3. Estimates of CPT parameters  
    Coef. Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α = β: Cons 0.2772** 0.0404 0.1981 0.3563 
λ: Cons 1.2470** 0.2127 0.8300 1.6639 
γ+: Cons 0.8333** 0.0417 0.7516 0.9149 
γ-: Cons 0.8308** 0.0360 0.7601 0.9014 
mu: Cons 6.6739** 1.2526 4.2188 9.1290 
      
Ho: λ = 1 p = 0.2456     
Ho: γ+ = 1 p = 0.0001     
Ho: γ- = 1 p = 0.0000     
Ho: γ+ = γ- p = 0.9669     
Notes:  
 * and ** signify significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively  
 Standard errors adjusted for clustering 
 Estimated using TK (1992) probability weighting function 
 Assume α = β 
 
 
Figure 1. Probability weighting function 
 
Notes:  
 Estimated using TK (1992) probability weighting function 
 p refers to the probabilities presented to participants in a given lottery task while ω(p) is the 
weighted probability   
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Figure 2. Alternative probability weighting functions (conditional CPT model) 
 
 
Table 4 reflects the CPT specification with covariates. Specifically, we include a number of 
dummy variables reflecting participants’ demographic characteristics, including (i) gender 
(Female); (ii) level of education (Grade-12), denoting whether participants have received their 
final school-leaving certificate); (iii) age (with Age signalling if participants are over 40); and 
(iv) household income (where HH income equals to one of monthly household income is less 
than R2 000).  
 
In addition, dummy variables reflecting participants’ flood adaptation activities have also been 
incorporated into the model. Specifically, Do nothing equals one if a participant has done 
nothing to reduce damage from flooding; Plastic sheeting indicates if a participant has used 
plastic sheeting on his roof and/or floor (but has not raised his home above ground or slanted 
his roof); Home above ground signals whether a participant has used sandbags, stilts or pallets 
to raise his/her home above ground (participants may or may not also have used plastic sheeting 
on their roof); and, finally, the reference case is Slanted roof, which indicates whether a 
participant has slanted their roof to facilitate rainwater runoff (and in addition may or may not 
have raised his/her home above ground and used plastic sheeting). Both the cost and 
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“Slanted roof”. Table 5 shows the overlap between adaptation strategies. Of the 33% of 
participants who have raised their home above ground, 40% use plastic sheeting on their roof, 
and 21% use plastic sheeting on their floor. Furthermore, of the 9% of participants who slant 
their roofs, 80% use plastic sheeting on their roof, 20% use plastic sheeting on their floor and 
40% have raised their home above ground.  
 
Finally, we include a dummy variable “Flooding” which captures participants’ experiences 
with flooding. Specifically, the variable equals one if the subject experienced flooding in the 
past two years. As expected, there is a degree of variation with respect to flood experience and 
uptake of adaptation strategies. Specifically, of those individuals opting to do nothing, use 
plastic sheeting, raise their home above ground and slant their roof, 53%, 88%, 88% and 93% 
have experienced flooding in the past two years.  
 
The coefficients in table 4 are interpreted as the marginal effect of each variable as compared 
to the default case (Harrison et al. 2007). With respect to flood adaptation strategies, the results 
suggest that individuals opting for less effective strategies (relative to the most effective 
strategy of slanting one’s roof) are more risk seeking. In particular, for those individuals opting 
to do nothing (relative to those individuals who slant their roofs), RRA decreases by 0.542 (p 
= 0.001, CI: -0.851, -0.233). When correcting for this effect, RRA is estimated at 0.415 (p = 
0.005 on the hypothesis of risk neutrality). In addition, RRA decreases by 0.619 (p = 0.000; 
CI: -0.816, -0.423) for those individuals relying solely on plastic sheeting; decreasing to 0.338 
when correcting for this effect (p = 0.003). Finally, for those individuals who raise their homes 
above ground, RRA decreases by 0.535 (p = 0.000, CI: -0.705, -0.364). When correcting for 
this effect, RRA is estimated at 0.423 (p = 0.000).  
 
There are significant differences in the extent of probability weighting for the adaptation 
strategies Do nothing and Slant roof in the gain frame (Do nothing: 0.452, p = 0.030; CI: 0.045, 
0.859). Figure 3 presents the probability weighting function for these adaptation strategies. 
With respect to the decision weights reflected in the right hand panel of figure 3, it is evident 
that individuals who chose to slant their roofs, relative to those that opt to do nothing, exhibit 















Table 4. Estimates of CPT parameters  
   Coef. Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
 α Cons 0.9572** 0.1281 0.7062 1.2082 
  Female 0.0982 0.0641 -0.0275 0.2239 
  Grade-12 -0.1409** 0.0527 -0.2441 -0.0377 
 Age ≥ 40 0.0305 0.0788 -0.1240 0.1849 
 HH income ≤ 2000 -0.0265 0.0605 -0.1451 0.0920 
 Unemployed HH -0.0948 0.0590 -0.2105 0.0209 
 Do nothing -0.5420** 0.1575 -0.8507 -0.2333 
 Plastic sheeting  -0.6194** 0.1001 -0.8157 -0.4231 
 Home above ground -0.5345** 0.0869 -0.7048 -0.3643 
 Flooding -0.1036 0.1090 -0.3172 0.1099 
 λ Cons 1.3853 0.7466 -0.0780 2.8486 
 Female 0.5700 0.3807 -0.1762 1.3163 
 Grade-12 0.2341 0.3168 -0.3868 0.8550 
  Age ≥ 40 -0.9155* 0.4169 -1.7326 -0.0983 
 HH income ≤ 2000 -0.2417 0.2904 -0.8108 0.3274 
  Unemployed HH -0.2482 0.2893 -0.8153 0.3189 
 Do nothing -0.6748 0.4928 -1.6408 0.2911 
 Plastic sheeting -0.4352 0.5511 -1.5154 0.6450 
 Home above ground 0.0606 0.5371 -0.9921 1.1134 
 Flooding -0.1766 0.3310 -0.8254 0.4722 
 γ (gains) Cons 0.5653* 0.2871 0.0027 1.1280 
  Female 0.0097 0.0994 -0.1851 0.2046 
  Grade-12 -0.0659 0.0914 -0.2449 0.1132 
  Age ≥ 40 -0.0779 0.1134 -0.3001 0.1443 
 HH income ≤ 2000 -0.0479 0.1091 -0.2617 0.1659 
  Unemployed HH -0.1451 0.0886 -0.3188 0.0286 
 Do nothing 0.4521* 0.2077 0.0450 0.8592 
 Plastic sheeting 0.1825 0.1886 -0.1872 0.5521 
 Home above ground 0.1493 0.1801 -0.2038 0.5024 
 Flooding 0.1887 0.1397 -0.0850 0.4624 
γ (losses) Cons 0.8396** 0.2682 0.3139 1.3652 
 Female -0.0481 0.0918 -0.2281 0.1319 
 Grade-12 -0.0673 0.1117 -0.2862 0.1516 
 Age ≥ 40 -0.4146* 0.1711 -0.7500 -0.0792 
 HH income ≤ 2000 0.0501 0.0869 -0.1203 0.2204 
 Unemployed HH 1.8362** 0.4505 0.9533 2.7192 
 Do nothing -0.2619 0.1451 -0.5463 0.0225 
 Plastic sheeting 0.2946 0.1871 -0.0722 0.6613 
 Home above ground 0.2555 0.1322 -0.0036 0.5145 
 Flooding -0.1944 0.1690 -0.5257 0.1368 
mu Cons 6.4963* 1.5059 3.5447 9.4479 
Notes:  
 * and ** signify significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively  
 Standard errors adjusted for clustering 













Table 5. Adaptation strategies  
Primary adaptation strategy % of sample 
Plastic sheeting on 
roof 
% of subsample 
Plastic sheeting 
on floor 
% of subsample 
Home above 
ground 
% of subsample 
Do nothing 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Plastic sheeting 0.28 0.90 0.21 0.00 
Home above ground 0.33 0.40 0.21 1.00 
Slant roof 0.09 0.80 0.20 0.40 
Notes:  
 Plastic sheeting refers to use of plastic sheeting on roof and/or floors 
 Read table as follows: 33% of the sample raise their home above ground. Of these participants, 
40% use plastic sheeting on their roof, 21% use plastic sheeting on their floor (and obviously 
100% raise their home above ground) 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability weighting functions for selected adaptation strategies 
 
Note: Estimated using TK (1992) probability weighting function 
 
 
For comparative purposes, the parameter estimates of an EUT model (also assuming a CRRA 
utility function) are provided in Appendix E. As appears from Panel A in table E1, which 
reflects the results of the EUT model with no covariates, RRA is estimated to be -0.070; 
however, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, indicating a scenario of risk 
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the literature across different samples generally indicate moderate levels of risk aversion (Holt 
and Laury 2002, Harrison and Rutström 2009 and Harrison et al. 2010).12  
 
As previously mentioned, EUT assumes local asset integration in terms of which individuals 
evaluate net gains and losses. In contrast, CPT assumes that individuals do not locally asset-
integrate but rather evaluate gross gains and losses (Harrison and Swarthout 2012). The results 
from the CPT model (when estimating without asset integration) indicate a utility function that 
is concave over gains and convex over losses. Additionally, the probability weighting functions 
likewise imply risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses. The implication is that, in the 
event of assuming no probability weighting, this dynamic should be absorbed into the utility 
function, thus exaggerating the curvature further. However, the utility function under the EUT 
specification, which assumes asset integration and does not allow for probability weighting, is 
essentially linear. As such, the assumption of asset-integration is the most likely driver of the 
differences between the EUT and CPT models.13  
 
Panel B in table E1 reflects the result of the model when including the familiar explanatory 
variables. In addition, dummy variables reflecting the treatment frame are incorporated into the 
model (Gain frame, Mixed frame and Loss frame, with Gain frame as the reference case). With 
respect to flood adaptation, the results are in broad consensus with the CPT model, implying 
that individuals relying on plastic sheeting and choosing to raise their home above ground are 
less risk averse relative to individuals that slant their roofs; however, these results are only 
significant at the 10% level. More specifically, for those individuals relying solely on plastic 
sheeting, RRA decreases by 0.540 (p = 0.058, CI: -1.098, 0.018), and individuals who raise 
their homes above ground exhibit less risk aversion relative to those that slant their roofs (p = 
0.099, CI: -0.719, 0.061).  
 
                                                          
12 As mentioned above, in the context of the sample setting being an extremely low-income community, 
participants’ choice of adaptation strategy can have significant financial implications; conversely, experimental 
elicitation of risk preferences are constrained in terms of the income variations that are able to be simulated (we 
thank an anonymous reviewer for this point). Consequently, the risk neutrality evident in the EUT model could 
reflect the fact that the experimental payoffs did not simulate sufficient income variations to reveal the true risk 
parameter. While this limitation must be acknowledged, we do find evidence of utility risk aversion (over gains) 
and utility risk seeking (over losses) in the CPT model. By incorporating probability weighting, the CPT model 
allows for a more detailed breakdown of the various sources of risk aversion. More specifically, the incorporation 
of probability weighting provides another way in which individuals can exhibit risk aversion that is distinct from 
the risk aversion synonymous with the concavity of the utility function (Andersen et al. 2010).  













In terms of a comparison of the EUT and CPT non-nested models, we would anticipate that the 
CPT model is the preferred model, given the inference of probability weighting from the CPT 
parameter estimates. Following Andersen et al. (2010), Harrison and Rutström (2009) and 
Harrison (2008), we apply the Vuong (1989) and Clarke (2003) tests to the EUT and PT models 
(with no covariates). Both tests favour the CPT model over the EUT model (Vuong test 
statistics: -10.49 and favours EUT if positive; Clarke test statistic: 4586 and favours EUT if 




Developmental economists are concerned with the extent to which individual risk preferences 
are linked with economic success (Tanaka et al. 2010). An example of this (albeit one unrelated 
to flooding) is the poverty-trap hypothesis, which posits that without insurance as a safety net, 
risk-averse individuals might be reluctant to invest in riskier but potentially more profitable 
activities (Dercon 2005). However, while there is a large literature addressing the estimation 
of risk preferences in developed and developing countries, comparatively fewer papers 
consider the extent to which estimated risk preferences are correlated with observed behaviour.  
 
Against this background, this study characterises the risk attitudes of a sample of individuals 
living in a flood-prone urban informal settlement in South Africa, and considers the extent to 
which risk attitudes are correlated with choice of flood adaptation strategy.  
 
The observed risk attitudes of this low-income community and, more particularly, the 
relationship between risk attitudes and flood adaptation, are particularly interesting, given that 
decisions around flood adaptation involve significant stakes. In particular, vulnerability to 
flood risk (and the financial loss and diminished wellbeing associated with flood damage to 
immovable property and possessions) are determined, in part, by choices regarding how to 
mitigate the risk of damage from flooding (in other words, choice of adaptation strategy). While 
there are a number of adaptation strategies that participants can implement in a bid to reduce 
their exposure to flood risk, there is significant variation in individuals’ efforts to adapt.  
                                                          
14 Note that the Vuong and Clarke tests are premised on the assumption that only one of the models is the true 
model whereas a “mixture model approach” allows for heterogeneity in decision making, such that subjects’ 
















The results signal a correlation between risk aversion and adaptation strategies undertaken. 
Adaptation strategies incorporated into the model are classified from least effective [(i) do 
nothing or (ii) rely solely on plastic sheeting] to most effective [(iii) raise your home above 
ground or (iv) slant your roof].  
 
The CPT model indicates that adaptation strategies are correlated with risk preferences. 
Specifically, the results indicate that individuals that (i) do nothing, (ii) rely solely on plastic 
sheeting or (iii) raise their homes above ground, are less risk averse relative to individuals who 
slant their roofs to assist rainwater runoff.  
 
This result implies that attempts by local authorities to encourage uptake of adaptation 
strategies must take into account risk attitudes (as opposed to assuming risk neutrality on the 
part of the decision maker). More specifically, given the level of variation in individual 
adaptation efforts, city officials might supplement ongoing education initiatives with proactive 
measures to incentivise even risk-seeking individuals to engage with adaptation (for example, 
through the provision of a subsidy on building materials).  
 
More generally, while risk preferences are often considered within very specific contexts – for 
example in applications to addiction, the result of this study indicates that attitudes toward risk 
impact on individual decision-making (and therefore welfare outcomes) within the wider 
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Appendix A. Experiment design 
 
Table A1. Experiment design: lottery probabilities 
 Lottery 1 Lottery Option 2 
Gain frame R0 R50 R100 R150 R0 R50 R100 R150 
Mixed frame -R150 -R100 -R50 R0 -R150 -R100 -R50 R0 
Loss frame -R75 -R25 R25 R75 -R75 -R25 R25 R75 
Lottery task: Prob. 1 Prob. 2 Prob. 3 Prob 4. Prob. 1 Prob. 2 Prob. 3 Prob. 4 
1 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
2 0.13 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.38 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.74 
4 0.00 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.62 0.25 0.00 
5 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 
6 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.26 
7 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.00 
8 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 
9 0.37 0.26 0.37 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.13 0.00 
10 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.62 0.00 














Appendix B. Experiment procedures 
 
Figure B1. Decision sheet, lottery task 1, gain frame 
Lottery 1: 
R0 R50 R100 R150 














R0 R50 R100 R150 



















Appendix C. Experiment instructions (loss frame) 
Introduction 
 
Good morning! Thank you for coming. My name is [NAME], and I am a researcher with the University 
of Cape Town. These are my colleagues [NAMES]. We have invited you here to play some financial 
games.  
You will be paid for participating in this workshop today. For being here today you will earn R50. This 
is your money to take home.  
We are going to start by filling out a short survey. You will earn money for filling in this survey. You 
will earn R300 for filling in this survey.  
Now this is very important. Let me repeat: this is VERY important. When we play the financial 
games, you can lose money. Any money that you lose will be deducted from this R300 that you have 
earned for filling in the survey. You could lose some or all of this R300 during the day. Remember that 
any money that you lose while we play the games will be deducted from this R300.  
How much money you lose depends on the decisions you make during the games. That is why it is very 
important you understand the rules of the games, which I am going to explain to you as we go along.  
The income you earn from today will be paid to you at the end of the day in the form of a cash cheque 
which you can cash at any branch of ABSA Bank. 
You play these games as individuals, not in groups. So please don’t talk to anyone while we are playing 
the games. If you have any questions at any stage you can just raise your hand and someone will come 
and answer your question privately.   
Participation in these sessions is voluntary. If you decide not to take part, you may leave at any moment, 
even after you have started playing – but then you will not earn any money. If you prefer to stay we ask 
that you sign the form that our assistants are bringing around right now.  
[HAND OUT THE CONSENT FORMS]   
This form says that you understand participation in these games is voluntary and that you can leave 
whenever you want to. But if you do leave before we have finished playing all the games, you won’t 
receive any money.  
Is everyone finished signing the forms? Ok, someone is going to come around and collect the forms 


















As I said, we are going to start by filling out a short survey… 
 
Remember, you will earn R300 for filling in this survey.  
 
[Hand out the surveys]  
 





Let’s move on to the financial games.  
 
Remember, you can lose money by playing these games. Any money that you lose will be deducted 
from the R300 that you have earned for filling in the survey.  
 
I am now going to explain the rules of the game. 
Let’s start with the first game in the booklet: Game 1 
 
GAME 1 
This poster is a large version of the sheet of paper that is in front of you.  
In this game, you must choose between 2 options: Option 1 and Option 2 [REFER TO POSTER].  
 
You must show on the sheet in front of you, whether you choose Option 1 or Option 2.  
 
Now, for both of these options, for Option 1 and Option 2, the amount of money you lose depends on 
these spinning wheels. And, it depends on what colour the arrow lands on. 
 
On this spinning wheel we have option 1. And on this spinning wheel we have option 2. 
 
Option 1. 
[Hold the spinning wheel underneath the poster] 
As you can see, in option 1, the arrow can land on blue, green or purple [rotate the spinning wheel while 
you talk] 
[Point to the poster] 













If the arrow lands on green, you lose R50  
If the arrow lands on purple, you lose nothing  
These blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how much money you 
would lose if the arrow lands on blue, purple or green:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R150 
If the arrow lands on red you lose R100 – but there is no red in this game 
If the arrow lands on green, you lose R50,  
And if the arrow lands on purple, you lose nothing.  
There are two ways you can think about Option 1.  
The first way is to use the percentages that are shown in this row [point]. With Option 1, there is a 13% 
chance that you will lose R150. There is a 25% chance that you will lose R50. There is a 62% chance 
that you will lose nothing.  
The other way to think about Option 1 is to look at the different sizes of the coloured areas. This is the 
way that we are going to explain the games to you. 
The purple area is MUCH bigger than both the green and blue areas. So this means that if you choose 
Option 1, there is a much bigger chance of the arrow landing on purple and you losing nothing than 
there is of the arrow landing on blue and green.  
Now look at the green area. This is slightly bigger than the blue area. So at least you know there is a 
slightly bigger chance of the arrow landing on green than there is of the arrow landing on blue. So you 
have a slightly bigger chance of losing R50 than you do of losing R150.  
But even though the blue area is small – it is still there. So there is a small chance the arrow could land 
on blue and you could lose R150.  
Now let’s look at Option 2.  
As you can see, in option 2, the arrow can only land on green because the whole area is green [rotate 
the spinning wheel while you talk] 
[Hold the spinning wheel under the poster] 
[Point to the poster] 














These blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how much money you 
would lose if the arrow lands on green:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R150 – but there is no blue in this game 
If the arrow lands on red you lose R100 – but there is no red in this game 
If the arrow lands on green, you lose R50 
And if the arrow lands on purple, you lose nothing – but there is no purple in this game 
So the arrow can only land on green. That means with Option 2 you are sure to lose R50.  
So now, you have to decide if you want to choose Option 2 and know that you will lose R50 for sure, 
or if you want to choose Option 1 – where there is a big chance you will lose nothing but a small chance 
you will lose R150.  
Let’s do an example. Let’s pretend that I am the type of person that wants to pick Option 1. Then I 
would show this by making a tick next to Option 1 [make a tick next to option 1]. Now that I have 
chosen Option 1, we spin the wheel so that I can see how much money I would lose. [Spin the wheel]. 
Ok, so the arrow has landed on [blue, green, purple] which means that I would have lost [R150, R50, 
R0].  
GAME 2 
Ok, let’s look at the second game. Once again, you must show on the sheet in front of you, whether you 
choose Option 1 or Option 2.  
Now, for both of these options, for Option 1 and Option 2, the amount of money you lose depends on 
these spinning wheels. And, it depends on what colour the arrow lands on. 
On this spinning wheel we have option 1. And on this spinning wheel we have option 2. 
Option 1.  
As you can see, in option 1, the arrow can land on red, blue or green 
[Rotate the spinning wheel while you talk] 
[Hold the spinning wheel under the poster] 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on red, you lose R100  













If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R150  
Remember, these blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how much 
money you would get lose the arrow lands on red, green and blue:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R150 
If the arrow lands on red you lose R100 
If the arrow lands on green, you lose R50 
And if the arrow lands on purple, you lose nothing – but there is no purple in this game.  
The green area is a bit bigger than the red area and MUCH bigger than the blue area. So this means that 
if you choose Option 1, there is a bigger chance of the arrow landing on green and you losing R50 than 
there is of the arrow landing on red or blue.  
But the red area is still quite big. So there is still a big chance of the arrow landing on red and of you 
losing R100. 
Even though the blue area is very small, there is still a small chance that the arrow could land on blue 
and then you could lose R150.  
Option 2 
As you can see, in option 2, the arrow can only land on red because the whole area is red [rotate the 
spinning wheel while you talk] 
[Hold the spinning wheel under the poster] 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on red, you lose R100  
These blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how much money you 
would lose if the arrow lands on red:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R150 – but there is no blue in this game 
If the arrow lands on red you lose R100 
If the arrow lands on green, you lose R50 – but there is no green in this game  














So the arrow can only land on red. That means with Option 2 you are sure to lose R100.  
So now, you have to decide if you want to choose Option 2 and lose R100 for sure, or if you want to 
choose Option 1 and maybe only lose R50. But remember, with Option 1, there is still a small chance 
of you losing R150.  
Let’s do an example. Let’s pretend that I am the type of person that wants to pick Option 2. Then I 
would show this by making a tick next to Option 2. With Option 2, I know that I will lose R100 for sure 
so there is no need to spin the wheel. But let’s spin it anyway [spin the wheel]. OK the arrow landed on 
red and I lose R100.  
GAME 3 
Let’s look at the third game. Once again, you must show on the sheet in front of you, whether you 
choose Option 1 or Option 2.  
On this spinning wheel we have option 1. And on this spinning wheel we have option 2. 
Option 1.  
As you can see, in option 1, the arrow can land on green or purple [rotate the spinning wheel while you 
talk] 
[Hold the spinning wheel under the poster] 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on green, you lose R50  
If the arrow lands on purple, you lose nothing  
The green area is quite a bit bigger than the purple, so if you choose this option, there is a bigger chance 
of you losing R50 than there is of you losing nothing. But the purple area is still quite big – so there is 
still a large chance of you losing nothing. But the worst you can do in this option, is lose R50. 
Option 2.  
As you can see, in option 2, the arrow can land on purple, green or blue [rotate the spinning wheel while 
you talk] 
[Hold the spinning wheel under the poster] 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on purple, you lose nothing  













If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R150  
The purple area is very large. So if you choose this option, there is a very large chance that the arrow 
will land on purple and that you will lose nothing.  
Even though the green and blue areas are very small, they are still there. So there is still a small chance 
the arrow will land on green and you will lose R50 and a small chance the arrow will land on blue and 
you will lose R150.   
So now, you have to decide if you want to choose Option 1 – where the worst you can do is lose R50, 
or if you want to choose Option 2, where there is a big chance you will lose nothing but there is a small 
chance you will lose R150.  
Let’s do an example. Let’s pretend that I am the type of person that wants to pick Option 2. Then I 
would show this by making a tick next to Option 2. Now that I have chosen Option 2, we spin the wheel 
so that I can see how much money I would earn. [Spin the wheel]. Ok, so the arrow has landed on [blue, 
green, purple] which means that I would have lost [R150, R50, R0]. 
[Conclude:] 
Are there any questions so far? 
Soon I am going to ask you to go through the booklet yourself. And on each page, I want you to decide 
whether you would like to play Option 1 or Option 2.  
Before you do that I want to explain one last thing: 
 
In this booklet there are 60 games. You are going to fill in the booklet for all 60 games. But we won’t 
have time to play all 60 games. So at the end of the day, we will choose 2 games to play for money.  
 
But we don’t know which of these 60 games we will be playing for money.  
 
I have here 60 pieces of paper – numbered 1-60. I am going to put these pieces of paper in this bag. At 
the end of the day, 2 of you will each pull a piece of paper out the bag.  
 
Whichever numbers are pulled out the bag – those are the games we will play.  
 
So if number 1 is pulled out the bag, we will play game 1 for money, if number 20 is pulled out the bag, 
we will play game 20 for money. Let’s do a demonstration [pull a number out of the bag]… so, because 
we don’t know which of the 60 games we will be playing for real money, it is important to act as 
if every game is being played for real money. 
 
Now you can go through the booklet yourself. And on each page, I want you to decide whether you 













Remember that any money that you lose will be deducted from the R300 that you have earned 
for filling in the survey. 
When everyone is finished, we will use these numbered pieces of paper to decide which 2 games we 














Appendix D. Alternate CPT models 
Table D1. CPT model with alternate probability weighting functions 
    Coef. Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
Panel A: CPT model with the Power probability weighting function 
α: Cons 0.3215** 0.0297 0.2633 0.3798 
λ: Cons 1.3188** 0.1855 0.9553 1.6824 
γ+: Cons 0.9281** 0.0675 0.7958 1.0603 
γ-: Cons 0.8005** 0.0625 0.6780 0.9231 
mu: Cons 5.1652** 0.8120 3.5738 6.7567 
      
Ho: λ = 1 p = 0.0857     
Ho: γ+ = 1 p = 0.2864     
Ho: γ- = 1 p = 0.0014     
Ho: γ+ = γ- p = 0.1582     
Panel B: CPT model with the Prelec weighting function 
α: Cons 0.2474** 0.0348 0.1792 0.3156 
λ: Cons 1.1106** 0.1515 0.8136 1.4076 
η+: Cons 1.1069** 0.0634 0.9826 1.2311 
η-: Cons 0.8858** 0.0578 0.7724 0.9992 
Φ+: Cons 0.8275** 0.0378 0.7534 0.9015 
Φ-: Cons 0.8053** 0.0456 0.7159 0.8946 
mu:  Cons 5.8162 0.9390 3.9757 7.6567 
      















Appendix E. EUT model 
 
Panel A in table E1 reflects the results of the EUT model with no covariates. For the CRRA expected 
utility specification, r < 0 denotes risk-loving behaviour, r = 0 indicates risk neutrality and r > 0 denotes 
risk aversion (Harrison et al. 2010). As evident from Table 3, RRA is estimated to be -0.070, however 
the coefficient is not significantly different from zero indicating risk neutrality (p = 0.441; CI: -0.247, 
0.108). Estimates found in the literature across different samples generally indicate moderate levels of 
risk aversion: Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison and Rutström (2009) for American university 
students; and, in a developing-country context, Harrison et al. (2010) estimate a CRRA coefficient of 
0.536 from experiments conducted in Ethiopia, India and Uganda (note lottery tasks are restricted to 
the gain frame).  
 
Panel B in table E1 reflects the result of the model including the familiar explanatory variables. In 
addition, dummy variables reflecting the treatment frame are incorporated into the model (Gain frame, 
Mixed frame and Loss frame with Gain frame as the reference case). Figure D1 reflects the distribution 
of the predicted values of r of the EUT model (with covariates). The results indicate the presence of 
both risk-loving and risk-averse behaviour within the sample.  
 
With respect to flood adaptation, table E1 suggests that individuals that use plastic sheeting and that opt 
to raise their home above ground are less risk averse relative to individuals that slant their roofs, 
however, these results are only significant at the 10% level:  Specifically, for those individuals relying 
solely on plastic sheeting, RRA decreases by 0.540 (p = 0.058, CI: -1.098, 0.018). Furthermore, 
individuals who raise their home above ground are less risk averse relative to those that slant their roofs 















Table E1. EUT model  
    Coef. Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
Panel A 
r Cons -0.0698 0.0906 -0.2474 0.1077 
mu Cons 0.1634** 0.0151 0.1339 0.1930 
Panel B 
r Cons 1.068** 0.388 0.308 1.829 
 Loss frame -1.977 1.885 -5.672 1.718 
 Mixed frame -0.724 0.426 -1.559 0.110 
 Female -0.011 0.172 -0.349 0.327 
 Grade-12 -0.081 0.280 -0.629 0.468 
 Age ≥ 40 0.009 0.183 -0.351 0.368 
 HH income ≤ 2000 -0.094 0.211 -0.508 0.320 
 Unemployed HH -0.044 0.204 -0.444 0.356 
 Do nothing -0.545 0.422 -1.372 0.282 
 Plastic sheeting -0.540 0.285 -1.098 0.018 
 Home above ground -0.329 0.199 -0.719 0.061 
 Flooding -0.177 0.283 -0.731 0.378 
mu Cons 0.172 0.062 0.052 0.293 
Notes:  
 * and ** signify significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively  
 Standard errors adjusted for clustering 
 
   






























Despite the yield improvements associated with the adoption of new farming technologies and 
modern inputs, technology diffusion amongst small-scale farmers in developing countries is 
slow. In this context, given the inherently risky environments in which farmers in the 
developing world operate, poor households are thought to be caught in a risk-induced poverty 
trap; specifically, poorer households that are unable to insulate themselves from consumption 
risk avoid these risks by opting for lower return, lower risk agriculture, and thus do not benefit 
from technological innovation. Using a series of laboratory experiments in a South African 
setting, this paper examines whether the provision of a framed index insurance product induces 
individuals to opt into riskier but potentially more profitable activities. To do so, we use a 
simple gambling task with real monetary prizes to elicit subjects’ risk preferences. Elicited risk 
preferences are applied to the uptake of credit and insurance in a series of framed insurance 
simulation games. Experiment participants are small-scale and subsistence urban food growers. 
Overall, the results of the experiment lend empirical weight to the poverty-trap argument. 
Firstly, a high degree of risk aversion is evident among the sample. Secondly, risk-averse 
individuals are more likely to opt into traditional agriculture (reflected as traditional seeds in 
the experiment) and are less likely to use modern farming inputs that require financing (high-
yield varieties) despite the availability of insurance. The results indicate that the provision of 
index insurance is not a panacea for the problem of promoting technology diffusion to small-
scale farmers in the developing world, but that residual production risk and basis risk must be 
considered in the contract design.  
 
















Despite the potential for yield improvements from the adoption of new farming technologies 
(such as high yield varieties) and modern inputs (such as fertiliser), the rate of adoption among 
small-scale and subsistence farmers in developing countries is slow (Feder et al. 1985, Cornejo 
et al. 2002, Simtowe 2006, Engle-Warnick et al. 2007, Duflo et al. 2011). While risk aversion 
and imperfect credit and insurance markets are widely credited as key factors in the slow rate 
of technology diffusion (Humphrey and Verschoor 2004, Giné et al. 2008, Giné and Yang 
2009), it is difficult to distinguish the impact of constrained credit, on the one hand, from 
appetite for risk, on the other. Specifically, while wealthier households have greater access to 
the credit necessary to finance agricultural investment, they are also better equipped to bear the 
higher risk burden associated with investment in new agricultural technologies (Giné and Yang 
2009). Recognizing the role of risk attitudes as a barrier to technology adoption that is 
independent of wealth effects implies that promoting technology diffusion requires more than 
simply providing access to credit. For example, even when credit is available for the financing 
of agricultural investment, borrowers risk defaulting on their loans in the event of crop failure 
– a risk that is greater for borrowers who are uninsured. In this context, the provision of bundled 
credit and insurance products are better suited to facilitating technology adoption relative to 
the provision of credit alone. 
 
Against this background, this paper contributes to the existing literature by, firstly, 
disentangling the role of risk aversion on investment choices from wealth effects and credit 
constraints and, secondly, testing whether low investment rates can be overcome by offering 
bundled credit and insurance products. To do so, we first use a framed game coupled with 
simple risk experiments to identify which participants choose low-risk, low-yield strategies. In 
terms of the framing of the game, participants, who consist of a sample of South African 
subsistence farmers, are choosing between traditional agriculture versus investing in a new 
farming input which requires them to take out a loan. Next, we test whether the provision of a 
framed insurance product (bundled with a loan) induces those individuals who chose the low-
risk strategies in the first part of the experiment to opt into more risky but potentially more 
profitable activities in the second part. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly 
test the effect of insurance on technology adoption among subjects who have already 













simulation games to reveal farmers’ preferences around insurance (the reader is referred to 
Carter et al. 2008, Patt et al. 2009 and Patt et al. 2010), these studies do not untangle the effects 
of risk preferences from credit constraints by considering farmers’ choices first without and 
then with the possibility of insurance.  
 
By considering risk aversion as a barrier to technology adoption and further assessing the role 
of insurance in overcoming this barrier, we are able to provide interesting insights into the risk-
induced poverty-trap hypothesis – whereby risk-averse farmers opt into low-return and low-
risk agricultural strategies – and the possible role of insurance in breaking this cycle (Mosley 
and Verschoor 2005). In this context, three recent studies indicate that the provision of 
insurance does actually promote agricultural investment into higher-yielding but higher-risk 
strategies.52 Cole et al. (2013b) conduct a randomised field experiment with small agricultural 
firms in India (with many firms consisting of one family) where the treatment group is provided 
with a number of rainfall insurance policies while the control group is provided with a fixed 
cash payment. The authors find that provision of insurance significantly increases production 
of cash crops (crops with higher expected returns relative to other types but that are more 
sensitive to rainfall variability). Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012), who conduct a randomised 
experiment with farmers in India, find that insured farmers are more likely to plant riskier but 
high-yielding crops. In a randomised trial set in Ghana, Karlan et al. (2012) offer small-scale 
farmers cash grants, rainfall insurance grants or both. The authors find that, while rainfall 
insurance results in both greater investments in agriculture and riskier production choices, the 
effect of the cash grant is relatively small. The authors conclude that uninsured risk poses a 
binding constraint to agricultural investment.  
 
Overall, the results of the experiment lend empirical weight to the poverty-trap argument. 
Firstly, a high degree of risk aversion is evident among the sample. Secondly, risk-averse 
individuals are more likely to opt into low risk, low return agricultural strategies and are less 
likely to use modern farming inputs that require financing – despite the availability of 
insurance.  
 
                                                          
52 These randomised control trials consider the impact of insurance on farmers’ behaviour. As such, the 













The insurance product in this experiment is designed to reduce the loss experienced by the 
participants in the event of a negative event (framed in the games as crop failure from poor 
rainfall), but does not remove this loss entirely. This design element reflects the idea that index 
insurance does not remove all risk from the production process. For example, index insurance 
introduces basis risk – whereby a farmer experiences a loss but does not receive an insurance 
payout (Patt et al. 2009). In this context, like Karlan et al. (2012), we find uninsured risk to act 
as a barrier to agricultural investment. The results indicate that the provision of index insurance 
is not a panacea for the problem of promoting technology diffusion to small-scale farmers in 
the developing world, but that residual production risk and basis risk must be considered in the 
contract design. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: a literature review is provided in Section 2, while a 
simple theoretical model is provided in Section 3. The sample statistics are discussed in Section 
4 while the experimental design and procedures are outlined in Section 5. The results are 
discussed in Section 6 and the paper concludes with a discussion in Section 7.  
 
2 Literature review 
 
The reviewed papers are structured so as to consider insights about: (1) credit 
constraints/wealth and insurance uptake, (2) risk aversion and insurance uptake, (3) 
wealth/access to credit and investment behaviour, (4) risk aversion and investment behaviour 
and (5) the correlation between credit/wealth and risk aversion and the risk-induced poverty 
trap.  
 
Studies indicate that credit constraints and low levels of wealth diminish insurance uptake. 
Cole at al. (2013a) report that liquidity constraints reduce demand for a rainfall insurance 
product in India. The authors argue that, as households must buy insurance at the start of the 
farming season, when other farming inputs such as seeds, labour and fertiliser also need to be 
purchased, only wealthier households are able to afford insurance. Giné et al. (2008) examine 
the uptake of a rainfall insurance product amongst small scale farmers in India. Their results 
confirm that wealthy households are more likely to take up the insurance product, while uptake 














In terms of the relationship between risk aversion and insurance uptake, Giné et al. (2008) also 
find risk averse households to be less likely to purchase insurance if they are unfamiliar with 
insurance in general, or with the microfinance organisation offering it. These results indicate 
that, in addition to access to credit, risk attitudes act as further constraints to the uptake of 
insurance.   
 
Now considering the relationship between wealth or access to credit and investment in new 
technology. Investment behaviour is constrained in environments where farmers lack access to 
the credit facilities necessary to finance inputs (e.g., fertiliser). A number of studies show 
adoption to be correlated with wealth. Croppenstedt et al. (2003) find limitations around access 
to credit to be a significant supply-side constraint to the adoption of fertiliser by Ethiopian 
farmers. The authors argue that the cash resources available to households are insufficient to 
finance fertiliser purchases. Chirwa (2005) finds that the adoption of fertiliser among farmers 
in Malawi increases with income and plot size (an indicator of wealth). Dercon and 
Christiaensen (2011) examine the link between consumption risk and fertiliser adoption 
amongst small-scale farmers in Ethiopia. The authors note that, while average yields (and 
returns) are higher with fertiliser, given the sunk cost associated with using fertiliser, overall 
yields are lower than they would have been without fertiliser when harvests are low (for 
example, because of lack of rain). This makes adoption of fertiliser fairly risky. The results 
indicate that downside consumption risk (from low rainfall and a consequently poor harvest) 
discourages fertiliser usage. However, households with more livestock (a measure of liquidity) 
and male-headed households (also a proxy for wealth) are more likely to adopt fertiliser. Note 
that the authors used a fixed effects logit model, thus ensuring that all time-invariant household 
characteristics – most notably risk preferences – are captured. 
 
Farmers in the developing world, who operate in extraordinarily risky environments, are faced 
with a number of production risks – given their reliance on rain fed agriculture, the most notable 
of these is climate variability (Hazell et al. 2010). As such, in situations where credit is 
accessible but where insurance markets are imperfect (and thus access to insurance is limited 
or non-existent), potential borrowers are deterred from taking loans amid the high costs 
associated with loan default (for example, in the event of crop failure), such as confiscation of 
assets (Giné and Yang 2009). More broadly, as production failure is one of the primary sources 
of income variability among small-scale and subsistence farmers, and because modern farming 













from fluctuations in income might decide not to adopt new farming practices and inputs 
(Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). Against this background, Liu (2008) relates Chinese farmers’ 
risk attitudes to the adoption of a new production technology (Bt cotton). The author finds that 
farmers who are more risk and loss averse adopt new technologies later. Using survey data 
from Malawi, Simtowe (2006) finds that the adoption of hybrid maize is lower for farmers who 
exhibit risk aversion around the use of fertiliser (a complementary input for maize).  
 
Giné and Yang (2009) point out the likely correlation between access to credit, on the one hand, 
and willingness to take on risk (for example, by investing in a new input) on the other. Wealthy 
households will have greater access to credit relative to less wealthy households. Furthermore, 
wealthier households are more likely to invest in new inputs because they can better bear the 
associated risk burden. It is thus unclear whether it is constrained credit or rather limited access 
to insurance markets (to address production risk) that is the main driver of the slow pace of 
technology diffusion (Giné and Yang 2009). Two papers that go some way toward untangling 
the effect of credit constraints versus appetite for risk are those of Giné and Yang (2009) and 
Giné et al. (2008). Giné and Yang (2009) run a randomised field experiment in Malawi to 
assess whether provision of insurance facilitates the uptake of loans (to finance a new crop 
technology). Half the farmers in the sample were offered a loan without insurance, while the 
remaining farmers were offered loans bundled with rainfall insurance. While take-up of the 
basic loan (without insurance) was 33%, take-up of the loan bundled with insurance was lower 
– at 17.6%. The authors suggest that the limited liability clause in the loan contract acted as de 
facto insurance. Additionally, take-up of the insured loan was correlated with income, wealth 
and education. Using household survey data, Giné et al. (2008) examine the determinants of 
Indian farmers’ insurance participation. Their results indicate that both access to credit and risk 
attitudes act as constraints to uptake.   
 
This link between risk attitudes and investment behaviour perpetuates a risk-induced poverty 
trap. Mosley and Verschoor (2005) note that risk aversion is a key element in the poverty trap: 
poor individuals who are risk averse – and thus unwilling to invest in modern inputs because 
of the associated production/consumption risks – will remain poor, while wealthier individuals 
who are in a position to insulate themselves from risk will benefit from technological 
innovations and become wealthier still. Similarly, Giné and Yang (2009) argue that risk-averse 













financing. Insurance products that reduce the consumption risks associated with the use of 
modern inputs would thus promote technology diffusion and help break the poverty-trap cycle.  
 
3 A model of risk preferences and insurance 
 
Using a simple model adapted from Humphrey and Verschoor (2004), who illustrate the role 
of risk preferences in the uptake of micro-credit schemes, we consider the rationale behind 
index insurance in the context of risk preferences.  
 
The assumptions used in this model echo the framing of the insurance simulation games that 
will be discussed in a subsequent section. Specifically, we assume that, in order to finance new 
farming technologies (for example high-yielding seeds or fertiliser), farmers need to take out a 
loan. The loan needs to be repaid at the end of the farming period, irrespective of whether the 
farmer experiences production failure. By bundling the loan with weather index insurance, the 
farmer is able to reduce the costs associated with production failure.   
 
Ignoring insurance at first, we assume a farmer can plant either traditional seeds or high-
yielding seeds. The returns from traditional seeds are fairly certain and these seeds do not 
require financing. As such, the farmer earns a return on traditional seeds of 2y.  
 
The returns from the improved seeds are dependent on the level of rainfall (in other words, 
there is an element of production risk), where the probability of good rain is 0.5. With good 
rain, the farmer earns a return of 4y; however, when the rains are low, the farmer earns a return 
of 0, net of loan repayment.  
A risk averse individual would choose to plant traditional seeds because
)0(5.0)4(5.0)2( uyuyu  . Conversely, a risk neutral individual would be indifferent between 
the two options because )0(5.0)4(5.0)2( uyuyu  . 
 
Insurance would work to encourage the uptake of high-yielding seeds through mitigating losses 
when the rains are low. In this case, when rainfall is low, instead of earning 0, the farmer earns 
1.5y (still less than if s/he had opted for traditional seeds). However, the farmer needs to pay 
for the insurance irrespective of the level of rainfall, but, as in the case of index insurance, does 













and the rainfall is good, the farmer earns 3y (as opposed to 4y). The utility from purchasing the 
insurance product is thus )5.1(5.0)3(5.0 yuyu  . 
 
The risk neutral farmer will now select the insurance option as opposed to the traditional seed 
option because )2()5.1(5.0)3(5.0 yuyuyu  . In addition, the risk averse farmer at the margin 




The sample consists of 82 small-scale and subsistence farmers who grow organic produce in 
vegetable gardens situated in urban informal settlements around Cape Town, South Africa. 
Produce is rain-fed, rendering the farmers extremely susceptible to variations in rainfall.  
 
Sample statistics are provided in table 1. On average, participants are 54 years old and 
approximately 62% are female.  Levels of education are low throughout the sample. In terms 
of highest level of education completed, around 13% of the sample have no schooling or 
obtained some pre-primary school education. Approximately 24% have some primary school 
education while just over 12% completed their primary schooling (Grade 7). Just under 33% 
have obtained some high school education (Grades 8-11) and around 7% have obtained a Grade 
12 qualification. 
 
Monthly household income is extremely low – with around 98% of households earning less 
than $27153 per month. Moreover, for nearly half the sample, monthly household income is 
less than $90 per month.  
 
Around 79% of participants indicated that they had never applied for a loan from a bank or 
other financial institution. The main reasons given by participants for not applying for a loan 
include: the perception that a loan is too expensive and difficult to repay (37%), the perception 
that the loan would not be granted (24%), preference for borrowing money from family and 
friends (21%), preference to not borrow money from anyone (15%) and uncertainty with 
respect to how to go about applying for a loan (5%).54  
                                                          
53 $/Rand = 11.06 on 10 February 2014.  













Table 1. Sample statistics  







  n = 82 n = 29 n = 29 n = 24 
Age     
  Mean 53.85 57.86 57.14 45.17 
  Std. Dev. 14.36 11.48 12.69 16.00 
  Median 56.00 62.00 58.50 49.50 
Female (%) 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.61 
Education (%)     
  No schooling 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.04 
  Incomplete primary schooling 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.13 
  Complete primary schooling  0.12 0.21 0.10 0.04 
  Some secondary schooling 0.33 0.24 0.28 0.50 
  Grade 12 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.21 
Household size     
  Mean 5.23 5.10 5.41 5.17 
  Std. dev. 1.85 1.74 2.23 1.49 
  Median 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
HH income (%)1     
  $0 – $23  0.15 0.10 0.04 0.41 
  $23 – $45  0.11 0.19 0.04 0.12 
  $45 – $90 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.00 
  $91 – $181 0.42 0.33 0.56 0.29 
  $181 – $271 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.18 
Notes: 1 65 respondents answered this question; 21 in session 1, 27 in session 2 and 17 in session 3; 
percentages are calculated from these totals.  
 
 
As expected, uptake of credit is low in the sample. Around 15% of participants have a store 
card with a South African retailer, 5% of participants have a bank loan, and only 1% of 
participants have a credit card. Conversely, 18% of participants indicate having an existing 
loan from a friend or family member.  
 
In the survey, participants were asked how they finance new farming inputs and equipment. 
The proportion that obtains finance through a bank is extremely low at 1%. Around 38% use 
personal savings, 16% borrow money from an informal savings group, 12% borrow money 
from family and friends, and 24% utilise other resources (such as obtaining money from local 














As anticipated, given the low levels of income prevalent in the sample, the uptake of formal 
insurance (with the exception of funeral insurance) is extremely low. While 29% of participants 
have a funeral policy, only 2% have some form of life insurance and 1% have medical 
insurance.  
 
5 Experimental design 
 
The experiment is a within subject design whereby each subject participated in all games. In 
terms of the setup, subjects first completed a series of risk games (with probability levels of 
30%, 50% and 70%) before participating in two series of insurance games: 
 
In the first series of insurance games, participants chose between: (i) traditional agriculture, 
framed as traditional seeds (TS) not requiring financing and, (ii) modern farming inputs, framed 
as high-yielding seeds that are financed through a basic loan (HYL). Subjects played three 
games, each with a different probability of production risk (namely, 30%, 50% and 70%). Note 
that as each game is a new game, income does not accumulate and is not carried over from one 
game to the next. As participants chose between traditional seeds and high-yielding seeds with 
a loan, we refer to this series of insurance games as series 1 or TS vs. HYL.   
 
In the second series of insurance games, in addition to TS and HYL, participants could select 
a third option of high-yielding seeds – but this time the basic loan is bundled with rainfall 
insurance (HYI). Again, there are three games with varied probability levels of 30%, 50% and 
70%. We refer to this set of insurance games as series 2 or TS vs. HYL vs. HYI.   
 
Lastly, once all the games were concluded, participants filled out a survey. 
 
The risk and insurance games as well as the experimental procedures are discussed in more 
















5.1 Risk games 
 
Subjects are presented with three gambles and, in each gamble, make a series of choices 
between (i) an increasing sure payoff and (ii) a risky prospect. As is evident from table 2, the 
probability levels of the three games are 30%, 50% and 70%, respectively.  
 
Table 2. 30%, 50% and 70% gambles (in Rand) 
Game Option 1 Option 2 
 Minimum Maximum Probability Prize EV 
1 R3 R26 30% R50 R15 
2 R13 R36 50% R50 R25 
3 R23 R46 70% R50 R35 
 
Appendix A illustrates the decision sheet for game 1 (30% gamble). In each row, subjects 
choose between an increasing sure payoff (Option 1) and a risky prospect (Option 2). Following 
Moore and Eckel (2006), the increasing sure payoff offered under Option 1 ranges between R3 
and R26 and increases in R1 increments; this incremental increase is common across all the 
decision sheets. The mechanism of specifying a range for the sure payoff prevents participants 
from specifying unreasonable certainty equivalents – for example, a certainty equivalent of 
more than R50 for a gamble with a maximum prize of R50 (Moore and Eckel 2006). With 
respect to Option 2, the payoff remains constant throughout the decision rows, with players 
either earning R50 or nothing, with an expected value of R15. An extremely risk averse 
individual would prefer Option 1 in the first row of the decision sheet, while an extremely risk-
seeking subject would prefer Option 2 in the last decision row. The point at which a participant 
moves over from Option 2 to Option 1 provides a measure of the subject’s certainty equivalent.  
 
The presence of multiple switching points (when subjects switch back and forth between 
Option 1 and Option 2 when moving down the rows of the decision sheet) is common in 
experiments which elicit a switching point (Holt and Laury 2002) and particularly when such 
experiments are carried out in developing countries (Galarza 2009, Jacobson and Petrie 2009, 
Brick and Visser 2011). Against this background, the instructions were carefully worded to 
make the logical inconsistency of multiple switching apparent to the participants (an excerpt 














Using a Multiple Price List (MPL) format similar to the one used in this experiment, Tanaka 
et al. (2010) enforced monotonic switching by explicitly asking subjects to state at which row 
they wanted to switch from one option to another. Participants went through the instructions 
and played a practice round, and were then asked to specify the row in which they wanted to 
switch from Option 2 to Option 1.  
 
Note that various examples were provided to participants in this experiment on the day, 
including: only selecting Option 1, only selecting Option 2 and switching from Option 2 to 
Option 1 at various rows. In this way, participants did not feel forced to switch at a particular 
point.  
 
While 84 subjects participated in the experiment, two of the subjects exhibited multiple 
switching behaviour and have been excluded from the sample – leaving a sample of 82 farmers.  
 
5.2 Insurance games 
  
5.2.1 Series 1: TS vs. HYL 
 
In each of the three games, participants choose between two types of seeds: traditional seeds 
or high-yielding seeds. The payoff from each seed type is determined by the level of rainfall – 
which can be high (good) or low.  
 
In terms of the framing, the farmers are told to consider traditional seeds as those seeds with 
which they are familiar. As these seeds are saved every year, they do not cost anything. While 
the payoff from this seed type is less variable, it is lower relative to other seed types. As appears 
from table 3, the payoff from traditional seeds is R10 if rainfall is good, and nothing when the 
rains are low. 
 
Once again, as per the framing, farmers are told to think about high-yielding seeds as a new 
seed type that can increase their harvest when the rains are good but that perform badly when 
the rains are low. Improved seeds need to be purchased annually. Because of this cost, in order 
to purchase improved seeds, participants need to take out a loan of R35 at the bank. This loan 













after paying back the loan, is R100. When the rains are bad, instead of earning nothing as in 
the case with traditional seeds, participants lose R35 after repaying the loan.  
 
Table 3.  Framed experiments, payoffs  
Series 1 
 Rainfall 
 Good Low 
TS 10 0 
HYL 100 -35 
Series 2  
 Rainfall 
 Good Low 
TS 10 0 
HYL 100 -35 
HYI 80 -10 
Notes:  
 TS: Traditional seeds 
 HYL: High-yielding seeds (with loan) 
 HYI: High-yielding seeds (with loan bundled with insurance) 
 The probability of good rain changes in each round:  
o 30% in round 1 
o 50% in round 2 
o 70% in round 3 
 
As previously mentioned, subjects participate in three games. In each game, the probability of 
“good” rain is varied. Following the percentages in the risk experiments outlined previously, 
the probability of good rain varied over the games as follows: game 1 (30%), game 2 (50%) 
and game 3 (70%). 
 
5.2.2 Series 2: TS vs. HYL vs. HYI 
 
In the second series of insurance games, farmers are now able to choose between traditional 
seeds, high-yielding seeds with a loan, and a third option of high-yielding seeds with a loan 
and a rainfall index insurance product.  
 
It is explained to participants that they can buy rainfall insurance for R20 as a means to protect 
their income and reduce their losses when the rains are low. It is emphasised that, if the rains 
are good, there is no return from the insurance. In this case, the payoff from high-yielding seeds 













R80 (table 2). However, if the rains are low, participants receive R45 back from the insurance 
company, reducing the loss to R10 (table 3).  
 
The expected values (EV) and standard deviations (SD) associated with each choice are 
reflected in table 4 (not provided to participants). As is apparent from the table, for all 
probability levels, the traditional seed option has the lowest EV and SD. In addition, again for 
all probability levels, the high-yielding loan option has the highest SD (and this hierarchy is 
intact across all probability levels).  
 
Table 4.  Expected values and standard deviation   
Prob. of good rain: 30% 50% 70% 
 EV SD EV SD EV SD 
TS 2.99 4.56 4.98 4.98 6.97 4.56 
HYL  5.50 61.86 32.50 67.50 59.50 61.86 
HYI  17.00 41.24 35.00 45.00 53.00 41.24 
Notes:  
 TS: Traditional seeds 
 HYL: High-yielding seeds (with loan) 
 HYI: High-yielding seeds (with loan bundled with insurance) 
 
When the probability of good rainfall is low (30%), the EV of the option of high-yielding seeds 
bundled with a loan and insurance (HYI) exceeds the EV of the choice of high-yielding seeds 
with loan (HYL). Conversely, as expected, when the probability of good rain is high (70%), 
the EV of the loan option exceeds the EV of the insured-loan option. 
 
5.3 Experiment procedures 
 
The experiments were repeated over three days – with a total of 84 farmers participating. As 
mentioned previously, two of the subjects who exhibited multiple switching behaviour have 
been excluded from the sample, leaving a sample of 82.  The same enumerator went through 
the instructions on each day and the same translator was present to translate the instructions 
into Xhosa.  
 
At the start of the day, participants were told that they will earn R180 for participating in the 
experiment and for filling in a survey. In order to eliminate as far as possible any house money 













lost throughout the day would be added or deducted from the R180 already earned. Subjects 
were paid at the end of the day by cash cheque.   
 
Note that games other than those discussed here were conducted on the day – but as these are 
not analysed in this article, they are not mentioned here.  
 
Large poster-sized versions of the decision sheets were used to illustrate the examples, and 
participants first played a practice round for most of the games.  
 
Given the low levels of education and numeracy prevalent in the sample, the probabilities 
associated with both the risk and insurance games were conveyed to participants with the use 
of spinning wheels. The enumerator referred to the relevant spinning wheel when explaining a 
particular game and the spinning wheel was displayed while participants were making their 
decisions.  
 
In terms of the payment mechanics, the probabilities were also operationalised with the use of 
the spinning wheels. For the risk games, once the decision sheets for a particular game were 
collected, a participant would draw a ball from a bag to determine which row in the decision 
sheet was to be played for money. The spinning wheel was then spun so that participants who 
had selected risky Option 2 could determine their earnings from the game. Similarly, in the 
insurance games, once a particular game was concluded, the spinning wheel was spun to 
determine whether the level of rainfall was good/low (and so that participants could determine 
their earnings based on the choices they made). While this procedure was followed after each 
game (risk and insurance), participants were told upfront that they would not be paid for all 
games but would rather receive payment for one of the three risk games, one of the three 
insurance games in series 1 (TS vs. HYL) and, similarly, one of the three insurance games in 
series 2 (TS vs. HYL vs. HYI). As the random draw determining for which games participants 
would be paid was conducted at the end of the day, while participants were able to keep track 
of their potential earnings from each game, they only learnt their actual earnings at the end of 
the day. This design element, combined with the fact that each (risk and insurance) game 
represented a new game – thus ensuring that income did not accumulate throughout the games, 














There was no asymmetry of information between the experimenter and the participants. Neither 
the experimenter nor the participants knew a priori which row would be played for money and 
what the outcome of the spinning wheel would be.  
 




This section proceeds as follows: in Section 6.1, participants risk attitudes are described. 
Section 6.2 examines: (i) the relationship between risk aversion and technology adoption and, 
in particular, whether risk aversion explains low investment rates in new farming strategies 
and, (ii), whether the provision of insurance induces individuals who had previously chosen 
low-risk strategies to opt into higher-risk but potentially higher-return farming strategies.  
 
As previously mentioned, two of the subjects exhibited multiple switching points and were 
removed from the sample – leaving a sample of 82 subjects.  
 
6.1 Risk attitudes 
 
Figure 1 reflects the distribution of certainty equivalents amongst the different risk games. As 
is evident from the figure, the choices made by the participants reflect a significant degree of 
risk aversion. As evident from figure 1, a significant proportion of participants in each risk 
game always selected the safe Option 1 – and so revealed the lowest possible certainty 
equivalent. These proportions are as follows: 30% game: 51% of participants; 50% game: 49% 
of participants; 70% game: 45% of participants. Additionally, again in each game, the majority 
of subjects revealed certainty equivalents below the expected value of the gamble: 30% game: 
92% of participants; 50% game: 85%; 70% game: 72%.  
 
Akay et al. (2011) conducted comparable risk experiments with 92 Ethiopian farmers. Using a 
probability gamble of 50%, the authors found a similarly high level of risk aversion with nearly 















Figure 1. Frequency distributions of certainty equivalents 
 
Note: Expected value of gamble reflected by red line 
 
Because participants filled out a survey capturing their demographic information, we are able 
to regress the risk attitudes on a set of explanatory variables. Note that we avoid dependence 
on assumptions around the theory of utility maximisation by using the certainty equivalents 
directly to create a measure of risk aversion.55 In addition to the certainty equivalents being 
censored at lower and upper bounds (table 2), as mentioned above, around half the participants 
in each gamble selected the lowest possible certainty equivalent. Therefore, we use a panel data 
tobit model. In order to estimate the regression, we convert participants’ certainty equivalents 
for each gamble into a number between 0 and 1 as follows: (CE - CEUL) / (CELL - CEUL), where 
CE is the participants’ certainty equivalent, CEUL is the upper limit and CELL is the lower limit. 
Using this measure, the certainty equivalent is converted into a value between 0 and 1 with a 
value of zero signifying risk-seeking behaviour, a value of 0.5 indicating risk neutrality and a 
value of 1 indicating risk aversion.  
 
                                                          
55 For comparison with other studies, table C1 in Appendix C provides the bounds on r implied by subjects’ 
choices when a Constant Relative Risk Averse (CRRA) utility function (defined over the lottery prize) is assumed 
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Explanatory variables incorporated into the model include dummy variables for session, 
probability level of gamble (with the 70% gamble being the reference case), gender, whether a 
participant is 50 years or older, whether a participant has finished high school, and, finally, 
whether a participant earns an income greater than R500. The dependent variable is the 
participants’ CE ratio. Positive coefficients indicate increasing risk aversion. The regression 
results are reflected in table 5.  
 






30% Gamble 0.295** 
 (0.106) 




Age > 50  0.244 
 (0.183) 
High School 0.157 
 (0.202) 





 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 Panel tobit regression 
 Dependent variable: CE ratio 
 Positive coefficients indicate increasing risk aversion 
 
The results indicate that subjects are significantly more risk averse in the 30% and 50% 
gambles relative to the 70% gamble; however, this result is only significant at the 10% level 
for the 50% gamble (30% gamble: p = 0.002; 50% gamble: p = 0.082).  
 
6.2 Risk aversion, insurance and technology adoption 
 
Table 6 reflects the uptake (as a percent) of each of the framed seed options in both series 1 
and series 2. This information is represented graphically in parts 1 & 2 of figure 2. To recap, 













loan (HYL), while in series 2, farmers are additionally able to opt for high-yielding seeds with 
a loan and insurance (HYI).  
 
Starting with series 1, in the first game, when the probability of good rainfall is 30%, more than 
half of the participants (54%) select the traditional seed option, while 46% opt for the uninsured 
loan. As the probability of good rainfall increases, the proportion favouring the traditional seed 
option declines: for example, in the 70% game, 27% of participants opt for traditional seeds as 
compared to 73% opting for the high-yielding seeds (with loan). This is illustrated graphically 
in part 1 of figure 2.  
 
In series 2, when the probability of good rainfall is 30%, the majority of participants (46%) opt 
into the high-yielding seeds (with loan and insurance), while 33% and 21% respectively choose 
traditional seeds and high-yielding seeds (loan). Demand for insurance remains relatively 
unchanged throughout the games, despite the increasing probability of good weather. 
Conversely, the demand for traditional seeds declines to 18% in the 70% game while the uptake 
of the high-yielding seeds with loan increases to 35%. This is illustrated graphically in part 2 
of figure 2.  
 
Table 6. Uptake of each option in the simulated insurance games  












30% 54 46 33 21 46 
50% 40 60 22 34 44 
70% 27 73 18 35 46 
Notes:  
 TS: Traditional seeds 
 HYL: High-yielding seeds with loan 





















Figure 2. Uptake of framed seed options in the simulated insurance games 
 
Notes:  
 TS: Traditional seeds 
 HYL: High-yielding seeds with loan 
 HYI: High-yielding seeds with loan and insurance 
 
 
Using the CE ratio described earlier, we devise three categories of risk preferences: namely 
risk seeking (CE ratio < 0.5), risk averse (0.5 < CE ratio < 0.9) and extremely risk averse (CE 
ratio >= 0.9). Figure 3 reflects the uptake of each option in series 1 of the insurance games (TS 
vs. HYL) by risk category. In general, uptake of the traditional seed appears to be increasing in 
risk aversion while, conversely, uptake of the high-yielding seed is decreasing in risk aversion,  
the exception is in the 70% probability game where uptake of the high-yielding seed is higher 
among risk-averse individuals relative to those who are risk seeking. A Fisher’s exact test is 
used to confirm whether there is a relationship between the type of seed chosen in the framed 
games and risk attitudes. The results indicate that there is a significant relationship between 
choice of seed and risk attitudes in both the 50% and 70% games (30% risk & insurance games: 
p-value = 0.837; 50% risk & insurance games: p-value = 0.031; 70% risk & insurance games: 




































To further analyse participants’ uptake decisions in series 1 (TS vs. HYL), a random-effects 
logit regression is estimated, the results of which are reflected in table 7. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable reflecting the choice of traditional seeds as opposed to the high-
yielding seeds. Participants’ CE ratios have been incorporated into the model as an explanatory 
variable; the remaining explanatory variables are familiar. Positive coefficients indicate an 
increase in the likelihood of choosing traditional seeds.  
 
The results indicate that participants are less likely to opt for traditional seeds when the 
probability of good rain is 70% (relative to 50%) (p = 0.010), signalling the importance of 
production risk on input choice. Furthermore, the coefficient of CE ratio indicates that 
individuals who are more risk averse are more likely to opt for traditional seeds, but this result 
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Prob. good rain (30%) 0.634 
 (0.542) 
Prob. good rain (70%) -1.713* 
 (0.667) 
CE ratio 1.575+ 
 (0.888) 
Age > 50 0.892 
 (1.254) 
High School -0.512 
 (1.152) 









P > chi2 0.0663 
Notes:  
 Dependent variable is uptake of traditional seeds in T1 (TS vs. Uninsured loan) 
 Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the likelihood of choosing traditional seeds.  
 Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered on the subject level 
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 A higher CE ratio denotes higher risk aversion 
 
 
The second objective of this study is to determine whether individuals who selected traditional 
seeds in series 1 (TS vs. HYL) are more likely to opt for high-yielding seeds in series 2 (TS vs. 
HYL vs. HYI) when the option of insurance is available. As such, for the subsample of 
individuals who selected traditional seeds in series 1, part 1 in figure 4 reflects participants’ 
choices in series 2. As demonstrated by the figure, the majority of individuals opt for either 
traditional seeds or high-yielding seeds with loan and insurance. For the sub-sample of 
individuals who selected high-yielding seeds in series 1, part 2 in figure 4 indicates that the 
majority of these individuals opted either into high-yielding seeds (with loan) or high-yielding 















Figure 4. Uptake of each option in series 2 according to choice in Series 1 
 
Notes:  
 TS: Traditional seeds 
 HYL: High-yielding seeds with loan 
 HYI: High-yielding seeds with loan and insurance 
 Figure (1) reflects distribution of choices of subjects who chose TS in Series 1 (TS vs. HYL) 




A two-sample proportions test is used to compare the proportion of subjects switching between 
the different options. Firstly, a comparison of the proportion of individuals who selected TS in 
both series 1 & 2 to the proportion who switched from HYL in series 1 to TS in series 2 
confirms that, for all games, the proportions differ significantly from one another (p < 0.01 for 
30%, 50% and 70% games). In other words, as expected, the proportion of subjects who stayed 
with their choice of TS is significantly larger than the proportion who switched from HYL (in 
series 1) to TS in series 2. Secondly, a comparison of the proportion of individuals who 
switched from TS to HYL relative to the proportion who opted for HYL in both series 1 and 2 
indicates that the proportions differ significantly in the 30% and 50% games (p < 0.01 for 30%, 
50% games). This results suggests that, of those opting for HYL in series 2, a larger proportion 
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of individuals who switched from TS to HYI relative to the proportion who switched from 
HYL to HYI suggests that only in the 70% game do these proportions differ significantly (30% 
and 50% games: p > 0.05; 70% game: p < 0.01). Broadly and taken together, these results imply 
that, firstly, of those who chose TS in series 2, a greater proportion initially chose TS in series 
1 and, secondly, of those who chose HYL in series 2, a greater proportion initially chose HYL 
in series 1. The results for HYI are less clear and suggest that participants opting for HYI in 
series 2 are equally likely to have selected either TS or HYL in series 1.   
Table 8 reflects the results of random-effects ordinal panel regressions. The dependent variable 
is a three level variable that ranks the seed options in series 2 according to the hierarchy of their 
associated standard deviations (1 = HYL, 2 = HYI, 3 = TS). The results are displayed as 
proportional odds ratios.  
In regression 1, the familiar CE ratio has been included. The coefficient for CE ratio confirms 
that as risk aversion increases, participants are more likely to opt into TS relative to HYI and 
HYL, however, this results is only significant at the 10% level (p = 0.099). The coefficient 
indicates that for a one unit increase in the CE ratio, the odds of choosing TS versus the 
combined HYI and HYL categories are 5 times greater. In regression 2, as opposed to the CE 
ratio, we include a dummy variable for participants’ choices in series 1 (TS vs. HYL), where 
the variable equals 1 if participants selected TS. The coefficient indicates that participants who 
selected TS in series 1 are 8 times more likely to again opt for TS in series 2 versus the 
combined HYI and HYL categories (p = 0.000). We replicate the regression in equation 3, but 
this time for a subsample of individuals with a CE ratio > 0.5 (in other words, a subsample of 
individuals who are risk averse). Again we find that risk averse individuals who selected TS in 






















Table 8. Regression analysis of participants’ uptake decisions in series 2 (TS vs. HYL vs. HYI) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Session1 4.202 4.056 3.079 
 (5.273) (4.376) (3.267) 
Session2 3.196 2.598 1.515 
 (3.107) (2.248) (1.264) 
Prob. good rain (30%) 2.303* 1.909+ 2.106+ 
 (0.886) (0.704) (0.906) 
Prob. good rain (70%) 0.613 0.908 0.997 
 (0.279) (0.413) (0.502) 
CE ratio 5.267+ - - 
 (5.308) 
TS in series 1  8.112** 8.133**  
  (4.875) (5.412)  
Age > 50 0.503 0.475 0.680 
 (0.541) (0.420) (0.660) 
High School 0.427 0.537 0.482 
 (0.412) (0.440) (0.371) 
HH income > R500 0.236 0.325 0.353 
 (0.286) (0.341) (0.391) 
Female 4.651 3.090 2.405 
 (4.548) (2.590)  
Observations 189 189 148 
ll -155.1 -150.7 -125.5 
df_m 9 9 9 
chi2 18.76 25.71 20.70 
p 0.0273 0.00228 0.0141 
Notes:  
 Results reported as odds ratios 
 Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered on the subject level 





The link between production (and thus consumption) risk and adoption perpetuates the idea of 
a risk-induced poverty trap in which poorer households that are unable to adequately insulate 
themselves from consumption risk avoid some of the possible downside risk by opting for the 
lower return afforded by lower risk agriculture, rather than the potentially higher returns 
engendered by use of modern inputs (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). As expected, risk 
aversion is often considered to be a key element in this poverty-trap cycle, as poor individuals 
who are risk-averse – and thus unwilling to invest in potentially profitable but riskier modern 













from risk will benefit from technological innovations (Mosley and Verschoor 2005). In these 
circumstances, insurance products that reduce the consumption risks associated with the use of 
modern inputs would, in theory, promote technology diffusion and help break the poverty-trap 
cycle.  
 
However, the argument that risk aversion perpetuates a cycle of poverty needs to be 
substantiated through empirical evidence. In this setting, Giné and Yang (2009) discuss the 
likely correlation between access to credit, on the one hand, and willingness to take on risk (for 
example, by investing in a new input) on the other. While a number of studies show a positive 
correlation between wealth and adoption of technology (Croppenstedt et al. 2003, Cole at al. 
2013a, Giné et al. 2008, Chirwa 2005, Dercon and Christiaensen 2011), the dynamics at work 
are not always clear. For example, while wealthy households will have greater access to credit 
relative to less wealthy households, they are also more likely to invest in new inputs because 
they can better bear the associated risk burden (Giné and Yang 2009). However, some studies 
find adoption and risk aversion to be negatively correlated (Liu 2008, Simtowe 2006). These 
results motivate our effort to disentangle the effect of credit constraints from risk preferences.   
To do so, we run a series of framed field experiments with a sample of South African 
subsistence farmers. In the first treatment, farmers choose between traditional agriculture 
(framed as traditional seeds) and investing in a new farming input that requires them to take 
out a loan (framed as high-yielding seeds with a loan). In a subsequent treatment, farmers make 
this decision again, but are provided with a third option of investing in high-yielding seeds with 
a loan and rainfall insurance. We also elicit farmers’ risk preferences using simple lottery tasks 
for real monetary prizes.  
 
By omitting an insurance option from the initial treatment of the insurance games, we are able 
to examine whether the provision of the simulated insurance product induces risk-averse 
subjects to move from low risk, low return traditional agriculture to use of riskier but 
potentially more profitable high-yielding seeds. As such, we are able to assess whether the 
availability of insurance products, which reduce (but do not remove) the consumption risks 
associated with the use of modern inputs, promotes technology diffusion and helps to break the 
poverty-trap cycle by encouraging individuals (and particularly risk-averse individuals) to opt 














This laboratory approach ensures that we are able to isolate the impact of risk preferences and 
avoid other confounding factors that are likely determinants of insurance uptake, such as credit 
constraints (Croppenstedt et al. 2003, Cole at al. 2013a, Giné et al. 2008, Chirwa 2005, Dercon 
and Christiaensen 2011) and issues around familiarity with insurance and trust of insurance 
companies (Giné et al. 2008). 
 
Overall, the results of the experiment lend empirical weight to the poverty-trap argument. First, 
a high degree of risk aversion is evident among the sample. Akay et al. (2012), who conducted 
a similar experiment with farmers in Ethiopia, found comparably high levels of risk aversion 
in their sample. Secondly, irrespective of the level of production risk (the probability of good 
rainfall was varied at different probability levels), risk-averse individuals are more likely to opt 
into traditional agriculture (reflected as traditional seeds in the experiment) and are less likely 
to use modern farming inputs that require financing (high-yield varieties) despite the 
availability of insurance.  
 
The results confirm the long-held contention in the literature that pure risk preferences are a 
determinant in farmers’ adoption decisions. However, they further indicate that index insurance 
is not a panacea when it comes to promoting technology diffusion.  
 
The insurance product in this experiment was designed to reduce the loss experienced by the 
participants in the event of crop failure, but did not remove this loss entirely, and no doubt this 
impacted the results. This design reflects the idea that index insurance does not completely 
remove production and consumption risk, but rather reduces or minimises the risk. The 
laboratory experiment reflects the reality that index insurance does not remove all risk from 
the production process; specifically, even if a particular index insurance product completely 
removed the production risk associated with rainfall variability, arguably the most important 
source of production risk for farmers in developing countries, it would not pay out for crop 
damage derived from other factors (such as pests), known as basis risk (Barrett et al. 2007).  
Thus, in order to overcome risk aversion among poor individuals stuck in the poverty cycle 
and to facilitate the uptake of insurance products, basis risk and residual production risk not 
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Appendix A. Decision sheet 
 
Table A1. 30% gamble  
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] R3 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[2] R4 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[3] R5 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[4] R6 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[5] R7 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[6] R8 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[7] R9 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[8] R10 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[9] R11 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[10] R12 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[11] R13 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[12] R14 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[13] R15 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[14] R16 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[15] R17 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[16] R18 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[17] R19 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[18] R20 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[19] R21 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[20] R22 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[21] R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[22] R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[23] R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      

















Game 1: 30% probability of earning R50 
I am now going to explain the rules of the first game. This poster is a large version of the sheet of paper 
that is in front of you.  
In this game, you must choose between 2 options: Option 1 and Option 2 [REFER TO POSTER].  
 
You must show on the answer sheet in front of you, for each row, whether you choose Option 1 or 
Option 2.  
 
This is very important: if you choose Option 1, you will earn a sure amount of money! 
 
If you choose Option 2, the amount of money you earn depends on this spinning wheel. And, it depends 
on whether the arrow lands on white or black.  
 
Because this is SO important, let me say it again: if you choose Option 1, you will earn a sure amount 
of money. But, if you choose Option 2, the amount of money you earn depends on this spinning wheel. 
And, it depends on whether this arrow lands on white or black [DEMONSTRATE BY MOVING THE 
ARROW].  
 
This is what will happen if you choose Option 2:  
 
One of you will come up and spin the arrow. If your arrow lands on white, you will earn nothing. If the 
arrow lands on black, you will earn R50. DEMONSTRATE BY SPINNING THE ARROW: the arrow 
has landed on [white, black]. This means you would have earned [nothing, R50]. 
 
[SPINNING WHEEL REPRESENTING 30%]: Now, as you can see, the white area is much bigger 
than the black area. So this means that, if you choose Option 2 and spin the wheel, there is a bigger 
chance of the arrow landing on white than there is of it landing on black. So there is a bigger chance of 
you earning nothing than there is of you earning R50.  
 
OK, let’s look at the poster: 
 
In row 1:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R3 for sure. You won’t 
have to spin the arrow. 
 
But, if you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on 
what colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 













In row 2:  
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R4 for sure. You won’t 
have to spin the arrow. 
If you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, you 
earn R50.   
In row 3:  
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R5 for sure. You won’t 
have to spin the arrow. 
If you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, you 
earn R50.   
In row 10:  
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R12 for sure. You 
won’t have to spin the arrow. 
If you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, you 
earn R50.   
In row 15:  
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R17 for sure. You 
won’t have to spin the arrow. 
If you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, you 
earn R50.   
In row 20:  
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R22 for sure. You 
won’t have to spin the arrow. 
If you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, you 














In row 24:  
If you choose Option 1 [GESTURE TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn R26 for sure. You 
won’t have to spin the arrow. 
If you choose Option 2 [GESTURE TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, you 
earn R50.   
[IMPORTANT TO STRESS:]  
OK, now this is very important! As you can see, the sure payoff you earn from Option 1 increases as 
you go down the rows. It has increased from R3 in row 1 to R26 in row 24 [GESTURE TO THE 
POSTER AS YOU SAY THIS].  
But, the payoff to Option 2 stays the same throughout the whole game! In the first row, if you choose 
Option 2, you will either earn nothing if the arrow lands on white, or your will earn R50 if the arrow 
lands on black. In row 10, if you choose Option 2, you will either earn nothing if the arrow lands on 
white, or you will earn R50 if the arrow lands on black. In row 24, if you choose Option 2, you will 
either earn nothing if the arrow lands on white, or R50 if the arrow lands on black. [GESTURE DOWN 
POSTER WHILE SAYING THIS] 
Let’s do an example: [NOW YOU ACTUALLY DRAW ON THE POSTER] 
In row 1, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you will 
earn R3 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the arrow lands on. 
If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn R50. Let’s pretend you 
choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the right box like this [MAKE A 
TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
In row 2, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you will 
earn R4 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the arrow lands on. 
If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn R50. Let’s pretend you 
choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the right box like this [MAKE A 
TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
In row 3, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you will 
earn R5 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the arrow lands on. 
If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn R50. Let’s pretend you 
choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the right box like this [MAKE A 
TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
In row 4, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you will 
earn R6 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the arrow lands on. 













choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the right box like this [MAKE A 
TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
In row 5, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you will 
earn R7 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the arrow lands on. 
If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn R50. Let’s pretend you 
choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the right box like this [MAKE A 
TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 all the way down to row 8. TICK UP TO ROW 8.  
Now, in row 9, you choose Option 1. [NOW MAKE A TICK IN THE LEFT COLUMN] 
So in row 9 you switch to Option 1. Remember that you always get a sure return with Option 1, so you 
will have a sure payoff of R11. So at row 9, you prefer the sure payoff of R11 you get with Option 1, 
as opposed to taking a chance with Option 2 on where the arrow lands and earning either R0 or R50. 
Then when we go to row 10, you will now earn R12 if you pick Option 1 – the sure payoff is now even 
higher. And in row 11 you will earn even more with Option 1 – you will earn R13. In row 12, Option 1 
will give you even more money – you will get a sure payoff of R14. So your earnings from Option 1 
are getting higher and higher as you go down the rows. But with Option 2, you always have the same 
chance of earning R0 or R50 depending on where the arrow lands.  
So, going back to your choice, if you liked Option 1 more in row 9 when you had a sure payoff of R11, 
then you would also like Option 1 in rows 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, all the way to 20 as the payoffs get higher 
and higher.  
So (this is VERY important), once you pick Option 1, you will pick Option 1 for the rest of the rows! 
[REPEAT THIS POINT A FEW TIMES] 
[Note: Important they know that once they pick Option 1, they must stay with Option 1 for the rest of 
the rows. Once they have filled in the practice sheet, we will go around and check that respondents 
have not made a mistake.]  
[IMPORTANT] You are not going to be paid for each row. I have here 24 numbered balls. I am going 
to now put these balls into this bag [PUT THE BALLS INTO A BAG]. Once we have played the game 
and you have made a choice between Option 1 and Option 2 for each row, we will use this bag to decide 
which row will be played for money. One of you will pull a ball out of this bag. If the ball has the 
number 1 on it, we will play row 1 for money. If the ball has a 2 on it, we will play row 2 for money. If 
the ball has a number 24 on it, we will play row 24 for money.  
After we know which row we are playing for money, one of you will then come up and spin the arrow. 














Because this is the first game, we are going to first do a practice round. So this round won’t count 
for money – but is just to make sure that you understand how the game works. 
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it 
says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to choose Option 1 and 
receive a sure amount of money, or whether you would like to choose Option 2 and spin the arrow.  
Ok, now we are going to play the game for real. Please write the number we gave you at the start of 
the experiment on the sheet where it says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST 
PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to choose Option 1 and 















Game 1  
Experiment number: _________ 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] R3 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[2] R4 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[3] R5 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[4] R6 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[5] R7 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[6] R8 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[7] R9 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[8] R10 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[9] R11 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[10] R12 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[11] R13 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[12] R14 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[13] R15 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[14] R16 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[15] R17 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[16] R18 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[17] R19 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[18] R20 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[19] R21 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[20] R22 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[21] R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[22] R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[23] R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      















INSURANCE GAMES: TRADITIONAL SEEDS AND LOAN 
 
Game 1 
30% chance of good rain 
 
I want you to imagine that this game represents a farming season. And, at the start of this farming 
season, you have to decide what type of seed you are going to use.  
The amount of money that you can earn or lose depends on what type of seed you choose to 
plant and how much it rains! 
[INTRODUCE RAINFALL] 
I want to explain this table, which you have on the answer sheet in front of you [REFER TO POSTER 
AS YOU TALK]. 
Now, these columns tell you about the rainfall. In the blue column, rainfall is good. In the red column, 
rainfall is low.  
So, I said earlier that you need to choose what type of seed to plant. You must choose between 
traditional seeds and improved seeds [REFER TO POSTER]. 
 Rainfall 
 Good Low 
Traditional seeds 10 0 
Improved seeds with loan 100 -35 
[TRADITIONAL SEEDS] 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. Traditional seeds are the seeds that you have always used. You save 
these seeds every year, so they do not cost you anything. Your harvest is lower with traditional seeds 
than with other seeds. But the good thing about traditional seeds is that your harvest will be quite 
certain.  
You can see on the poster, if you use traditional seeds:  
When the rains are good: you will earn R10.  
 
When the rains are low: you will earn nothing.  
So if you choose to plant traditional seeds, you know that you will earn a maximum of R10 and a 














Now let’s talk about improved seeds.   
You have heard about these seeds from other farmers who have started using them, but you have not 
used these seeds yourself. The few farmers who have started using these new seeds have told you 
that the seeds can really increase your harvest when the rains are good. But these seeds do very 
badly when the rains are low. 
[IMPROVED SEEDS WITH LOAN] 
If you want to try improved seeds, you need to buy them. But because they are expensive, you will 
need to take out a loan at the bank. So that is why you have an option here of: improved seeds with 
loan [REFER TO THE OPTION ON THE POSTER]. 
In order to buy the improved seeds, you need to take out a loan of R35 at the bank. 
This loan needs to be paid back at the end of the game.  
The payoffs in the table show you what you are left with AFTER you have paid back the loan 
[STRESS THIS POINT]. 
If you buy improved seeds using a loan from your local bank and the rains are good, after paying 
back the bank loan, you are left with R100.  
But, just like the traditional seeds, improved seeds do not do well when rainfall is low. But even 
when rains are low, you still need to pay the bank back for the R35 loan. So now, instead of earning 
nothing when the rains are low, you still have to pay R35 back to the bank. So, when the rains are 
low, you actually LOSE R35. Remember, this money will be taken out of the R180 you have 
already earned for participating.  
[EXPLAIN HOW THE RAINFALL WORKS] 
OK, but how do you know if there is good or bad rainfall?  
We are going to use this spinning wheel.  
If the arrow lands on blue – then there is good rain.  
If the arrow lands on red – there is low rain.  
Let me say that again… [REPEAT].  
[SPINNING WHEEL REPRESENTING 30% CHANCE OF GOOD RAIN]: As you can see, the 
arrow can land on blue or red. If the arrow lands on blue, rainfall is good. If the arrow lands on red, 
rainfall is low. The blue area is much smaller than the red area. So there is a much bigger chance of 
the arrow landing on red than there is of the arrow landing on blue. So there is a much bigger chance 













[EXAMPLE] Ok, let’s do an example. It is the start of the farming season, and you must decide if you 
want to use traditional seeds or improved seeds.   
If you want to use the traditional seeds, you do not have to worry about taking out a loan from the 
bank. If the rains are good, you will earn R10. If the rains are low, you will earn nothing.  
If you decide to use improved seeds, you will have to take a loan from your local bank. You need to 
borrow R35 from the bank in order to buy the improved seeds. Remember that you have to pay 
this loan back at the end of the game.  
If the rains are good, after paying back the loan, you are left with R100. If the rains are low, you still 
have to pay the bank back the R35 you borrowed. So now, instead of earning nothing, when the rains 
are low, you actually LOSE R35.   
Let’s pretend that you decide to plant traditional seeds. You would make a tick on your answer sheet 
like this [APPROPRIATE MARK ON ANSWER SHEET]. Now let’s see what your payoff would be. 
[SPIN THE WHEEL]. OK, so the arrow landed on [blue, red] which means that the rains are [good, 
low]. This means you would earn [R10, R0].  
Let’s try another example. Let’s pretend that you decide to plant improved seeds by getting a loan of 
R35 from the bank. So then you tick this option on your answer sheet – improved seeds with loan 
[APPROPRIATE MARK ON ANSWER SHEET]. Now let’s see what your payoff would be. [SPIN 
THE WHEEL]. OK, so the arrow landed on [blue, red] which means that the rains are [good, low]. So 
after paying back the loan to the bank, you would [earn R100, lose R35] [POINT TO CORRECT 
COLUMN IN POSTER]. If the rains had been [good, low], after paying back the loan, you would 
have [earned R100, lost R35]. 
So how will the game work? You are going to make your decisions on the answer sheet. When you are 
finished, someone is going to come and collect your answer sheets. Then someone will spin the arrow 
so we know what the level of rainfall is.  
Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
Let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
On the answer sheet in front of you, please indicate whether you would like to plant traditional seeds 















Experiment number: _________ 
 
 Rainfall 
 Good Low 
Traditional seeds 10 0 
Improved seeds with loan 100 -35 
 
Please choose the option that you prefer from the 2 options listed below.  
Note: Only choose one option 
Type of seed: Your choice () 
Traditional seeds   














INSURANCE GAMES: TRADITIONAL SEEDS, LOAN & INSURANCE 
 
Game 1 
30% chance of good rain 
 
The next set of games is similar to the games you have just played.  
Once again, I want you to imagine that this game represents a farming season. And, at the start of 
this farming season, you have to decide what type of seed you are going to use.  
The amount of money that you can earn or lose depends on what type of seed you choose to 
plant and how much it rains! 
[INTRODUCE RAINFALL] 
Just like before, these columns tell you about the rainfall. In the blue column, rainfall is good. In the 
red column, rainfall is low.     
Just like before, you need to choose what type of seed to plant. You must choose between traditional 
seeds and improved seeds [REFER TO POSTER]. 
 Rainfall 
 Good Low 
Traditional seeds 10 0 
Improved seeds with loan 100 -35 
Improved seeds with loan & insurance 80 -10 
[TRADITIONAL SEEDS] 
Let’s remind ourselves about traditional seeds:  
Traditional seeds are the seeds that you have always used. You save these seeds every year, so they do 
not cost you anything. Your harvest is lower with traditional seeds than with other seeds.  
But the good thing about traditional seeds is that your harvest will be quite certain.  
You can see on the poster, if you use traditional seeds: When the rains are good, you will earn R10. 
When the rains are low, you will earn nothing.  
[IMPROVED SEEDS] 













You have heard about these seeds from other farmers who have started using them, but you have not 
used these seeds yourself. The few farmers who have started using these new seeds have told you 
that the seeds can really increase your harvest when the rains are good. But these seeds do very 
badly when the rains are low. 
[IMPROVED SEEDS WITH LOAN] 
If you want to try improved seeds, you need to buy them. But because they are expensive, you will 
need to take out a loan at the bank. So that is why you have an option here of improved seeds with 
loan [REFER TO THE OPTION ON THE POSTER]. 
In order to buy the improved seeds, you need to take out a loan of R35 at the bank. 
This loan needs to be paid back at the end of the game.  
The payoffs in the table show you what you are left with AFTER you have paid back the loan 
[STRESS THIS POINT]. 
If you buy improved seeds using a loan from your local bank and the rains are good, after paying 
back the bank loan, you are left with R100.  
But, just like the traditional seeds, improved seeds do not do well when rainfall is low. But even 
when rains are low, you still need to pay the bank back for the R35 loan. So now, instead of earning 
nothing when the rains are low, you still have to pay R35 back to the bank. So, when the rains are 
low, you actually LOSE R35. Remember, this money will be taken out of the R180 you have 
already earned for participating.  
[IMPROVED SEED WITH LOAN AND INSURANCE:] 
But now there is another way to buy improved seeds! 
Now, in addition to the loan, you can also buy insurance. That is why we have this option: 
improved seeds with loan and insurance [POINT TO POSTER]. 
Buying insurance is a way to protect your income and reduce your losses when the rains are low.  
We will call this insurance “rainfall insurance.” You can buy rainfall insurance for R20. 
I am now going to explain how the rainfall insurance works.  
If you want to buy improved seeds, you need to take a loan of R35 from the bank in order to buy the 
seeds. You now also have an option of paying an extra R20 to buy rainfall insurance.  














If the rains are good, you don’t get anything back from the insurance company. This is because your 
crops received enough rainfall. So, even though you have spent R20 on insurance, if the rains are 
good, you do not get any money back from the insurance company. 
If the rains are low, you will get money back from the insurance company. The insurance company 
will give you R45 back. The insurance company gives you money back as if your crops had received 
enough rainfall.  
Ok, so if you decide to buy improved seeds with a loan AND insurance, it becomes even more 
expensive to buy improved seeds. You will need to pay the bank the R35 you have borrowed. You 
will also need to pay the insurance company R20 for the insurance.  
Let’s look at what you could earn if you choose to buy improved seeds with insurance. These 
payoffs show you how much money you are left with AFTER you have paid back the loan and 
paid for the insurance. The payoffs include any money that you get back from the insurance 
company. 
Let’s look at what you will earn if the rains are good. If you buy improved seeds with a loan and 
insurance, and the rains are good, after paying back the loan and paying for the insurance, you will 
earn R80.  
If you had just bought improved seeds with a loan and had decided not to buy the insurance, you 
would have earned R100 [POINT TO THIS ON POSTER]. But now, you spent an extra R20 on the 
insurance. So now, if the rains are good, you will only earn R80 
Remember, even though you have spent R20 on the insurance, you don’t get any money back from 
the insurance company when the rains are good.  
OK, let’s look at what you will earn if the rains are low.  
Now you have still spent R20 on insurance. But, because the rains are low, you get money back from 
the insurance company. You get R45 back from the insurance company. So, if you buy improved 
seeds and a loan, and the rains are low, you will lose R10.  
If you had bought the improved seeds without the insurance, and the rains were low, you would have 
lost R35. But now you only lose R10. This is because you have got money back from the 
insurance company.  
[EXPLAIN HOW THE RAINFALL WORKS] 
OK, but how do you know if there is good or bad rainfall?  
We are going to use this spinning wheel.  














If the arrow lands on red – there is low rain.  
Let me say that again… [REPEAT].  
[SPINNING WHEEL REPRESENTING 30% CHANCE OF GOOD RAIN]: As you can see, the 
arrow can land on blue or red. The blue area is much smaller than the red area. So there is a much 
bigger chance of the arrow landing on red than there is of the arrow landing on blue. So there is a 
much bigger chance of there being low rain than there is of there being good rain.  
[EXAMPLE] Ok, let’s do an example. It is the start of the farming season, and you must decide if you 
want to use traditional seeds or improved seeds.   
If you want to use the traditional seeds, you do not have to worry about taking out a loan from the 
bank. If the rains are good, you will earn R10. If the rains are low, you will earn nothing. 
If you decide to use improved seeds, you will have to take a loan from your local bank. And you have 
to pay this loan back to the bank. You can also decide whether or not you would like to take out 
insurance.   
Let’s look at the first option, which is to buy improved seeds with a loan only. If the rains are good, 
after paying back the loan, you are left with R100. If the rains are low, after paying back the loan of 
R35 to the bank, you lose R35.  
Your other option is to buy the improved seeds with a loan, but to pay an extra R20 and buy 
insurance. Remember, you pay the R20 for the insurance regardless of whether the rain is good or 
low. And you get money back from the insurance company only when the rains are low.  
If you decide to buy insurance and the rains are good, after paying back the bank loan and paying for 
the insurance, you will earn R80. If you did not buy the insurance, you would have earned R100. So 
your income is lower because you spent an extra R20 on the insurance. 
Now, let’s look at what happens if you choose to buy insurance and the rains are bad. You pay R20 
for the insurance, but you get R45 back from the insurance company. So now, if the rains are bad, you 
only lose R10. But, if you had not bought the insurance, you would have lost R35.  
Let’s pretend that you decide to plant traditional seeds. You would make a tick on your answer sheet 
like this [APPROPRIATE MARK ON ANSWER SHEET]. Now let’s see what your payoff would be. 
[SPIN THE WHEEL]. OK, so the arrow landed on [blue, red] which means that the rains are [good, 
low]. This means you would earn [R10, R0].  
Let’s try another example. Let’s pretend that you decide to plant improved seeds. But you don’t want 
to buy insurance. So then you tick this option on your answer sheet – improved seeds with loan 
[APPROPRIATE MARK ON ANSWER SHEET]. Now let’s see what your payoff would be. [SPIN 
THE WHEEL]. OK, so the arrow landed on [blue, red], which means that the rains are [good, low]. 













CORRECT COLUMN IN POSTER]. If the rains had been [good, low], after paying back the loan, 
you would have [earned R100, lost R35]. 
Let’s try another example. Let’s pretend you still want to buy improved seeds, but you also want to 
buy insurance So then you tick this option on your answer sheet – improved seeds with loan and 
insurance [APPROPRIATE MARK ON ANSWER SHEET]. Now let’s see what your payoff would 
be. [SPIN THE WHEEL]. OK, so the arrow landed on [blue, red], which means that the rains are 
[good, low]. So, after paying back the loan and paying an extra R20 for insurance, you would 
[earn R80, lose R10] [POINT TO CORRECT COLUMN IN POSTER]. If the rains had been [good, 
low], after paying back the loan and paying an extra R20 for insurance, you would have [earned R80, 
lost R10]. 
So, how will the game work? You are going to make your decisions on the answer sheet. When you are 
finished, someone is going to come and collect your answer sheets. Then someone will spin the arrow 
so we know what the level of rainfall is.  
Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
Let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
On the answer sheet in front of you, please indicate whether you would like to plant traditional seeds 
or improved seeds with a loan or improved seeds with a loan and insurance. You can only pick one 
















Experiment number: _________ 
 
 Rainfall 
 Good Low 
Traditional seeds 10 0 
Improved seeds with loan 100 -35 
Improved seeds with loan & insurance 80 -10 
 
Please choose the option that you prefer from the 3 options listed below.  
Note: Only choose one option 
 
Type of seed: Your choice () 
Traditional seeds   
Improved seeds with loan   















Appendix C. CRRA parameters 
 
For comparison with other studies, table C1 reflects the bounds on r implied by subjects’ 
choices when a Constant Relative Risk Averse (CRRA) utility function (defined over the 
lottery prize) is assumed (Holt and Laury 2002, Andersen et al. 2008, Andersen et al. 2010, 
Harrison and Rutstrӧm 2008). The CRRA function is of the form U(x) = (x1−r)/(1 − r) where x 
is the lottery prize and r is the latent risk coefficient – where r = 0 indicates risk neutrality and 
r > 0 indicates risk aversion. Table C1 is interpreted as follows: highly risk averse subjects who 
selected Option 1 (safe choice) from row 1 (and therefore made 24 safe choices) reveal a CRRA 
estimate of greater than 0.572 in the 30% gamble, 0.485 in the 50% gamble and 0.541 in the 
70% gamble. Risk averse subjects who switched from Option 2 (risky choice) to Option 1 (safe 
choice) in rows 2-5 (i.e., made between 20 and 23 safe choices) reveal a CRRA interval of 
between 0.410 and 0.572 in the 30% gamble, 0.375 and 0.485 in the 50% gamble and, finally, 
0.438 and 0.541 in the 70% gamble. The proportion of subjects in each risk category is reflected 
in table C2, which confirms that the majority of participants made choices reflecting a high 













Table C1. Implied bounds of CRRA and associated risk classification   
Switching row # Safe choices 30% gamble 50% gamble 70% gamble  
10 – 13 12 – 15 0.027 < r < 0.229 0.028 < r < 0.223 0.039 < r < 0.278 Risk neutral/slightly risk averse 
6 – 9 16 – 19 0.229 < r < 0.410 0.223 < r < 0.375 0.278 < r < 0.438  
2 – 5 20 – 23 0.410 < r < 0.572 0.375 < r < 0.485 0.438 < r < 0.541 
1 24 0.572 < r 0.485 < r 0.541 < r 
 
Table C2. Proportion of subjects in each risk category    
Switching row # Safe choices 30% gamble 50% gamble 70% gamble  
10 – 13 12 – 15 12% 12% 7% Risk neutral/slightly risk averse 
6 – 9 16 – 19 18% 9% 16%  
2 – 5 20 – 23 10% 16% 4% 
1 24 51% 49% 45% 
 
 
Increasing degrees of risk 
aversion 

















In the context of applications to both mitigation and adaptation, the four papers of this thesis 
consider: (i) self-interested use of equity preferences and, more so, the impact of material 
self-interest on cooperation in the negotiating process; (ii) the effect of heterogeneous 
mitigation costs on cooperation in meeting a domestic emission reduction target; (iii) the 
relationship between risk attitudes and choice of adaptation strategy in the context of 
uncertainty around the timing and severity of climate variability; and (iv), the relationship 
between risk attitudes and adaptation when proposed adaptive strategies have uncertain 
outcomes. The results are outlined below in reference to these broad categories:      
 
(i) Self-interested use of equity preferences in multilateral climate negotiations and 
the impact of self-interest on the negotiating process  
 
The first paper of this thesis “What is fair? An experimental guide to climate negotiations” 
considers one of the negotiating challenges prevalent in multilateral climate negotiations: 
namely, the potential for self-interested use of equity principles (where individuals’ use of 
equity principles reflects material self-interest as opposed to a genuine sense of fairness). To do 
so, a threshold public good game with a climate change framing is used, where groups of 
individuals, consisting of participants from the US, EU, China, India and SA, must collectively 
meet an emission reduction target (the threshold). In the first treatment, called the own 
nationality treatment, the participants choose between various equity principles when the cost 
ranking (in terms of contributions to the public good) of each principle is made explicit for each 
of their respective nationalities.  
 
In line with the findings of other studies, choice of equity principle among American and 
Chinese players is found to be in line with material self-interest, with the majority of 
participants from both nationalities opting for burden-sharing principles that specify the 
smallest contributions to the public good of mitigation. This result, that choice of burden-
sharing principle is (at least partly) derived from material self-interest, is important in the 
context of multilateral climate negotiations where the equity principle that an agent adheres to 













Against this background, this experiment further examines the impact of self-interest on the 
negotiating process. To do so, in a second treatment, while participants must once again choose 
between the various burden-sharing principles, they do so from behind a veil of ignorance, 
where they no longer know which payoff function is applicable to them. In this treatment, the 
results indicate that both American and Chinese participants are more likely to opt for equity 
principles that specify larger contributions to the public good. Additionally, the results signal 
that the self-interested use of equity principles impedes success in meeting the specified 
threshold (in terms of the framing: the emission reduction target). While initially around 37% 
of groups met the target; this proportion increased significantly to almost 57% when 
participants selected equity preferences from behind the veil of ignorance.  
 
Within the context of ongoing climate policy, the voluntary emission reduction pledges under 
the Copenhagen Accord (a pledge and review system of voluntary emission reduction targets) 
fall far short of guaranteeing that the target of keeping temperature warming to below 2 °C will 
be met. The results of this article indicate that self-interested use of equity principles explains 
(at least in part) this gap between the voluntary pledges and scientific threshold: specifically, 
negotiators are able to make pledges that are more in line with their own material self-interest 
(and that collectively are insufficient to meet the threshold) while still legitimising their 
position through the use of equity principles. 
 
(ii) The effect of heterogeneous mitigation costs on cooperation in meeting a 
domestic emission reduction target  
 
The current model for tackling climate change is a top-down approach in terms of which 
emission reduction targets are first negotiated at multilateral climate talks and then 
implemented at a domestic level by national governments, through the formulation of climate 
policy. This implementation phase requires a diversity of groups, including businesses, rich 
and poor households, farmers, lobbyists, environmentalists and oil and mining companies, to 
work together to reduce emissions. As such, climate change mitigation is a prime example of 
a public good dilemma in which stakeholders are heterogeneous.  
 
In this context, it is not immediately clear whether individuals will be able to reach consensus 
on a contribution norm. While communication has been found to be effective in facilitating 













communication might prove to be counterproductive, emphasising dissimilarities between 
players rather than fostering cooperation. Against this background, the second paper 
“Cooperation and Climate Change: Can Communication Facilitate the Provision of 
Public Goods in Heterogeneous Settings?” uses a public good game with a climate change 
framing to examine whether groups of heterogeneous individuals can meet a collective 
emission-reduction target through individual contributions. Subjects are able to communicate 
with one another in order to determine how to distribute the abatement burden. Players differ 
in terms of their marginal contributions to the public good (or, in terms of the framing, their 
marginal costs of abatement – with players either having high or low marginal abatement 
costs).  
 
Players were urged to collectively contribute a minimum number of experimental currency 
units to the public good (again, in terms of the framing, this corresponded to meeting a national 
emission-reduction target). With the opportunity to communicate with group members, the 
proportion of groups that met the target increased from 35% to 50%. Furthermore, with the 
introduction of communication, average contributions of both player types increased 
significantly relative to the baseline treatments. Finally, the proportion of perfect co-operators 
of both player-types (players who contribute their full endowment to public good provision) 
also increased significantly with the introduction of communication.      
 
However, the results also illustrate the problem with non-binding, piecemeal agreements. Free-
riding was pervasive for both player-types in both the baseline and communication treatments; 
furthermore, the prevalence of free-riding increased significantly among players with a high 
marginal cost of abatement with the introduction of communication. As such, for both player 
types, cooperation was polarised between free-riding and perfect cooperation.  
 
Given the climate change framing and context, subjects were not provided any information 
regarding the contribution behaviour of their group members: the rationale for this being that 
in a real-world setting, emission reduction totals are often estimates, there is a lag between 
mitigation activities and reporting by authorities and institutions and reporting of emission 
reduction activities are often voluntary (as is the case currently in South Africa). In this context 
it is likely that the non-binding nature of the group consensus coupled with the extreme 
anonymity of players (i.e. no feedback on contribution behaviour was provided) underpinned 













the communication treatment) and (iii) the finding that contributions do not differ by player 
type. Ultimately, in terms of policy relevance in a climate change context, the implication is 
that anonymity needs to be stripped away, for example through mandatory reporting.  
 
Furthermore, the results indicate that while stakeholder participation is important in promoting 
cooperation, there is always the risk that free-riders will engage in participatory processes on 
the formulation of climate policy, but then thwart efforts at the implementation phase by 
reneging on an agreed-to mitigation obligation (the anonymity implicit in the design facilitated 
this). The implication is that punishment opportunities will likely play an important role in 
compelling cooperation.  
 
Relatedly, players with high marginal abatement costs were found to free-ride significantly 
more than players with low abatement costs in the communication treatment. The implication 
is that the presence of heterogeneity – which is translated within the framework of the game as 
an inequality – provides individuals with a justification to renege on an agreement. In a climate 
change context, parties to the negotiations who view themselves as unfairly disadvantaged 
might be more prone to non-compliance. Participatory processes must thus take cognisance of 
the equity contexts within which the negotiations are happening (for example, equity is an 
important subtext in multilateral climate change negotiations). 
 
(iii) Risk attitudes and choice of adaptation strategy in the context of uncertainty 
around the timing and severity of climate variability   
 
While there is now broad consensus regarding the consequences of climate change, there is 
continued uncertainty around the timing and severity of climate change impacts (IPCC 2013). 
Accordingly, responding to the risks inherent in climate change (through adaptation) involves 
decision-making under uncertainty. With this in mind, any proposed adaptation policy with 
uncertain outcomes must take into account individuals’ aversion to risk and the manner in 
which they make choices under conditions of uncertainty (Harrison et al. 2010).  
 
In this context, the third paper of this thesis, “Risk Attitudes and Adaptation: Experimental 
Evidence from a Flood-Prone Urban Informal Settlement in South Africa”, characterises 













adaptation strategy, of a sample of individuals living in a particularly flood-prone urban 
informal settlement in Cape Town.  
 
The observed risk attitudes of this low-income community and, more particularly, the 
relationship between risk attitudes and choice of adaptation strategy, are particularly interesting 
given that decisions around flood adaptation involve significant stakes. In particular, 
vulnerability to flood risk (and the financial loss and diminished wellbeing associated with 
flood damage to immovable property and possessions) are determined, in part, by choices 
regarding how to mitigate the risk of damage from flooding (in other words, choice of 
adaptation strategy). While there are a number of adaptation strategies that participants can 
implement in a bid to reduce their exposure to flood risk, there is significant variation in 
individuals’ efforts to adapt.  
 
The experiment reported in this paper replicates the design of Harrison and Rutström (2009) in 
which subjects are provided with 60 lottery tasks and, for each lottery task, choose between 
two lottery pairs. While the participants partake in either a gain, mixed or loss frame, 
endowments are used to equalise the payoffs across the frames 
 
The results signal that adaptation strategies are broadly correlated with risk attitudes. 
Specifically, the results indicate that individuals that (i) do nothing, (ii) rely solely on plastic 
sheeting or (iii) raise their homes above ground, are less risk averse relative to individuals who 
(iv) slant their roofs to assist rainwater runoff.  
 
This result implies that attempts by local authorities to encourage uptake of adaptation 
strategies must take into account risk attitudes (as opposed to assuming risk neutrality on the 
part of the decision maker). More specifically, given the level of variation in individual 
adaptation efforts, city officials might supplement ongoing education initiatives with proactive 
measures to incentivise even more risk-seeking individuals to engage with adaptation (for 
example, through the provision of a subsidy on building materials).  
 
More generally, while risk preferences are often considered within very specific contexts – for 
example in applications to addiction, the result of this study indicates that attitudes toward risk 













framework of our daily decision-making and in situations where relatively high financial stakes 
are involved.  
 
(iv) Risk attitudes and adaptation when proposed adaptive strategies have 
uncertain outcomes 
 
In addition to uncertainty around the timing and severity of climate change impacts (IPCC 
2013), proposed adaptation strategies may also have uncertain outcomes. For example, within 
a developing country context, while the adoption of new farming practices to reduce 
vulnerability to climate change impacts has the potential to engender significant yield 
improvements, these practices are also potentially more risky relative to traditional agriculture. 
Mosley and Verschoor (2005) discuss the risk-induced poverty trap: poor individuals who are 
risk averse – and thus unwilling to invest in modern inputs because of these risks – will remain 
poor, while wealthier individuals who are in a position to insulate themselves from risk will 
benefit from technological innovations. 
 
Against this background, the fourth and final paper, “Risk Preferences, Technology Adoption 
and Insurance Uptake” explores the potential for index-insurance to induce risk-averse 
individuals to opt into riskier and potentially more profitable farming practices.  
 
To disentangle the effects of credit constraints from appetite for risk, we run a series of framed 
field experiments with a sample of South African subsistence farmers. In the first treatment, 
farmers choose between traditional agriculture (framed as traditional seeds) and investing in a 
new farming input that requires them to take out a loan (framed as high-yielding seeds with a 
loan). In a subsequent treatment, farmers make this decision again, but are provided with a 
third option of investing in high-yielding seeds with a loan and rainfall insurance. We also elicit 
farmers’ risk preferences using simple lottery tasks for real monetary prizes.  
 
By omitting an insurance option from the initial treatment of the insurance games, we are able 
to examine whether the provision of the simulated insurance product induces risk-averse 
subjects to move from low risk, low return traditional agriculture to use of riskier but 
potentially more profitable high-yielding seeds. As such, we are able to assess whether the 
availability of insurance products, which reduce (but do not remove) the risks associated with 













cycle by encouraging individuals (and particularly risk-averse individuals) to opt into riskier 
but potentially more profitable farming strategies.  
 
Overall, the results of the experiment lend empirical weight to the poverty-trap argument. First, 
a high degree of risk aversion is evident among the sample. Secondly, irrespective of the level 
of production risk (the probability of good rainfall was varied at different probability levels), 
risk-averse individuals are more likely to opt into traditional agriculture (reflected as traditional 
seeds in the experiment) and are less likely to use modern farming inputs that require financing 
(high-yield varieties) irrespective of the availability of insurance.  
 
The results confirm the long-held contention in the literature that pure risk preferences are a 
determinant in farmers’ adoption decisions. However, they further indicate that index insurance 
is not a panacea when it comes to promoting technology diffusion.  
 
The insurance product in this experiment was designed to reduce the loss experienced by the 
participants in the event of crop failure, but did not remove this loss entirely, and no doubt this 
impacted the results. This design reflects the idea that index insurance does not completely 
remove production and consumption risk, but rather reduces or minimises the risk. The 
laboratory experiment reflects the reality that index insurance does not remove all risk from 
the production process; specifically, even if a particular index insurance product completely 
removed the production risk associated with rainfall variability, arguably the most important 
source of production risk for farmers in developing countries, it would not pay out for crop 
damage derived from other factors (such as pests), known as basis risk (Barrett et al. 2007). 
Thus, in order to overcome risk aversion among poor individuals stuck in the poverty cycle 
and to facilitate the uptake of insurance products, basis risk and residual production risk not 
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